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Procuring Guilty Pleas for
International Crimes: The Limited
Influence of Sentence Discounts
Nancy Amoury Combs 59 Vand. L. Rev. 69 (2006)
International tribunals prosecuting those responsible for
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes face many of the
same resource constraints that bedevil national criminal justice
systems. Consequently, international tribunals have begun to utilize
various procedural devices long used by national prosecutors to
speed case dispositions. One such procedural device is the guilty
plea. National prosecutors induce criminal defendants to plead
guilty and waive their rights to trial through a process of plea
bargaining; that is, by offering defendants sentencing concessions in
exchange for their guilty pleas. International prosecutors who seek
to engage in plea bargaining, however, face a host of impediments
unknown to domestic prosecutors. Most important of these is that
some groups of international defendants do not significantly value
the sentencing concessions that form the heart of plea bargaining in
national criminal justice systems. This Article explores the role of
sentencing discounts in the guilty-plea decisions of international
defendants, and it reveals that while sentencing discounts play the
primary role in influencing Western defendants charged with
domestic crimes to plead guilty, those same discounts often have
relatively little effect on the guilty-plea decisions of various groups of
international defendants. Indeed, whether the prospect of sentence
leniency will motivate an international defendant to plead guilty
depends on a number of eclectic and sometimes unexpected factors,
including the nature of the crime, the nature of the prosecutorial
selection process, the background of defense counsel, the status and
education of the defendants, and the defendants' cultural views
about crime and its appropriate punishment. The study in its
entirety reveals that the wholesale transplantation of plea
bargaining practices that successfully procure guilty pleas in the
context of domestic prosecutions is likely to prove inefficient and
ineffective in the context of many international prosecutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Approximately 90 percent of all American criminal cases are
disposed of by means of guilty pleas,1 and a large percentage of
defendants brought before courts in England, Australia, and other
countries that use common-law procedures likewise plead guilty.
2
Why do substantial numbers of defendants in national criminal justice
systems choose to convict themselves when they are entitled to have
their guilt formally adjudicated? The widely accepted primary reason
is that they receive sentencing discounts when they choose to self-
convict. Most defendants charged with domestic crimes plead guilty
following a process of plea bargaining between defense counsel and
prosecutors. Although plea bargaining can take many forms, 3 at its
1. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970) (relying on estimates "that
about 90%, and perhaps 95%, of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty"); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21-22 (3d ed. 2000) (observing that no more than 15% of
felony charges and only 3% to 7% of misdemeanor charges are likely to be resolved by trial);
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1012 (2000) (noting that in
modern American courtrooms guilty plea rates in the neighborhood of ninety or even ninety-five
percent are common); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979,
1993 (1992) ("[E]ighty to ninety percent of defendants currently plead guilty.").
2. See KATHY MACK & SHARYN ROACH ANLEU, PLEADING GUILTY: ISSUES AND PRACTICES 4
& n.22 (1995) (reporting that 83.5% of criminal cases in South Australia and 78% of criminal
cases at the County Court of Melbourne were resolved by guilty plea); John Willis, New Wine in
Old Bottles: The Sentencing Discount for Pleading Guilty, 13 LAW IN CONTEXT 39, 59 (1995)
(observing that the majority of Australian defendants plead guilty); ANDREW SANDERS &
RICHARD YOUNG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 396 (2000) (reporting that 82% of British cases were
disposed of by means of guilty plea); Penny Darbyshire, The Mischief of Plea Bargaining and
Sentencing Rewards, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 895, 896 (observing "that the overwhelming majority of
[English] defendants ... plead guilty"); Gail Kellough & Scot Wortley, Bail Decisions and Plea
Bargaining as Commensurate Decisions, BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 186, 188 (2002) (reporting on
surveys that "have revealed that over 90 per cent of all criminal cases [in Canada] are resolved
before trial through a negotiated plea"); JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS 1
n.1 (1979) (noting that "[m]ost defendants, both in England and in the United States," plead out).
3. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 199,
199-200 (1979) (noting that plea bargaining can involve "negotiation over sentence as distinct
from charge, over dropping all charges as distinct from reducing them, over facts as distinct from
the purely instrumental manipulation of charges [and that each form] can be implicit or
explicit"). Robert Weninger, for instance, states that "[tihe widest definition of plea
bargaining.., includes any inducements that are offered in exchange for a defendant's
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heart is a promise of some form of sentence leniency in exchange for
the defendant's guilty plea. 4 In the context of domestic crimes, then,
most defendants are understood to plead guilty primarily, if not
exclusively, in order to obtain sentence discounts, 5 and the magnitude
of the available discounts will largely determine how many guilty
pleas will be obtained.6 As the South Australian Court of Criminal
Appeal put it:
If a plea of guilty, as distinct from remorse evidenced by such a plea, cannot be regarded
as a factor in mitigation of penalty, there is no incentive, other than the demands of
honesty, for an offender to admit his guilt, and experience indicates that the demands of
honesty have but little influence on many of those who appear in the docks of criminal
courts. In most cases, if the offender has nothing to gain by admitting his guilt, he will
see no reason for doing so.
7
When the crime in question is an international crime that is
being prosecuted before an international tribunal, the question arises
whether the prospect of a sentence reduction provides defendants with
the same compelling motivation to plead guilty that it does for
defendants accused of domestic crimes. After violent upheavals left
thousands or hundreds of thousands dead in the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and East Timor, the United Nations ("UN") established
criminal tribunals to prosecute some of the international crimes that
were committed in those locations.8  These three tribunals-the
concession of criminal liability." Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case
Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265, 289-90 (1987).
4. E.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 1, at 21 (explaining that guilty pleas arise when "the
prosecution offers certain concessions in return for the defendant's entry of the plea").
5. See Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669, 675 (1980)
(attributing American guilty pleas to the expectation of sentence discounts); R. v. Jones (2000)
Q.C.A. 84, 2000 WL 1244498 (Austl.) (Davies JA) (asserting that in most cases a guilty plea "is
evidence of an expectation on the part of the offender usually as a result of legal advice that a
guilty plea will probably result in a reduced sentence"); MICHAEL ZANDER & PAUL HENDERSON,
CROWN COURT STUDY, RCCJ RESEARCH STUDY No. 19, at 146 (1993) (reporting that the majority
of British defendants who plead guilty are influenced by the expected sentencing discount); R. v.
March [2002] EWCA (Crim) 551, 2002 Crim.App. R(S) 98 (Eng.) (holding that failing to give a
defendant a sentence discount following a guilty plea would discourage guilty pleas); Willis,
supra note 2, at 71 ("Without precise and predictable benefits for pleading guilty, it is by no
means clear that defendants and their advisers will be sufficiently reassured to change their
plea."); cf. MACK & ANLEU, supra note 2, at 39 (reporting on interviews with prosecutors and
defense counsel who said that a sentence discount is an important factor motivating defendants
to plead guilty but is not always the most important factor).
6. Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 212, 235
(1979) ('The high rates of guilty pleas in the 1920s left little room for dramatic increases. In
recent years, however, prosecutors may have found it necessary to offer greater concessions
simply to keep those rates constant.").
7. R. v. Shannon (1979) 21 S.A. St. R. 451 (Austl.).
8. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
(as amended) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 & Annex (Nov. 8, 1994) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; UNTAET
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"),
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), and the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor ("Special Panels")-
have lately experienced considerable pressure to dispose of their cases
more expeditiously. To that end, international prosecutors at these
institutions have been making substantial efforts to induce defendants
to plead guilty, and, in particular, they have offered the kinds of
sentencing concessions that would prove attractive to most defendants
appearing before national courts.. These offers have in many cases
failed to induce international defendants to plead guilty, and this
failure has in some cases necessitated a greater reliance on other,
perhaps less desirable means of docket-clearing. 9
Informed by a series of personal interviews that I conducted
with international defense counsel and prosecutors, 10 this Article
analyzes efforts to obtain guilty pleas in international cases. The
Article shows that the primary reason that those efforts fail in certain
contexts is that sentencing discounts play only the most minor role, if
they play any role at all, in the guilty-plea decisions of certain groups
of international criminal defendants. Whether the prospect of
sentence leniency will in fact motivate international defendants to
plead guilty depends on a number of eclectic and sometimes
unexpected factors, including the nature of the crime, the nature of
the prosecutorial selection process, the background of defense counsel,
Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious
Criminal Offenses (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter Special Panels Statute]. Other international
criminal tribunals exist as well. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established to prosecute
international and domestic crimes that occurred during Sierra Leone's brutal eleven-year civil
war. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4168th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug.
14, 2000) (stating that "the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security in the region" and directing the UN Secretary-General to
negotiate with the government of Sierra Leone regarding the Special Court); Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, arts. 2-5, available at http://www.sc.sl.org/scsl-statute.html
[hereinafter SCSL Statute]. The UN and Cambodia have recently agreed to establish
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders, but the
Chambers have not yet begun work. See Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 1, May 22, 2003, available at
http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/justice/docs/gares57228b.pdf. The Rome Statute
establishing a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) was signed in 1998. Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. AIConf.183/9 [hereinafter Rome
Statute]. This Article does not discuss these institutions since they are not currently receiving
guilty pleas.
9. See infra notes 70-72.
10. The footnotes identify some interviewees, but many others spoke to me on condition of
anonymity. In the latter cases, if a documentary source is available, I cite it and omit any
reference to the interviews. In cases in which no documentary source is available, I cite the
interview, identifying the interviewee by pseudonymic initials.
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the status and education of the defendants, and the defendants'
cultural views about crime and its appropriate punishment. These
factors can coalesce in unforeseen ways: in the context of some large-
scale crimes, virtually no sentence reduction will be sufficient to
motivate defendants to plead guilty, while in the context of other
atrocities, no sentence reduction is necessary to motivate defendants
to plead guilty.
This Article explores the role of sentencing discounts in the
guilty-plea decisions of international defendants. The Article reveals
that although institutions currently prosecuting international crimes
are similarly structured and seek to fulfill similar mandates, dramatic
differences exist regarding the way in which defendants prosecuted
before these institutions value sentencing discounts. The views of
ICTY defendants, for instance, most resemble those of Western
defendants appearing before national criminal courts. In particular,
an ICTY defendant's expected sentence reduction appears to play a
primary role in his decision whether or not to plead guilty. By
contrast, the prospect of sentencing reductions does not appear to
significantly influence the decisions of ICTR defendants and Special
Panels defendants. Most ICTR defendants are ideologically committed
to an understanding of the Rwandan conflict that precludes their
pleading guilty to the commission of genocide, regardless of the
sentencing benefit they might obtain by doing so. Thus, prosecutorial
attempts to motivate ICTR defendants to plead guilty with the
promise of sentence reductions have been largely unsuccessful.
Special Panels defendants, by contrast, are culturally committed to a
world view that places tremendous value on confession, apology, and
reconciliation. Thus, promises of sentence reductions have been
unnecessary to persuade Special Panels defendants to plead guilty
since they are already inclined to do so. The analysis that follows
suggests that prosecutors who seek to persuade international
defendants to plead guilty must assess a multiplicity of factors and in
many cases extend their inducements beyond the traditional promise
of sentencing concessions.
Part II provides a brief description of plea bargaining in
national courts and examines in particular the relationship between
different forms of negotiation and the sentencing schemes to which
those negotiations must adapt. This examination reveals that the
effectiveness of a given form of plea bargaining depends largely on the
way in which the sentencing of crimes in that jurisdiction is
conducted; the insights of this examination are then applied to the
plea bargaining and sentencing practices prevailing at the
international tribunals. Part II ends by detailing the conventional
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
view that most Western defendants who plead guilty to domestic
crimes do so primarily to obtain sentencing concessions. Some
defendants charged with international crimes likewise plead guilty
primarily to obtain sentencing concessions; in particular, an
examination of ICTY plea bargaining and sentencing practices,
undertaken in Part III, indicates that the guilty-plea decisions of
ICTY defendants, like the decisions of defendants charged with
domestic crimes, are substantially influenced by the expectation of
sentence reductions. Ideological commitments and race-based
loyalties can serve to reduce the influence of sentencing concessions,
however, as Part IV reveals through its exploration of plea bargaining
efforts at the ICTR. Finally, through an examination of guilty-plea
practices at the Special Panels, Part V concludes the study by
illuminating the significant role that socio-economic and cultural
factors can play in encouraging or discouraging international
defendants to plead guilty. The study, in its entirety, reveals that the
wholesale transplant of plea-bargaining practices that successfully
procure guilty pleas in the context of domestic crimes is likely to prove
inefficient and ineffective in the context of many international crimes.
II. PLEA BARGAINING AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
Most guilty pleas in national criminal justice systems are
secured following a process of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining can
take a number of forms. In most cases, the bargaining is explicit; that
is, the prosecution and defense bargain openly about the concessions
the defendant is to receive. Such negotiations typically concern either
the sentence that will be imposed on the defendant (sentence
bargaining) or the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty
(charge bargaining). When engaged in sentence bargaining, the
prosecutor usually agrees to recommend that the court impose a
specific sentence or a narrow range of sentences. In jurisdictions
where sentence bargaining is practiced, courts typically sentence in
accordance with prosecutorial recommendations; 1 indeed, unless a
11. American judges, for instance, virtually always follow sentence recommendations. See
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 1, at 956 (explaining that a prosecutor may "promise a certain
sentence upon a guilty plea" and that the possibility is slight that the trial judge will not follow
his recommendations); Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1976) ("Students of the criminal courts of many American
jurisdictions have noted that judges almost automatically ratify prosecutorial charge reductions
and sentence recommendations."); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:
The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 38 ("[R]egardless of the
articulated standard, courts rarely intervene in plea agreements."). Australian judges, by
[Vol. 59:1:69
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court follows the prosecutor's recommendations in most cases, the
prosecutor will be unable to sentence bargain because the prosecutor's
recommendations are valuable only to the extent that the court
adheres to them. When engaged in charge bargaining, the prosecutor
typically agrees to dismiss certain charges-usually the most
serious-with the expectation that the defendant will receive a lower
sentence as a result. 12 Some jurisdictions additionally or alternatively
practice implicit plea bargaining, which refers to a judicial practice of
imposing lower sentences after a guilty plea than after a trial. In
those jurisdictions, no bargaining needs to take place between the
defense and prosecution; rather, defendants plead guilty on the
expectation that the court will sentence them more leniently.
13
The sort of plea bargaining that is practiced in a given
jurisdiction depends on a number of considerations, the most important
of which is the legislative scheme that governs the court's sentencing.
As discussed in more detail below, it is generally understood that
defendants accused of domestic crimes plead guilty primarily to obtain
sentencing discounts; thus, to induce such a defendant to plead guilty,
a prosecutor must be able to offer the defendant a fairly certain
sentence reduction in exchange for his guilty plea. In many
jurisdictions, the prosecutor's charging decisions enable the prosecutor
to provide defendants this certainty. In particular, charge bargaining
is apt to be effective when the criminal code (1) classifies criminal
activity into carefully delineated, distinct crimes; and (2) constrains
judicial sentencing discretion by setting forth presumptive sentencing
ranges for particular crimes. California, for example, divides criminal
homicide into murder 14 and manslaughter. 15  Murder is further
contrast, are not so inclined to sentence in accordance with prosecutorial recommendations;
consequently, sentence bargaining between prosecution and defense is less common in Australia.
MACK & ANLEU, supra note 2, at 4, 26-27.
12. E.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 1, at 956 (explaining that an "on-the-nose" guilty plea to
one charge may be exchanged for the prosecutor's agreement to drop other charges). In many
cases, the dismissed charges carry mandatory sentences higher than the range of sentences
available for the remaining charges, so the dismissal of the more serious charges necessarily
results in a reduced sentence. See id.; Michael Bohlander, Plea Bargaining Before the ICTY, in
ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 151, 151
(Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (explaining the effect of dismissal on the overall sentence).
13. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 1076 (describing implicit plea bargaining in the federal
courts); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SoC'Y REV.
247, 253 (1979) (discussing the unspoken understanding between defendants and judges that
results in defendants being better off following a guilty plea). As a British court bluntly observed:
It is "trite to say that a plea of guilty would generally attract a lighter sentence. Every defendant
should know that." R. v. Cain, [1976] Crim. L.R. 464 (Eng.). See also R. v. Boyd, (1980) 2 Cr.App.
R(S) 234 (Eng.).
14. Murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2006).
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subdivided into first-degree murder 16 and second-degree murder, 17
while manslaughter is subdivided into voluntary,'8  involuntary, 19
vehicular, 20 and gross vehicular while intoxicated. 21 Each of these
crimes is punishable by a reasonably narrow range of sentences.
Defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter, for instance, must
be sentenced to three, six, or eleven years' imprisonment, 22 while
defendants convicted of involuntary manslaughter must be sentenced
to two, three, or four years' imprisonment. 23 Thus, charge bargaining
is effective in California because defendants are guaranteed a certain
degree of certainty about their potential sentences when deciding to
plead guilty.
Charge bargaining is not as effective when it comes to
international crimes, however, because those crimes are broadly
defined and encompass a wide range of behavior. Genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes constitute the core offenses over
which the ICTY, ICTR, Special Panels, and other international
criminal bodies have jurisdiction,24 and each of these crimes can be
15. Manslaughter is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." Id.
§ 192.
16. California defines first-degree murder as including "murder which is perpetrated by
means of a destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of
ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by
any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem,
kidnapping, train wrecking, or [other acts] or any murder which is perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle
with the intent to inflict death." Id. § 189.
17. Second-degree murder is any murder that is not first-degree murder. Id.
18. Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing without malice that occurs "upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion." Id. § 192(a).
19. Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing without malice that occurs during "the
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act
which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection,"
with the exception of acts committed while driving a vehicle. Id. § 192(b).
20. Vehicular manslaughter encompasses a number of acts involving a vehicle, including
"driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, and with gross
negligence" and "driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death,
in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence." Id. § 192(c)(1).
21. Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the "unlawful killing of a human
being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation
of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate
result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross
negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act which might produce death,
in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence." Id. § 191.5(a).
22. Id. § 193(a).
23. Id. § 193(b).
24. ICTY Statute, supra note 8, arts. 2-5; ICTR Statute, supra note 8, arts. 2-5; Special
Panels Statute, supra note 8, § 1.3 (providing additionally for jurisdiction over the domestic
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committed in a multitude of ways. Persecution as a crime against
humanity, for instance, can be perpetrated by means of murder,
extermination, or torture.25 Persecution also encompasses arguably
less serious discriminatory acts involving political, social, and
economic rights,26  including those targeting property alone.
27
Consequently, two defendants convicted of persecution may have
engaged in vastly different criminal behavior. General Blagki6, for
instance, was a military commander convicted by the ICTY of
persecution for having ordered "attacks on towns and villages; murder
and serious bodily injury; the destruction and plunder of property... ;
inhuman and cruel treatment of civilians and, in particular, their
being taken hostage and used as human shields; [and] the forcible
transfer of civilians."28 By contrast, Dragan Kolundiija, who was also
convicted by the ICTY of persecution, was a comparatively lowly shift
commander in a prison camp who had only a limited ability to prevent
the mistreatment of prisoners or to improve the conditions in which
prisoners were held.29 Kolundiija did not himself mistreat anyone;
30
rather, his conviction of persecution stemmed from his continuing to act
as a shift commander despite the abuse that others perpetrated on
prisoners and the appalling conditions prevailing at the camp.
Similarly, disparate acts or omissions can form the basis of other
international crimes. A defendant convicted of genocide, for instance,
might be responsible for a handful of murders or tens of thousands of
murders.
Perhaps because they must impose appropriate sentences for
crimes encompassing vastly differing levels of culpability, international
judges are given almost limitless discretion in sentencing. The statutes
offenses of murder, sexual offenses and torture); Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 5 (bestowing on
the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide and, if certain
conditions are met, over aggression); SCSL Statute, supra note 8, arts. 2-5 (authorizing the
Special Court for Sierra Leone to exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes
and certain violations of Sierra Leonean law).
25. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 349 (May 15, 2003).
26. Prosecutor v. Kupregki6 et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 615 (Jan. 14, 2000)
[hereinafter Kupregkik Judgment].
27. Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-94-14-T, Judgment, 233 (Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter
Blagkik Judgment]. The ICTY has been careful to instruct, however, that "not every denial of a
human right" can constitute persecution as a crime against humanity. Kupregkik Judgment,
supra note 26, T 618. It has defined persecution as "the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory
grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching
the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [of the ICTY Statute]," which
addresses crimes against humanity. Id. 621.
28. Blagkik Judgment, supra note 27, at Disposition.
29. Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Case No. IT-95-8-T, Sentencing Judgment, T 210 (Nov. 13,
2001) [hereinafter Sikirica Sentencing Judgment].
30. Id. TT 202, 204, 229.
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and procedural rules of the ICTY and the ICTR, for instance, instruct
judges to take into account various factors when sentencing, including
the gravity of the offense and the individual circumstances of the
defendant, 31 the general practice regarding prison sentences in the
courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 32 But that is the extent of
the guidance provided to-or the constraints imposed upon-the Trial
Chambers. The statutes and the rules do not provide any instruction
as to the relative "gravity" of the various offenses within the
Tribunals' jurisdictions,33 nor do they indicate which "individual
circumstances" might be relevant to sentencing or how they might be
relevant. Further, although the statutes and rules require the Trial
Chambers to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, they
fail to delineate any aggravating circumstances, and they make
mention of only one mitigating circumstance: "substantial cooperation
with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after
conviction." 34  Judges at other international tribunals possess
similarly broad discretion in sentencing. 35
31. ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 24(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 8, art. 23(2).
32. ICTY R.P. & EVID. R. 101(B)(i)-(iii) (2004); ICTR R.P. & EVID. R. 101(B)(i)-(iii) (2004).
For a critical analysis of that provision, see William A. Schabas, Sentencing By International
Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461, 480 (1997). The ICTY
and ICTR have not held themselves bound by the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia
or Rwanda. See Prosecutor v. Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 813 (Feb. 20, 2001);
Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Reasons for Judgment, 30 (Apr. 6, 2000)
(observing that the Trial Chamber is obliged only to take account of the sentencing practices in
Rwanda).
33. For a discussion of the ICTY's and ICTR's views on the relative gravity of various
offenses, see Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in International
Criminal Law, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 583 (2002) (examining whether the same act should be
punished more severely when charged as a crime against humanity rather than as a war crime);
see also Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal
Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 420 (arguing that "contrary to the current practice of the
ICTY, judges sentencing defendants convicted of violations of international law should consider
the elements of the chapeau in evaluating the harm caused by the defendants' acts").
34. ICTY R.P. & EVID. R. 101(B)(ii); ICTR R.P. & EVID. R. 101(B)(ii).
35. Judges of the Special Panels, for instance, are likewise instructed to consider in
sentencing "such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the
convicted person." Special Panels Statute, supra note 8, § 10.2. Judges of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone are also directed to consider the gravity of the offense and the defendant's
individual circumstances, and they are instructed in addition to "have recourse to the practice
regarding prison sentences in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the national
courts of Sierra Leone." SCSL Statute, supra note 8, arts. 19(1) & (2). Special Court for Sierra
Leone judges must also consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances; like the Statutes of
the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court Statute identifies no aggravating circumstances and only
one mitigating circumstance: substantial cooperation with the prosecution. SCSL Statute, supra
note 8, art. 6(4).
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Whether broadly defined crimes coupled with wide sentencing
discretion result in equitable punishment is open to debate. What is
not debatable, however, is that broadly defined crimes coupled with
wide sentencing discretion impede a prosecutor's ability to promise the
defendant a certain benefit with an offer to withdraw charges. In other
words, because international judges have such wide sentencing
discretion, and the crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction are so
broadly defined and so grave, a prosecutorial promise to withdraw a few
charges here and there often will fail to provide a defendant adequate
certainty that he is getting appropriate consideration-or any
consideration at all-for his guilty plea. So long as the remaining
charges are sufficiently serious, a Trial Chamber may well sentence a
defendant to the same term of imprisonment to which he would have
been sentenced had he not pled guilty. So, while a California defendant
can plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter instead of voluntary
manslaughter and be assured of a sentence reduction, a Tribunal
defendant who admits to murder as a crime against humanity instead
of the more serious extermination as a crime against humanity can be
assured of nothing.
Charge bargaining can be effective in the international realm,
then, only if the prosecution is willing to withdraw charges in a way
that would fundamentally alter either the legal or the factual
description of the criminal conduct. That sort of bargaining has
virtually never occurred at the international tribunals.36 By and large,
international prosecutors seeking to secure guilty pleas have focused
their efforts not on charge bargaining but on sentence bargaining and
implicit bargaining, as will be discussed in the following Parts.
Whatever forms of plea bargaining are practiced in a particular
jurisdiction, the end goal of each is the same: to provide the defendant
a sentencing discount as a means of convincing him to enter a guilty
plea. Plea bargaining in national criminal justice systems, then, is
premised on the assumption that defendants consider the offer of a
sentencing discount to be a compelling inducement. The very fact that
such high percentages of defendants charged with domestic crimes do
choose to plead guilty upon the offer of sentencing discounts seems to
prove the point. As Frank Easterbrook put it: "Defendants
presumably prefer the lower sentences to the exercise of their trial
rights or they would not strike the deals."37  Indeed, American
academics have constructed sophisticated economic models to predict
36. For a comprehensive treatment of ICTY charge bargaining, see NANCY AMOURY COMBS,
GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 2006).
37. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES
299, 309 (1983).
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whether an acceptable plea bargain will exist in certain situations,
and these models are predicated on the assumption that defendants
seek to minimize their incarceration time.38  Richard Adelstein
asserts, for instance, that "the defendant will agree to a guilty plea if
he perceives the cost of the sentence received upon the plea as less
than the expected disutility of the trial prospect and its associated
sentence."
39
Whether or not most American defendants engage in precise
calculations of conviction likelihood and sentencing possibilities,
empirical evidence suggests that they do plead guilty largely because
they expect to receive a sentence discount for doing so. Only a few
American jurisdictions have made any attempt to prohibit prosecutors
from offering sentencing concessions to defendants, 40 but those that
did so have experienced a sharp decline in their percentage of cases
disposed of by means of guilty pleas. In 1975, for instance, Alaska's
Attorney General prohibited his prosecutors from offering defendants
charging or sentencing concessions. 41 Defendants convicted at trial
continued to receive longer sentences than defendants who pled
guilty, 42 so implicit plea bargaining persisted. Although the
prohibition on charging and sentencing concessions did not cause as
dramatic an increase in trial rates as many had expected, probably
because implicit plea bargaining continued,43  it did cause a
substantial increase. In Anchorage, for instance, trials increased by
about 97 percent following the plea-bargaining ban. 44 At about the
same time that Alaska instituted its ban, the District Attorney in El
Paso County, Texas likewise banned both charging and sentencing
38. See, e.g., William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61
(1971) (describing the basic behavior assumptions of the prosecutor and accused in Landes's
theoretical model); Edward A. Ruttenberg, Plea Bargaining Analytically-The Nash Solution to
the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 330, 334 (1979) (examining the assumptions required to
construct a "synthesized model of plea bargaining').
39. Richard P. Adelstein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework for Analysis, 53 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 783, 809 (1978).
40. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 752 (1996) ("Calls for the abolition of plea bargaining have been heard and ignored for more
than twenty-five years.").
41. Michael L. Rubenstein & Teresa J. White, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 367, 367 (1979).
42. Teresa White Carns & John A. Kruse, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining Reevaluated, 75
JUDICATURE 310, 311-12 (1992).
43. See Rubenstein & White, supra note 41, at 380 & n. 18 (describing the concern of defense
counsel that, if they took a hopeless case to trial, the "convicted client would have to pay the bill
in the end, perhaps in the form of a longer sentence").
44. Id. at 374.
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negotiations in felony cases. 45 As in Alaska, implicit bargaining
continued because guilty-plea defendants received shorter sentences
than jury-trial defendants. 46  The implicit bargaining was not
sufficient to maintain the guilty-plea rates that existed prior to the
plea bargaining ban; rather, the proportion of cases disposed of by
trial almost doubled, and in three years' time, the criminal case docket
had increased by 250 percent, causing delays and straining
resources. 47 As these examples suggest, sentencing discounts matter
to American defendants. Without them, most American defendants
will proceed to trial.
Empirical studies likewise indicate that a substantial
proportion of defendants in the United Kingdom also plead guilty so as
to obtain sentencing concessions. 48 To encourage guilty pleas English
laws not only require judges to consider a defendant's guilty plea in
sentencing,49 but also require judges to announce when they have
discounted the defendant's sentence. 50 Similarly, some Australian
judges were disturbed because a substantial proportion of defendants
declined to tender early guilty pleas or declined to plead guilty at all
because they were uncertain as to what, if any, sentencing discount
they would receive. In response, the judges began establishing
guidelines for sentence reductions in guilty-plea cases and have begun
informing defendants as to what discount they have in fact received. 51
To the same end, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice in the
United Kingdom recommended providing defendants with a reliable
early indication of the maximum sentence they will receive after
pleading guilty as a means of encouraging early guilty pleas. 52 The
45. Weninger, supra note 3, at 275-76. See generally Sam W. Callan, An Experience in
Justice Without Plea Negotiation, 13 LAW & SOC Y REV. 327 (1979).
46. Weninger, supra note 3, at 295. A 1975 study of the attempt to eliminate plea
bargaining in Black Hawk County, Iowa, also found that implicit plea bargaining remained
following attempts to eliminate plea bargaining. Note, The Elimination of Plea Bargaining in
Black Hawk County: A Case Study, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1053, 1064 n.110 (1975).
47. Weninger, supra note 3, at 277-78.
48. C. Hedderman & D. Moxon, Magistrates' Court or Crown Court? Mode of Trial Decisions
and Sentencing, in 125 HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 32 (1992) (U.K.); see also SANDERS &
YOUNG, supra note 2, at 414.
49. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, art. 144(1) (Eng.).
50. Id. art. 174(2)(d). Few judges inform the defendant of the sentence he would have
received had he gone to trial, however. RALPH HENHAM, SENTENCE DISCOUNTS AND THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS 18-20 (2001).
51. See R. v. Thomson & Houlton (2000) 49 N.S.W.L.R. 383, 1 21-22, 109, 135, 148-152
(Austl.) (holding that New South Wales courts should follow the practice of other courts and
announce the sentencing discount bestowed on the defendant as a result of his guilty plea, and
setting the discount at between 10 and 25%).
52. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 112-13 (1993) (Runciman
Commission). But see SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 422 (opining that "[a] statement that
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Scottish High Court of Justiciary concurred in this approach,
observing that a Scottish statute that requires a judge to take account
of a guilty plea in sentencing "is not likely to give encouragement to
pleas of guilty unless accused persons and their legal representatives
have some assurance as to the allowance which the court is likely to
make."53 The sentencing judgments of appellate courts in the United
Kingdom are similarly premised on the assumption that defendants
plead guilty in order to obtain sentencing concessions. So as not to
discourage subsequent defendants from pleading guilty, appellate
courts routinely reduce sentences when they determine that the trial
court gave the defendant insufficient credit for pleading guilty.
54
Indeed, one Court of Appeal went so far as to state that the law
required the sentencing judge to give the defendant some sentencing
reduction for a guilty plea no matter how strong the prosecution's case
may be.5
5
The offer of sentencing concessions, then, is routine in nations
that use guilty pleas 56 because it is effective in inducing a substantial
portion of criminal defendants in those nations to plead guilty. Its
effectiveness stems largely from the fact that the criminal defendants
in question value the sentencing concessions they expect to receive
more than they value the trial rights that a guilty plea requires them
to forego. How tempting an inducement a sentencing discount will be
depends of course on the magnitude of the discount and the likelihood
of conviction following a trial. But the premise underlying the practice
of plea bargaining-that sentencing concessions substantially
influence defendants' guilty-plea decisions-appears to be sound in
the context of national prosecutions. It is also sound in the context of
some international prosecutions. The following Part will explore the
guilty-plea decisions of defendants charged with international crimes
on a plea of guilty [the judge] would impose one sentence but that on a conviction following a
plea of not guilty he would impose a severer sentence is one which should never be made").
53. Du Plooy v. H.M. Advocate, High Court of Justiciary, [2003] S.L.T. 1237, 2003 WL
22257793 (Scot.).
54. See, e.g., R. v. Marsh, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 465, 2004 Crim.App. R(S) 80 (Eng.)
(reducing sentence from ten years' imprisonment to eight years' imprisonment); R. v. McKeown,
[2004] EWCA (Crim) 461 (Eng.) (reducing sentence from two-and-one-half years' imprisonment
to two years' imprisonment); R. v. Buffrey, [1992] 14 Cr.App. R(S) 511 (Eng.) (reducing sentence
from five years' imprisonment to four years' imprisonment); R. v. Skilton & Blackham, (1982) 4
Cr.App. R(S) 339 (Eng.) (reducing robbery sentence from five years' imprisonment to three-and-
one-half years' imprisonment); R. v. Boyd, [1980] 2 Cr.App. R(S) 234 (Eng.) (reducing burglary
sentence from three years' imprisonment to two years' imprisonment).
55. See R. v. Fearon, (1996) 2 Cr.App. R(S) 25 (Eng.).
56. Guilty pleas are most commonly available in the criminal justice systems of Anglo-
American countries that utilize adversarial criminal procedures. Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping
a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 PENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
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in the former Yugoslavia and will reveal that these defendants, like
defendants charged with domestic crimes, find sentencing discounts to
be a compelling enticement.
III. THE SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE OF SENTENCING DISCOUNTS IN
INTERNATIONAL CASES: GUILTY PLEAS AT THE ICTY
War broke out in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in 1991, when many of its constituent republics sought
independence. 57 While the secessions of Croatia and Slovenia were
followed by only short-lived armed conflicts, the fighting between the
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina was fierce and
protracted. 5 The war in Bosnia resulted in approximately 200,000
deaths,59 approximately 20,000 rapes,60 the forced relocation of more
than two million people,61 and the "reappearance of concentration
camps on European soil."62 In 1993, the UN Security Council
determined that the situation constituted a "threat to international
peace and security" and established the ICTY to prosecute those
accused of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and
violations of the laws and customs of war in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia after January 1, 1991.63
Plea bargaining was not practiced during the early years of the
ICTY and indeed was considered by many to be a distasteful and
unnecessary procedural device. The practice was considered
unnecessary because so few defendants were in the dock during the
57. Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, T 9-10 (Aug. 2, 2001) [hereinafter
Krsti6 Judgment]. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 25-63 (1996); STEVEN L. BURG
& PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION 3-127 (1999).
58. See Krsti6 Judgment, supra note 57, 7-10 (explaining the history of the region, its
ethnic composition, and the ensuing conflict).
59. Rosemary E. Libera, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for Wartime
Damages, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 293 (2001).
60. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 52 (1997); Makau Matua, Savages, Victims, and
Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 223 (2001).
61. 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA xiii (1995); cf. Lynn Hastings,
Implementation of the Property Legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 221
(2001) (stating that ethnic cleansing during the war "deprived millions of Bosnian citizens of
their homes").
62. Developments in the Law-Introduction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1953 (2001); see also
SCHARF, supra note 60, at 31-32 (describing reports of ethnic cleansing received by the United
States, Britain, and France in 1991).
63. ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 1.
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Tribunal's early years 64 that prosecutors had little need to expedite
proceedings. The practice was considered distasteful for two reasons:
first, because many ICTY prosecutors hailed from civil-law countries
where plea bargaining is not widely practiced, and second, because the
very magnitude of the international crimes at issue made the sort of
back-room negotiations that characterize the plea bargaining of less
serious domestic crimes seem entirely inappropriate. During the
ICTY's procedural rulemaking process, for instance, the United States
proposed granting defendants full or partial testimonial immunity in
exchange for their cooperation. The proposal was rejected, 65 with
then-ICTY President Cassese stating: "The persons appearing before us
will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton
destruction, persecution and other inhuman acts. After due reflection,
we have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for
crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may
otherwise be." 
66
The landscape has changed markedly since those early days.
Now, at the same time that a record number of ICTY defendants await
trial, 67 the UN Security Council, unhappy with the ever-increasing
64. During its first two years of existence, the ICTY had no defendants in custody. Dugko
Tadi6 was not transferred to the ICTY until 1995, and another year passed before any other
indictees were transferred. Kelly Dawn Askin, The ICTY.- An Introduction to its Origins, Rules and
Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK
MCDONALD 13, 15-16 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001). The NATO peace-keeping force stationed in
Bosnia initially was not instructed to arrest Tribunal indictees. See THEODOR MERON, WAR
CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 281 (1998); Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the
Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS.
Q. 737, 795-96 (1998) (discussing the international community's "unwilling[ness] to make the
sacrifices necessary to arrest indicted persons"); Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Reflections on the
Contributions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 24 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 160 (2001). It was not until mid-1997 that the UN force in Croatia
and then NATO in Bosnia began detaining indictees. Id. at 161.
65. See Prosecuting and Defending Violations of Genocide and Humanitarian Law: The
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 88 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 239, 248 (1994)
(remarks of Steven J. Lepper) ("Among the suggestions rejected by the Tribunal was our thought
that some sort of immunity or plea-bargaining mechanism should be instituted.").
66. SCHARF, supra note 60, at 67.
67. The UN Detention Center is "almost at full capacity," now holding more than sixty
defendants, a record number. See Record Number of Detainees in The Hague, SENSE NEWS
AGENCY, Apr. 6, 2004. Even today, however, the ICTY frequently fails to receive adequate
cooperation from the States of the former Yugoslavia. See ICTY Office of the Prosecutor Press
Release, Address by Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia to the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. CDP/P.I.S./917-e, (Nov. 23,
2004) ('The first obstacle is the lack of co-operation of States, mainly in the arrest and transfer of
persons indicted by the ICTY."). Nevertheless, an increasing number of defendants began to be
transferred to the UN Detention Center after the United States and European governments
exerted substantial economic and political pressure to achieve that result. See Human Rights
Watch, Real Progress in The Hague, Mar. 29, 2005, available at http:/lhrw.org/englishdocs
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budgets of the ICTY and ICTR,68 is pressuring both Tribunals to
complete their trials within the next few years. 69 To comply with
these demands, both the ICTY and the ICTR have drastically reduced
the number of investigations they planned to conduct, 70 and the
Tribunals have made plans to transfer some of their cases to national
/2005/03/29/serbialO386.htm. Indeed, Serbia agreed to transfer Slobodan Milogevi6 to the ICTY
for trial only after the United States threatened to withhold approximately $500,000 in aid. Jack
Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (2003).
68. In 2004, the ICTY's two-year budget totaled nearly $273 million. The ICTY at a Glance,
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). The ICTR's 2004-2005
budget totaled more than $227 million. ICTR General Information, http://www.ictr.org
/default.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
69. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 4817th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28,
2003) (requesting that the Tribunals take all possible measures to complete investigations by
2004); S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. SCOR, 4935th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004) (calling on
the Tribunals to "complete all work in 2010"); see also ICTY Press Release, Judge Claude Jorda,
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Reports on the
Continued Non-Cooperation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. JDHIP.I.S./706-e, Oct. 23, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p706-e.htm
(then-ICTY President Jorda noting that the Security Council "expressly mandated us to
concentrate our work on the trial of the main civilian, military, and paramilitary leaders, in
particular, so as to be able to complete our trial activities by around 2008"); ICTY Press Release,
Address by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, Mrs. Carla Del Ponte, to the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc.
JJJIP.I.S/709-e, Oct. 30, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressrealp709-e.htm
(referring to "the completion strategy targets and the deadlines expected of us") [hereinafter Del
Ponte 2002 Address].
70. See Del Ponte 2002 Address, supra note 69 ("I have drastically prioritised our
investigative objectives, for both Tribunals, and further focused our efforts on 'the main civilian,
military and paramilitary leaders' so that we can now reasonably expect to fulfil the essence of
our prosecution missions for both Tribunals by the end of 2004."); Report of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Summary
6, U.N. Doc. A/57/150 (Aug. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ICTY 2002 Annual Report] (noting the ICTY's
efforts to further "focus ... [its] mission on trying those crimes which most seriously violate
international public order"). For a discussion of the ICTR's reduction in investigations, see Letter
dated 30 April 2004 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible
for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States
between 1 January and 31 December 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2004/341, 6, 30 (May 3, 2004) (detailing the revised completion strategy of the
ICTR); Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc.
S/20031946, Enclosure, September 29, 2003 (reducing the overall number of investigations for the
ICTR); Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994,
U.N. Doc. A57/163-S/2002/733, 9 (July 2, 2002) ('The Prosecutor has revised her future
investigation programme from the originally estimated number of 136 new suspects and will now
only conduct investigations against 14 new individuals together with 10 ongoing
investigations."); ICTR Press Release, ICTR President Calls for Compensation for Victims,
ICTR/INFO-9-2-326.EN (Oct. 31, 2002) (same).
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courts in the Balkans 71 and Rwanda. 72  In addition, Tribunal
prosecutors began to make a concerted effort to dispose of their cases
by means of guilty pleas. Initially, at the ICTY, these efforts proved
remarkably successful: eight of the record fifteen defendants convicted
at the ICTY in 2003 convicted themselves.73 Only one ICTY defendant
71. Both Tribunals added a provision to their procedural rules, permitting them to transfer
their cases to national courts for prosecution. See ICTR Press Briefing, ICTRIINFO-9-13-22.EN
(July 8, 2002), available at http://www.ictr/org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/pressbrief/2002/brief9-13-
22.htm (describing new Rule 11 bis); ICTY Press Release, Extraordinary Plenary Session of 30
September 2002, U.N. Doc. JDH/PIS/696e (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
pressrelp696-e.htm (same); ICTY 2002 Annual Report, supra note 70, 42; ICTY Press Release,
Address by his Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. JDH/P.I.S./690-e
(July 26, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p690-e.htm; see also Mark A.
Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across: The ICTY's Place in the International Legal Order, 37
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 701 (2003) (describing the plan to transfer defendants to Bosnian courts).
The ICTY prosecution has recently sought permission from the Trial Chambers to transfer some
cases to the courts of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stankovi6, Case No. IT-
96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis (May 17, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Jankovi6, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis (July 22,
2005); Prosecutor v. Kovacevi6, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Order on the Prosecutor's Request for
Referral to National Authorities Under Rule 11 bis (Jan. 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac,
Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Order for Further Information in the Context of the Prosecutor's Request
under Rule 11 bis (Jan. 20, 2005).
72. The ICTR has already transferred the twenty-five case files to Rwanda. See Rwanda:
UN Tribunal Hands More Cases to National Authorities, IRINNEWS.ORG, July 27, 2005,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48321&SelectRegion=Great-Lakes&SelectCountr
y=RWANDA (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); see also Letter dated 30 April 2004 from the President
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide
and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/341, 36-38 (May 3, 2004) (reporting
that the ICTR prosecutor intends to transfer forty-one cases in total); International Bar
Association, Rwanda: Government to Take Over More War Crimes Prosecutions, LEGAL BRIEF
AFRICA, Mar. 14, 2005; Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
U.N. Doc. S/2003/946, Enclosure at 23 (Sept. 29, 2003); ICTR NEWSLETTER, June 2004, at 5
('The Prosecutor has identified 41 cases which he intends to transfer to Rwanda and other
national jurisdictions for adjudication."); UN War Crimes Court Close to Deal with Rwanda on
Transferring Cases, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 13, 2004.
73. The four trials that the ICTY did conduct led to the conviction of seven defendants. See
Prosecutor v. Simi6 et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment (Oct. 17, 2003) (Blagoje Simic, Miroslav
Tadi6, and Simo Zari6); Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment (July 31, 2003)
(Milomir Staki6); Prosecutor v. Naletili6 & Martinovi6, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment (Mar. 31,
2003) (Mladen Naletili6 and Vinko Martinovi6); Prosecutor v. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T,
Judgment (Dec. 5, 2003) (Stanislav Gali6). In addition, guilty pleas were tendered by eight
others: Predrag Banovi6, Prosecutor v. Meaki6 et al., Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Joint Motion for the
Consideration of a Plea Agreement Between Predrag Banovi6 and the Office of the Prosecutor,
Annex 1 (June 18, 2003) [hereinafter Banovi6 Plea Agreement]; Momir Nikoli6, Prosecutor v.
Momir Nikoli6, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement
Between Momir Nikoli6 and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex A, Amended Plea Agreement
(May 7, 2003) [hereinafter Momir Nikoli6 Plea Agreement]; Dragan Obrenovi6, Prosecutor v.
Dragan Obrenovi6, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement
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has pled guilty since January 2004, 74 however, and the proliferation of
guilty pleas in 2003 and their abrupt drop-off in 2004 appear directly
related to the sentencing practices of the ICTY Trial Chambers in
guilty-plea cases. More particularly, ICTY defendants were willing to
plead guilty when they were able to bargain for and receive relatively
lenient sentences in exchange for their guilty pleas. But they stopped
pleading guilty when they lost confidence that they would be
sentenced in accordance with the bargains that they had negotiated.
In most guilty-plea cases, the ICTY prosecution and defense
agree on a sentence or a narrow range of sentences to recommend to
the Trial Chamber. As the following Sections will reveal, before
December 2003, this method of plea bargaining proved an effective
means of inducing defendants to plead guilty because the Trial
Chambers had never imposed a sentence longer than that which the
prosecution recommended. Sentencing in accordance with
prosecutorial recommendations proved uncontroversial because, in the
early days of ICTY sentence bargaining, prosecutors offered only
modest concessions to defendants pleading guilty; they were so modest
in fact that, in some cases, it was not clear that there existed any
sentencing differential between a conviction after trial and a conviction
after a guilty plea. In contrast, the sentence recommendations
negotiated more recently have been far more lenient. They have been
so lenient, in fact, that some Trial Chambers have refused to sentence
in accordance with them. The following Sections will detail the ICTY's
early guilty pleas, the evolution that has taken place both in the
prosecution's efforts to obtain guilty pleas and the Trial Chambers'
response to those efforts, and the chilling effect of the Trial Chambers'
sentencing on the willingness of ICTY defendants to plead guilty.
A. The ICTY's Early Guilty Pleas: Limited Benefits for Defendants
The first two ICTY defendants to enter guilty pleas did so
without engaging in plea bargaining. The first defendant to plead
Between Dragan Obrenovi6 and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex A, Plea Agreement (May 20,
2003) [hereinafter Obrenovi6 Plea Agreement]; Dragan Nikolid, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolik,
Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, 35 (Dec. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Dragan Nikolid
Sentencing Judgment]; Darko Mrda, Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing
Judgment, 4 (Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Mrda Sentencing Judgment], Miodrag Joki6,
Prosecutor v. Joki6, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 7-11 (Mar. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter Joki6 Sentencing Judgment]; Miroslav Deronji6, Prosecutor v. Deronjid, Case No. IT-
02-61-PT, Plea Agreement (Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Deronji6 Plea Agreement]; and Ranko
Jegik, Prosecutor v. Cegik, Case No. 95-10/1-PT, Plea Agreement (Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Cegik
Plea Agreement].
74. Miroslav Bralo pled guilty in July 2005. Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-PT, Plea
Agreement, 9 (July 18, 2005).
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guilty, Draien Erdemovi6, was a foot soldier in the Bosnian Serb army
who participated in the Bosnian Serbs' July 1995 massacre of
approximately 7,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica. Erdemovi6
brought himself and his crimes to the attention of the ICTY in 1996 and
immediately pled guilty to crimes against humanity without any offer of
leniency. 75 Goran Jelisi6, the next ICTY defendant to plead guilty,
proffered his guilty plea over the objections of his lawyers and received
no concessions therefor.7 6 Stevan Todorovi6 pled guilty in December
2000, and his case was seemingly the first to feature sentence
bargaining. As a consequence of this bargaining, Todorovi6 did obtain
what seemed at the time to be substantial sentencing concessions, but
the bestowal of these concessions can be explained, at least in part, by
the unusual circumstances surrounding his arrest. Todorovi6 was
appointed Police Chief of Bosanski Samac during the Bosnian conflict,
and as such, he participated in the take-over of the municipality and in
the deportation and detention of the non-Serb population. 77 After he
was indicted, Todorovi6 was allegedly arrested by means of kidnapping
and delivered to NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina ("SFOR"). 78 He
consequently challenged the legality of his arrest, and, in doing so,
obtained an order from the Trial Chamber requiring SFOR and the
States participating in SFOR to provide Todorovi6 with wide-ranging
and potentially embarrassing information about his arrest.79 NATO
and the United States, among other States, vehemently objected to the
order; thus, it did not come as a particular surprise when the
prosecution offered Todorovi6 a generous sentencing recommendation to
75. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 3, 6, 10 (Nov. 29,
1996) [hereinafter Erdemovi6 Sentencing Judgment]. For a thorough discussion of the Erdemovi6
case, see Combs, supra note 56, at 109-14.
76. See Combs, supra note 56, at 117. For a thorough discussion of the Jelisi4 case, see id. at
115-17.
77. Prosecutor v. Todorovi6, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Sentencing Judgment, 35, 42, 45 (July
31, 2001) [hereinafter Todorovi6 Sentencing Judgment].
78. See Major Christopher M. Supernor, International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals:
Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice, 50 A.F.L. REV. 215, 217 n.ll (2001); Marlise Simmons,
War Crimes Court Takes It Easy on a Cooperative Bosnian Serb, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at A4
(reporting that the method of Todorovi6's arrest set his case apart from others and was a difficult
issue for the court to handle). A regional court in Serbia subsequently convicted nine people of
"kidnapping for money." 9 Convicted of Kidnap of War-Crimes Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2000, at A15; see also Prosecutor v. Todorovi6, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript at 786 (Dec. 13,
2000) (detailing the defense counsel's discussion of Todorovid's capture and his captors'
subsequent prosecution).
79. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating To International
Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 387, 401 (2001).
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secure both his guilty plea and the withdrawal of his troublesome
challenge to his arrest.
8 0
The prosecution's recommended sentences for the next four
defendants to plead guilty, by contrast, did not seem significantly lower
than the sentences which likely would have been imposed after trials.
In the Sikirica case, for instance, the defendants were Dugko Sikirica,
Commander of Security at the infamous Keraterm prison camp, and
Damir Dogen and Dragen Kolund~ija, two of Keraterm's shift
commanders.8 1 Keraterm detainees were kept in appalling conditions
and were regularly beaten and killed by guards and by outsiders given
entry by guards.8 2 After the trial was mostly completed, all three
defendants pled guilty to persecution as a crime against humanity,
admitting to varying levels of culpability. The persecution count
alleged persecution by five methods: (a) murder; (b) torture and beating;
(c) sexual assault and rape; (d) harassment, humiliation, and
psychological abuse; and (e) confinement in inhumane conditions.8
3
Sikirica acknowledged participating in all of those methods and
admitted to personally killing one detainee;8 4 Dogen admitted to
participating in (b), (d), and (e);8 5 and Kolundiija admitted only to (e).
8 6
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecution recommended
sentences of between ten and seventeen years' imprisonment for
80. Todorovi6 pled guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against humanity for
murdering one person, beating twelve others, ordering and participating in the unlawful
detention of non-Serb civilians, ordering subordinates to torture and interrogate detainees, and
ordering six men to perform fellatio on one another on three different occasions. Todorovi6
Sentencing Judgment, supra note 77, 9. In Todorovi6's plea agreement, the prosecution and
defense each agreed to recommend sentences of between five and twelve years' imprisonment. Id.
11. The prosecution recommended a twelve year sentence, and the Trial Chamber sentenced
him to ten years' imprisonment. Id. 115. At Todorovi6's sentencing hearing, the prosecution
opined that, had Todorovi6 been convicted at trial, he probably would have been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment ranging from fifteen to twenty-five years or more. Prosecutor v. Todorovi6,
Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript at 55 (May 4, 2001) (on file with author).
81. Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Case No. IT-95-8-T, Sentencing Judgment, TT 118, 153, 200
(Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica Sentencing Judgment].
82. See id. 9 56-57, 62-65, 66-83 (describing conditions in the Keraterm camp);
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 159 (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor
v. Banovi6, Case No. IT-02-65-1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 27 (Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Banovi6 Sentencing Judgment] ("Keraterm authorities, as well as 'visitors', regularly subjected
the detainees to severe beatings and cruel and humiliating treatment, and many were killed.").
83. Sikirica Sentencing Judgment, supra note 81, T 18.




Sikirica, between five and seven years' imprisonment for Dogen, and
between three and five years' imprisonment for Kolundija.8
7
Since the Sikirica guilty pleas did not occur until the trial was
nearly completed, the prosecution did not save much time or resources
through the guilty pleas, and one can presume that the prosecution
consequently was not willing to offer as generous concessions to the
Sikirica defendants as it would have to defendants who pled guilty
before the trial began. That said, the Sikirica bargain is nonetheless
notable in how little it seemed to provide the defendants. Although
some of the relevant circumstances were different,88 the ICTY had
earlier sentenced Zlatko Aleksovski, a Croatian prison camp
commander, to a mere two-and-one-half-year prison sentence after
trial,8 9 which the Appeals Chamber subsequently increased to seven
years' imprisonment. 90 As another example, Hazim Deli6, Deputy
Commander of the Celebii prison camp, was convicted of brutally
murdering two detainees, raping and torturing two more, and torturing
numerous others, some by means of an electric shock device.91 Deli6
received a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment after trial, 92 which
was reduced after appeal to eighteen years' imprisonment;93 that is,
after a full-blown trial, Deli6 received a sentence only slightly higher
than the prosecution's maximum recommendation for Sikirica, for
crimes apparently involving greater harm. Similarly, Dragoljub Prcac
was an administrative aide at the notorious Omarska camp.94 Prcac,
like Kolundija, held a position of authority in a brutal detention center
but was not convicted of inflicting any direct harm.95 Without pleading
guilty, Prcac was sentenced to five years' imprisonment;96 that is, Prcac
received a sentence at the upper end of the prosecution's sentencing
recommendation for Kolundija.
87. Id. 25, 31, 37. The prosecution recommended the maximum sentence for each
defendant. Id. 42; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Transcript at 5687 (Oct. 8, 2001)
(on file with author).
88. Among other things, the conditions prevailing in the Keraterm camp seemed to be
worse than those at the Kaonik prison, at which Aleksovski was a commander. See generally
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment (Mar. 24, 2000).
89. Id. 244.
90. Id. 191.
91. Prosecutor v. Delalik, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 1253 (Feb. 20, 2001).
92. Id. 3.
93. Prosecutor v. Muck, Case No. IT-96-21-This-R117, Sentencing Judgment, 44 (Oct. 9,
2001).
94. Prosecutor v. Kvo6ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 439 (Nov. 2, 2001).
95. The prosecution accused Prcac of personal involvement in certain brutalities but failed to
prove its allegations. Id. 451-463.
96. Id. 726.
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The next guilty plea to be entered at the ICTY was tendered in
May 2002 by Milan Simi& Simi6 pled guilty to two counts of torture as
a crime against humanity for encouraging and participating in the
beatings of five men.97 Simi6 had been indicted with four co-defendants,
one of whom was Stevan Todorovi6. 98 After Todorovi6 pled guilty, a
trial commenced against the remaining four co-defendants, and Simi6
pled guilty eight months after the trial began. In exchange for Simi6's
guilty plea, the prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of no
longer than five years' imprisonment. More importantly, it also agreed
to withdraw several counts, including the most serious-persecution as
a crime against humanity relating to Simi6's mayor-like role in the
town of Bosanski Sama&99 While functioning in that capacity, Simi6
had been accused of implementing orders and regulations that
unlawfully detained non-Serb civilians in inhumane conditions. 100
Although prosecutors believed that substantial evidence supported that
charge, its continued prosecution was undesirable because Simi6, a
paraplegic, had grave health issues which had considerably slowed the
trial. 101 The prosecution withdrew the count, then, largely due to its
desire to speed up the trial by removing the illness-prone Simi6. In
accordance with the prosecution's recommendation, the Trial Chamber
sentenced Simi6 to five years' imprisonment. 10 2 The sentence did not
seem particularly discounted given that the crimes to which Simi6 pled
guilty-crimes which involved the beating of five men-involved less
harm than is the norm for ICTY crimes. Yet such a sentence would
97. Prosecutor v. Milan Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, 9-11, (Oct.
17, 2002) [hereinafter Simi6 Sentencing Judgment].
98. Prosecution v. Blagoje Simi6 et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Second Amended Indictment (Dec.
11, 1998).
99. Simi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 97, 10, 13, 22.
100. See Prosecutor v. Simi6 et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Fourth Amended Indictment, 16 (Jan.
9, 2002) (setting forth the persecution charge).
101. Interview with BH in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dec. 5, 2003). Simi6's medical
condition complicated the conduct of the trial from the outset. In an assassination attempt, Simi6
had lost the use of both legs, most of the use of one arm, and a kidney, which left him prone to a
variety of infections. Simi6 cannot move a wheelchair without assistance and, because he cannot
move the upper part of his body while in bed, he suffers continually from bed sores. Telephone
Interview with Slobodan Zecevi6, ICTY Defense Counsel (Dec. 17, 2002). At first, the Trial
Chamber held sessions only in the mornings to accommodate Simi6's medical needs; later, the
Tribunal provided him with a suitable bed on which to rest during breaks and a nurse to assist
him, allowing the Trial Chamber to sit for an additional hour in the afternoon. Finally, in
February 2002, the Tribunal installed a video-link and a two-way telephone link between the
ICTY's Detention Unit and the courtroom, so that Simi6 could remain in the Detention Unit
while still monitoring the trial and communicating with his counsel. Simi6 Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 97, 7-8.
102. Simi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 97, 122.
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have been unthinkable had the factual basis for Simi6's conviction
encompassed all the conduct for which he was initially charged.
During the first nine years of the ICTY's existence, then, only
seven defendants pled guilty. Two of those defendants-Erdemovi6
and Jelisi6-did not negotiate with the prosecution for a reduced
sentence. The remaining five did, but only two of them-Todorovi6
and Simi-appeared to receive considerable sentencing benefits in
exchange for their guilty pleas. Prosecutors appeared willing to
bestow these benefits on Todorovi6 and Simi6, however, primarily
because unusual features of their cases made prosecutors particularly
keen to dispose of them summarily. Prosecutors were not inclined to
offer generous sentencing discounts to run-of-the-mill defendants, and,
as a consequence, those defendants were not inclined to enter guilty
pleas. By October 2002, when the next ICTY defendant to plead guilty
did so, however, the Security Council's pressure on the Tribunal to
complete its work had made the expeditious disposition of cases a
necessity. In addition, evidentiary weaknesses in the cases against
certain high-ranking defendants had made the information possessed
by lower-ranking defendants particularly valuable. Consequently, in
2002 and 2003, the prosecution engaged in vigorous efforts to induce
defendants both to plead guilty and to provide the prosecution with
information useful in other cases. Initially, these efforts were
extremely successful. The following Section will discuss the spate of
ICTY guilty pleas that were tendered in 2002 and 2003 and the
sentencing backlash to which those cases gave rise.
B. The Second Phase in ICTY Plea Bargaining: Generous Concessions,
Substantial Cooperation, and Judicial Displeasure
Biljana Plavgi6 had been co-President of the Serbian Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was instrumental in promoting and
implementing the Bosnian Serbs' ethnic-cleansing campaign, which
resulted in the expulsion and death of hundreds of thousands of
Bosnian Muslims and Croats. 10 3 In October 2002, Plavgi6 pled guilty
to persecution as a crime against humanity, and the prosecution
103. Approximately 850 Muslim and Croat-occupied villages were destroyed entirely, and in
many municipalities, virtually all non-Serbs were killed or forced to flee. Prosecutor v. Plav~i6,
Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1, Sentencing Judgment, 32 (Feb. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Plav~i6
Sentencing Judgment]. In the thirty-seven municipalities described in Plavgi6's indictment, the
evidence showed that Serbian forces killed approximately 50,000 non-Serbs, destroyed more than
100 mosques and Catholic churches, and established more than. 400 detention facilities, which
confined nearly 100,000 people. Id. 41, 44, 45-48; Prosecutor v. PlavAi6, Case No. IT-00-39 &
40/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 416 (Dec. 16, 2002).
[Vol. 59:1:69
2006] GUILTY PLEAS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 93
withdrew genocide charges that had been brought against her.10 4 The
prosecution recommended a sentence of between fifteen and twenty-
five years' imprisonment for Plav~i6, 105 and the Trial Chamber
sentenced her to a mere eleven years in prison.
10 6
Nine guilty pleas followed Plavgi's in quick succession, 107 and
many featured lenient-some would argue, unseemly-sentence
recommendations, particularly in comparison to previous ICTY cases,
104. Plavgi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 103, 5.
105. Prosecutor v. Plav~i6, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at
638 (Dec. 18, 2002). The prosecution lauded Plavgi6's guilty plea as "an unprecedented
contribution to the establishment of truth and a significant effort toward the advancement of
reconciliation." Prosecution v. Plav~i6, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Prosecution's Brief on the
Sentencing, 25 (Nov. 25, 2002) (on file with author). At Plavgi6's sentencing hearing, the
prosecution presented the testimony of a number of witnesses, including former United States
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Deputy Chairperson of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Dr. Alex Boraine, who praised Plavgi6's guilty plea for the
contribution it made to reconciliation in Bosnia. Prosecutor v. Plaviid, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-
S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 520-22, 592-96 (Dec. 17, 2002); see also Prosecutor v.
Plavgi6, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 408 (Dec. 16, 2002)
(Witness Mirsad Tokaca described Plavgi6's guilty plea as "an extremely courageous, brave, and
important gesture," saying, "[Ilt represents support to what is the ultimate aim of all of us...
[that] normal conditions of life should be resumed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only in Bosnia-
Herzegovina but in the entire region as well."); id. at 458-59 (Elie Wiesel praising Plavgid as "the
only accused to have freely and wholly assumed her role in the wrongdoings and crimes set out
in the indictment, even though she once moved in the highest circles of power in her country.").
106. Plavgi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 103, 134. The sentence horrified Bosnian
Muslims. Mujesira Memisevi6, whose husband and children were killed during a Bosnian Serb
ethnic-cleansing campaign, described the sentence as "outrageously low" and stated, "I am
speechless. I cannot talk at all. I am shivering. I am completely shaken." Daria Sito-Sucic,
Muslim Victims Outraged, Say Plavgi6 Sentence Low, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2003. The Bosnian
president of the federal committee for the missing, Amor Masovi6, observed that Plavgid will
spend just two and a half minutes in prison for every one of her 200,000 Bosniak and Croat
victims. Amra Kebo, Regional Report: Plavgi6 Sentence Divides Bosnia, IWPR'S TRIBUNAL
UPDATE, No. 302, Feb. 24-28, 2003. And the ICTYs President enraged victims further by
sending Plavgi6 to serve her sentence in Sweden, where she is housed in a minimum-security
prison that apparently features sauna, solarium, massage room, horse-riding paddock, and other
amenities. Patrick McLoughlin, Serb War Criminal Plavgid Goes to Swedish Jail, REUTERS, June
27, 2003; see also Patrick McLoughlin, War Criminal's Conditions Rile Guards, REUTERS, Aug. 1,
2003 (Swedish prison guards objecting when Plav~i6 was granted special privileges including
private accommodation with a toilet and extended recreation time, and when she was presented
a birthday cake on her birthday). By contrast, Plavgi6 has claimed that, in an effort to coerce her
to testify against Slobodan Milogevi6, "bad air from a nearby factory is being pumped into her
cell, causing her lungs to bleed." Serb Leader Alleges Prison Conspiracy, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Oct. 18, 2003; Former Bosnian Serb President Complains about Prison Conditions in
Sweden, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 17, 2003.
107. See Banovi6 Plea Agreement, supra note 73; Momir Nikoli6 Plea Agreement, supra note
73; Obrenovi6 Plea Agreement, supra note 73; Dragan Nikoli6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note
73, 35; Mrda Sentencing Judgment, supra note 73, 4; Joki6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note
73, 7 7-11; Deronji6 Plea Agreement, supra note 73; Cegi6 Plea Agreement, supra note 73;
Prosecutor v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72-I, Annex A to the Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea
Agreement between Milan Babi6 and the Office of the Prosecutor Plea Agreement (Jan. 22,
2004).
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even previous cases involving guilty pleas. Ranko Cegi6, for instance,
was a member of the Bosnian Serb Police Reserve Unit at the Br~ko
Police Station and was tasked with, among other things, arresting
specified non-Serbs and bringing them to the Br~ko Police Station or
to the Luka Prison Camp.108 The Luka Prison Camp was the camp at
which Goran Jelisi6-the second ICTY defendant to plead guilty-
acted as de facto commander. Cegi6 admitted to killing ten people and
to forcing two brothers to perform fellatio on one another; 10 9 that is, he
admitted to crimes roughly comparable to the thirteen murders that
Jelisi6 admitted when he pled guilty. Both men pled guilty, but
Jelisi6's plea, coming before the rush to close the Tribunal, gained him
nothing. The prosecution recommended a life sentence for Jelisi6,110
and the Trial Chamber imposed a near equivalent, sentencing him to
forty years in prison.' By contrast, in the plea agreement it
concluded with Cegi6, the prosecution promised to recommend a
sentence of between thirteen and eighteen years' imprisonment, 1 2 and
the Trial Chamber sentenced him to an eighteen year term.11 3 Cegi6
held a less senior position than Jelisi6, and, unlike Jelisi6, Cegi6 did
agree to provide information to the prosecution, 114 but the prosecution
gave no indication that it found Cegi6's information particularly
useful.11 5 Even if it had, it is doubtful that Cegi's provision of that
108. Prosecutor v. Cegi6, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 7 (Mar. 11, 2004)
[hereinafter Cegi6 Sentencing Judgment].
109. Id. 77 9-17.
110. Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 119 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter
Jelisi6 Judgment]; Prosecution v. Jelisid, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Transcript at 3070, 3132 (Nov. 25,
1999). The prosecution's harsh sentencing recommendation likely stemmed in part from the fact
that Jelisi6's guilty plea did not save the Tribunal time and resources because Jelisi6 pled guilty
only to the crimes against humanity and war crimes charges, but not to a genocide count. So,
despite Jelisi6's guilty plea, a trial had to be held on that count. After hearing the prosecution's
evidence, the Trial Chamber acquitted Jelisi6 of genocide, holding that the prosecution had not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that "genocide was committed in Br6ko during the period
covered in the indictment." It held in addition that although Jelisi6 "obviously singled out
Muslims, he killed arbitrarily rather than with the clear intention to destroy a group." Jelisid
Judgment, supra, 108.
111. Jelisi6 Judgment, supra note 110, 139.
112. Cegi6 Plea Agreement, supra note 73, 11.
113. Cegi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 108, 111.
114. Cegi6 Plea Agreement, supra note 73, 10.
115. In many guilty-plea cases at the ICTY, the prosecution highlights to the Trial Chamber
the substantial value of the defendant's cooperation. In Erdemovi6, for instance, the prosecution
described the defendant's cooperation as "substantial, full and comprehensive" and in particular
noted that Erdemovi had provided the prosecution with facts of which they had previously been
unaware, enabling them to initiate on-site investigations that confirmed Erdemovi6's statements.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 7 16(iv) (Mar. 5, 1998).
Similarly, in BabiW, the prosecution's sentencing brief went on for pages describing the
usefulness of Babi6's information and testimony. Prosecution v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72-S,
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information and his subordinate position to Jelisik would justify the
vast difference between the two men's sentences.
Other examples of sentencing disparities abound. Predrag
Banovi6, a guard at the same Keraterm Camp where Sikirica, Dogen,
and Kolund~ija committed their crimes, pled guilty in June 2003 to
helping beat five prisoners to death and participating in twenty-seven
other beatings and shootings. 116 Even after Sikirica pled guilty, the
prosecution recommended that he receive a seventeen year sentence
for committing only one murder, while it recommended that Dogen
receive a seven year sentence when he was not personally implicated
in any serious violence." 7  Concededly, Sikirica and Dogen held
positions of greater responsibility than did Banovi6, but Banovi6's
crimes were vastly more numerous and brutal; thus, one might have
expected prosecutors to recommend for Banovi6 a sentence far greater
than Dogen's and perhaps equal to Sikirica's, particularly since Dogen
and Sikirica also pled guilty. Instead, in exchange for Banovi6's guilty
plea, the prosecution and defense agreed to recommend a mere eight
year term of imprisonment, which the Trial Chamber duly imposed.118
Again, Banovi6's plea agreement required him to cooperate with the
prosecution, 119 an obligation not imposed on the Sikirica defendants.
But this factor cannot explain the sentencing differential between the
two cases because the Banovi6 prosecutor told the Trial Chamber that
Banovi6's cooperation had not been sufficient to treat it as a
mitigating factor. 120 The relative leniency of Banovi6's eight year
sentence is further highlighted when it is compared to the twenty year
sentence that the ICTY contemporaneously imposed after a trial on
Prosecution's Sentencing Brief, I 37-46 (Mar. 22, 2004). The prosecution's sentencing brief in
Cei6, by contrast, states only that Cegi6 had engaged in an interview with the prosecution
during which he shared his knowledge of the international crimes that took place in and around
Br~ko during the armed conflict in Bosnia and that he had agreed to testify in future proceedings
if asked to do so. Prosecutor v. Cegi6, Case No. 95-10/1-S, Prosecution's Sentencing Brief, 1 57
(No.% 12, 2003).
116. Banovi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 82, at 29-30; Prosecutor v. Banovi6, Case No.
IT-02-65/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, 104 (Sept. 3, 2003); see also Bosnian Serb
Camp Suspect Pleads Guilty at Hague, REUTERS, June 26, 2003 (discussing the beatings and
guilty plea).
117. Sikirica Sentencing Judgment, supra note 29, 25, 31, 42.
118. Banovi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 82, 1 96.
119. Prosecutor v. Banovi , Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Annex 2 to Plea Agreement (June 2,
2003).
120. Prosecutor v. Banovi6, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 116
(Sept. 3, 2003).
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Mitar Vasiljevi6, who, like Banovi6, participated in the killing of five
people.121
Prosecutorial sentence recommendations became so lenient in
2003 that they began to lose their influence over the Trial Chambers.
ICTY Trial Chambers imposed sentences at or below prosecutorial
recommendations for the first nine defendants who pled guilty, 122 but
in December 2003, the Trial Chamber rejected the prosecution's
recommendation of a fifteen-to-twenty year sentence in the Momir
Nikoli case and instead sentenced Nikoli6 to a twenty-seven year
term. 123 In sentencing outside the prosecution's recommended range,
the Trial Chamber emphasized that Nikoli6 was evasive when
testifying in the trial of his co-defendants. 124  Eight days later, the
same Trial Chamber sentenced Momir Nikoli6's co-defendant, Dragan
121. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, 77 96-111 (Nov. 29, 2002).
Vasiljevi6 participated in the so-called Drina River incident in which Serbian paramilitaries,
among others, brought seven Bosnian Muslim men to the bank of the Drina river and shot them
at close range, killing five of them. Id. 97.
122. In the first round of sentencing in Erdemovid, the prosecution recommended a sentence
not exceeding ten years. Erdemovi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 75. The Trial Chamber
sentenced Erdemovi6 to ten years' imprisonment. Id. In the second round of sentencing,. the
parties agreed in a plea agreement "that seven years' imprisonment would be an appropriate
sentence." Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T bis, Sentencing Judgment, 18(d)
(Mar. 5, 1998). But the Trial Chamber sentenced Erdemovi6 to five years' imprisonment. Id.
23. In Jelisi6, the prosecution asked for a sentence of life imprisonment. Jelisi6 Judgment, supra
note 110, 7 119. The Trial Chamber sentenced Jelisi6 to forty years' imprisonment. Id. 139. In
Todorovi6, the parties entered into a plea agreement prohibiting the prosecution from
recommending a sentence in excess of twelve years' imprisonment. Todorovi6 Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 77, 11. The prosecution recommended a sentence of twelve years'
imprisonment, id. 22, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Todorovi6 to ten years' imprisonment,
id. 115. In Sikirica, as discussed above, the parties entered into plea agreements in which the
prosecution agreed not to recommend sentences exceeding seventeen years', seven years', and
five years' imprisonment for Sikirica, Dogen, and Kolundiija, respectively. Sikirica Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 29, TT 25, 31, 37. The prosecution recommended the maximum sentences
for each defendant, id. T 42, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Sikirica, Dogen, and Kolundiija to
fifteen years', five years', and three years' imprisonment, respectively, id. 245. In Milan Simi6,
the parties entered into a plea agreement in which they each agreed to recommend a sentence of
imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than five years. Simi6 Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 97, 13. The prosecution recommended a five year sentence, id. 30, and
the Trial Chamber imposed a five year sentence, id. 122. In Plav~i6, the prosecution
recommended a sentence of between fifteen and twenty-five years' imprisonment. Prosecutor v.
Plavgi6, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Prosecution's Brief on the Sentencing of Biljana Plavi6, 43
(Nov. 25, 2002). The Trial Chamber imposed an eleven year sentence. Plavgi6 Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 103. Finally, in Banovid, the prosecutor and defense both agreed to
recommend an eight year sentence for Banovi6. Banovi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 82,
11. The Trial Chamber obliged. Id. T 96.
123. Prosecutor v. Momir Nikoli6, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 71 19, 183
(Dec. 2, 2003).
124. Id. 156.
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Obrenovi6, to seventeen years' imprisonment after his guilty plea, 125 a
sentence which was well within the prosecution's fifteen-to-twenty
year recommendation. Thus, Momir Nikoli6's sentence appeared to be
an aberration resulting from Nikoli6's perceived lack of candor.
After another eight days, however, a different ICTY Trial
Chamber spurned the prosecution's sentence recommendation, this
time in the case of Dragan Nikoli6 (no relation to Momir). In addition
to serving as Commander of the brutal Sugica prison camp, where
murders, beatings, and rapes occurred daily, Dragan Nikoli6, admitted
to personally beating nine men to death, torturing five more, and
facilitating countless rapes.126 After months of intense negotiations,
the prosecution and defense entered into a plea agreement in which
the prosecution agreed to recommend a fifteen year sentence for
Nikoli6. However, the Trial Chamber sentenced Nikoli6 to twenty-
three years' imprisonment, holding that the "brutality, the number of
crimes committed and the underlying intention to humiliate and
degrade would render a sentence such as [the prosecution]
recommended unjust."127 The Trial Chamber tried to prevent this
harsher-than-recommended sentence from dealing a death blow to the
prosecution's attempts to obtain subsequent guilty pleas by expressly
stating that Nikoli6 would have received a life sentence had he not
pled guilty.128 As will be discussed below, however, it is by no means
clear that the Trial Chamber's efforts succeeded.
As part of Milan Babi6's January 2004 plea agreement, the
prosecution recommended an eleven year sentence for Babi6, 29 but the
Trial Chamber sentenced him to thirteen years' imprisonment,
holding that a term of no more than eleven years "would not do
justice."'130 A couple of months earlier, the Deronji6 Trial Chamber did
sentence in accordance with the prosecution's recommendations in
that case, imposing on Deronji6 the ten year prison sentence that the
prosecution recommended, but it did so over the vehement dissent of
the presiding judge, Wolfgang Schomburg. Judge Schomburg
concluded that Deronji6 deserved a sentence of no less than twenty
years' imprisonment' 3 l because even on the facts presented by the
125. Prosecutor v. Obrenovi6, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, 7 156 (Dec. 10,
2003).
126. Dragan Nikolik Sentencing Judgment, supra note 73, 56-60, 66-104.
127. Id. 281.
128. Id. 214.
129. Prosecutor v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment, 42 (June 29, 2004).
130. Id. 77 101-102.
131. Prosecutor v. Deronji6, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg,
2 (Mar. 30, 2004).
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prosecution-which Judge Schomburg believed were abridged as a
result of a charge bargain 132-Deronji6 was shown to be a high-
ranking perpetrator who had committed "heinous and long planned
crimes."
133
Milan Babi6's guilty plea was tendered in January 2004-
approximately one month after the Momir Nikoli and Dragan Nikoli6
Trial Chambers imposed their longer-than-recommended sentences.
Given these sentences, Babi6 might have decided not to plead guilty
but for the fact that he had been cooperating with the prosecution for
two years before he was indicted and, as his defense counsel put it,
"[i]t was a fait accompli that he would be indicted and plead guilty."
134
Eighteen months elapsed, however, before the Tribunal received its
next guilty plea in the Miroslav Bralo case. Miroslav Bralo's plea
agreement is unusual in that it does not contain any provisions
relating to sentence recommendations and indeed states that "no
promises or inducements have been made by the Prosecutor to induce
Miroslav Bralo to enter this Agreement."1 35 Bralo, however, was a
low-level offender whose case almost certainly would have been
transferred to the Special War Crimes Court in Sarajevo had he not
pled guilty. Many ICTY defendants have vehemently opposed the
transfer of their cases to Bosnia,1 36 and the desire to avoid that fate
likely motivated Bralo's plea.
Guilty pleas at the ICTY have thus dropped off markedly since
their height in 2003. One factor contributing to the substantially
decreased interest in guilty pleas is the highly critical publicity
engendered by the guilty pleas of 2003 and their concomitant sentence
discounts. Victims' groups and legal commentators have harshly
condemned the lenient sentences imposed on, among others, Plavgi6,
Banovi6, and Darko Mrda, the latter of whom pled guilty to
participating in the executions of more than 200 Bosnian Muslims. 137
132. Id. 9.
133. Id. 5.
134. Prosecutor v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Transcript of Appeals Proceedings at 34 (Apr.
25, 2005).
135. Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-PT, Plea Agreement, 9 (July 18, 2005).
136. E.g., Prosecutor v. Jankovi6, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case under
Rule 11 bis, 16 (July 22, 2005).
137. Mrda Sentencing Judgment, supra note 73, 1, 4. For a sampling of the critical
commentary concerning lenient sentences, see Sito-Sucic, supra note 106; Kebo, supra note 106;
Emir Suljagi6 & Amra Kebo, Mrda Guilty Plea Sparks Anger, IWPR'S TRIBUNAL UPDATE, No.
322, Aug. 1, 2003 (Mrda's guilty plea "sparked a row among survivors and missing persons
organisations who believe the proposed sentence is too lenient for the crimes committed - and are
outraged that, to date, the remains of many of those murdered have not been recovered.");
Bosnian Women's Association Calls Serb Camp Guard Sentence "Insult," BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Oct. 29, 2003 (reporting the view of Bosnian victims that Predrag Banovi6's eight
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The diminished interest in guilty pleas can also be traced in part to
the March 2004 departure of the Tribunal's American Chief of
Prosecutions, Michael Johnson, who was a strong supporter of plea
bargaining and who facilitated many of the 2003 plea agreements.
Some front-line ICTY prosecutors, by contrast, are rumored to be less-
than-favorably disposed to plea bargaining; indeed, counsel for Dragan
Nikoli6 accused prosecutors of essentially reneging on Nikoli6's plea
agreement by submitting a sentencing brief that was not in keeping
with the spirit of the agreement' 38 and by failing to seek a reduction of
Nikoli6's sentence on appeal. 139 Nikoli6's counsel pointedly observed
that such practices "will be noted by those whose duty it is to advise on
the issue of making a Plea Agreement with the Prosecutor."'
140
While these factors have played some role, the primary reason
that the ICTY is no longer obtaining many guilty pleas is that, as a
result of the sentences imposed on Momir Nikoli6, Dragan Nikoli6, and
Milan Babi6, ICTY defendants no longer have the requisite certainty
that they will receive the sentencing discounts for which they
bargained. Numerous interviews with defense counsel and prosecutors
confirm that ICTY defendants share with defendants accused of
domestic crimes in Western countries similar views about the
undesirability of incarceration. Thus, when assessing their options,
most ICTY defendants seek first and foremost to reduce the amount of
time they must spend behind bars. For this reason, the ICTY
defendants who have pled guilty recently did so only after their counsel
had engaged in intense and protracted negotiations over the
prosecution's sentence recommendation. That is, they pled guilty only
because they felt confident that they would receive a substantial
sentencing discount in exchange for their guilty plea. Based on the
year sentence constituted "shamefully small punishment"); Bosnian Muslims Protest "Shameful"
War Crimes Sentence, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 29, 2003 (reporting on victims' outrage
following the Banovi6 sentence); Nerma Jelacik & Chris Stephen, Anger at Short Sentence for
Prison Killer, IWPR'S TRIBUNAL UPDATE, No. 331, Nov. 1, 2003 (reporting victim outrage about
Banovi6's sentence); see also Pleading Repentance, BALKAN RECONSTRUCTION REPORT, Feb. 2,
2004 (reporting on a right-wing Croatian politician who decried Milan Babi6's plea bargain,
saying "[w]here is the justice in the fact that a person who is believed to have been one of the
most notorious figures in the bloody events of the 1990s in this region can expect only 11 years of
punishment?"); Milanka Saponja-Hadzi6, Hague Deals Reduce Impact, IWPR'S TRIBUNAL
UPDATE, No. 321, July 24, 2003.
138. See Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolik, Case No. IT-94-2-A, Transcript of Sentencing
Proceedings on Appeal at 23 (Nov. 29, 2004) (Nikoli's counsel asserted that the prosecution's
sentencing brief was not one "that actually matched the nature of the spirit and agreement
which I thought we had gone into the matter, and I was left with a sense of unease and profound
disappointment.").
139. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoljk, Case No. IT-94-2-A, Appellant's Brief in Reply to the
Prosecution Respondent's Brief, 5 (Aug. 24, 2004).
140. Id.
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Trial Chambers' past practice, the defendants counted on the
prosecution's recommendation to define the outer limit of their
incarceration exposure. Now that the recommendations no longer
provide that certainty, ICTY defendants apparently prefer to take their
chances on a trial. Miroslav Bralo was not likely to have the
opportunity to take his chance on an ICTY trial since his case seemed
destined for trial in Bosnia. Thus, Bralo saw fit to plead guilty despite
the Trial Chambers' recent repudiation of prosecutorial sentencing
recommendations. That his plea agreement does not even contain a
promise of a prosecutorial sentence recommendation may well reflect
Bralo's awareness of their limited influence.
While some Tribunal insiders maintain that prosecutors
continue to pursue plea negotiations in some cases, all agree that the
Trial Chambers' failure to sentence in accordance with prosecutorial
recommendations has had a chilling effect on the bargaining. 141 Milan
Babi6's defense counsel observed, for instance, that when he advised
Babi6 to enter into the plea agreement, he "believed that a plea
agreement meant something, that the Court would be guided by a plea
agreement, that they would follow the recommendation." He learned
subsequently, he said, that the effect of a plea agreement "is
nothing."1 42 As the following Part will reveal, ICTR prosecutors are also
experiencing difficulty obtaining guilty pleas, but there the difficulty
bears little relationship to the sentencing recommendations the
prosecution is willing to make, or the sentences the Trial Chambers
actually impose.
IV. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN PLEA BARGAINING: GUILTY PLEAS AT
THE ICTR
In April 1994, brutal ethnic violence erupted in Rwanda, a
small country in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, whose population
has historically been divided into two predominant groups, the Hutu
and the Tutsi. 143  The Tutsi minority had ruled Rwanda for
141. Telephone Interview with HN (Feb. 17, 2005); Interview with ME in The Hague, Neth.
(Nov. 18, 2004); Telephone Interview with Howard Morrison, ICTY Defense Counsel (Dec. 2,
2004); Telephone Interview with OF (Oct. 20, 2004).
142. Prosecutor v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Transcript of Appeals Proceedings, at 34 (Apr.
25, 2005).
143. GPRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 5 (1996); 1 VIRGINIA
MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 49-50
(1998). Rwanda's third group, the Twa, accounts for one percent or less of the population.
PRUNIER, supra, at 5.
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centuries, 44  but the Hutu gained control of the country at
independence in 1962145 and thereafter perpetrated a series of
massacres that drove nearly 100,000 Tutsi into exile in neighboring
countries.1 46 The exiled Tutsi formed an army, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front ("RPF'), and engaged in military clashes with the Rwandan
government1 47 before the two sides entered into the Arusha Peace
Accords in 1993.148 In April 1994, an airplane carrying the country's
Hutu president was shot down and, immediately thereafter, extremist
Hutu began killing large numbers of Tutsi and moderate Hutu,
massacring between 500,000 and one million people in one hundred
days. 149 The violence came to an end in July 1994 when the RPF
defeated the Rwandan army.150 Heeding calls for an international
tribunal similar to the ICTY, 151 the Security Council established the
ICTR.
144. PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, AND THE
UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 3 (2000) (reporting that between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries,
the Tutsi conquered central Rwanda and, in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, "the Tutsi
conquered and firmly established central control over much, but not all, of Rwanda, despite the
fact that they represented only about 10 per cent to 14 per cent of a population that was over 80
per cent Hutu").
145. PRUNIER, supra note 143, at 41-54; MAGNARELLA, supra note 144, at 12-13.
146. PRUNIER, supra note 143, at 56, 61 (reporting that there existed 120,000 refugees by
early 1962); see also MAGNARELLA, supra note 144, at 13 (noting that by 1963 Hutu attacks had
"resulted in thousands of Tutsi deaths and the flight of about 130,000 Tutsi to neighboring
countries"); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 63-69 (1998) (reporting a Tutsi's experiences during
periods of violence against the Tutsi); MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 143, at 47, 50 ("During the
next few years [after 1959] over 100,000 Tutsis fled to neighboring countries in the face of waves
of mass killings."); HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 150-60 (1999) (placing the 1962 Tutsi refugee total at 200,000); William A.
Schabas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to
Impossible Problems, 1996 CRIM. L. F. 523, 523-24 (1996).
147. PRUNIER, supra note 143, at 93-120; MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 143, at 50; Christina
M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of
1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 168 (2000).
148. BALL, supra note 146, at 162; MAGNARELLA, supra note 144, at 16-17; MORRIS &
SCHARF, supra note 143, at 50-51; see also PRUNIER, supra note 143, at 159-91 (providing an in-
depth account of the process and outcome of forming the Arusha Peace Accords).
149. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 143, at 53, 58; Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of
Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 351 (1997). For
comprehensive descriptions of the massacres and the events leading up to the violence, see
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY (1999) [hereinafter LEAVE NONE TO
TELL THE STORY]; PRUNIER, supra note 143.
150. LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, supra note 149, at 301-02; see also MORRIS & SCHARF,
supra note 143, at 58 (describing the final battles).
151. On June 28, 1994, the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations reported on
the gravity of the Rwandan situation. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N.
ESCOR, 51st Sess. 18-28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (June 28, 1994). Three days later, the
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At the time of this writing, the ICTR has disposed of only
nineteen cases involving twenty-five defendants, and, like the ICTY, it
currently labors under Security Council pressure to close its doors
within the next few years. However, despite its similar need to
dispose of its cases expeditiously, the ICTR's experience with guilty
pleas has been dramatically different from that of the ICTY. By
December 2004, only three ICTR defendants had pled guilty during
the nine years of the Tribunal's existence, and it had been four-and-
one-half years since the ICTR had received its last guilty plea. In
December 2004, Vincent Rutaganira gave the Tribunal its fourth
guilty plea,152 but the circumstances of that case provide little reason
to believe that many future guilty pleas will be forthcoming. Section A
will examine those four guilty pleas, and that examination will show
that, although the ICTR blundered in the sentencing of its first guilty-
plea case, the Trial Chambers and the prosecution learned from that
mistake. Indeed, sentencing in the next two guilty-plea cases
appeared to set the stage for a host of subsequent guilty pleas. Those
pleas did not materialize, however, demonstrating that appropriate
sentencing practices, while a necessary condition, are not a sufficient
condition for the procurement of guilty pleas in the context of
international crimes. Indeed, the ICTR prosecution's failure to induce
defendants to plead guilty, despite considerable efforts, highlights the
complex nature of international plea bargaining and the substantial
influence of factors that would play little or no role in the context of
domestic crimes. These factors will be examined in Section B, and
they will place Section A's discussion of the ICTR's four guilty-plea
cases in an entirely new light.
Security Council adopted Resolution 935 requesting the establishment of an impartial
Commission of Experts to examine and analyze further evidence of grave violations of
humanitarian law in Rwanda. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg., U.N. Doc.
SJRES/935 (July 1, 1994). The Commission recommended either the creation of a new
international criminal tribunal or the expansion of the ICTY's jurisdiction to cover crimes in
Rwanda. Commission of Experts on Rwanda, Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission
of Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935, 150-152, Annex
to Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1125 (Oct. 1, 1994).
152. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-I, Minutes of Proceedings (Dec. 8,
2004).
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A. The ICTR's Guilty-Plea Cases
1. Kambanda
Jean Kambanda was the Prime Minister of the interim
government that presided over Rwanda during the 1994 genocide.
Although apparently not one of the genocide's planners, 153 Kambanda
admitted to actively implementing the genocide by, among other
things, distributing arms and ammunition, setting up roadblocks to
capture Tutsi, and using media broadcasts to incite and encourage the
massacres. 154 Kambanda was arrested in Kenya in July 1997.155
Before a lawyer had been appointed for him, Kambanda engaged in
interviews with the prosecution, 156 and he reportedly left these
interviews with the belief that he would be sentenced to no more than
three years' imprisonment if he pled guilty. 57 In April 1998, then,
Kambanda entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution and pled
guilty to genocide and crimes against humanity. 158 None of the
sentencing promises that Kambanda believed he had received made
their way into his plea agreement. Rather, the agreement expressly
provided that the parties had made "no agreements, understandings or
promises" with respect to Kambanda's sentence. 159
Whether or not promises were made to Kambanda, it is
customary for prosecutors to recommend a discounted sentence
following a guilty plea. Kambanda's guilty plea might have been
expected to carry particular mitigating weight in sentencing due to his
high-level position. The ICTY in Plavgi6, for instance, emphasized
that Plavgi6's former position as President of the Republika Srpska
153. Kambanda maintains that the role of Prime Minister was foisted on him. Prosecutor v.
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Transcript at 20-21 (Sept. 3, 1998); LINDA MELVERN,
CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 170-71 (2004).
154. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-1, Plea Agreement Between Jean
Kambanda and the Office of the Prosecutor, 23-40 (Apr. 29, 1998) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Kambanda Plea Agreement]; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S,
Judgment and Sentence, 39 (Sept. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Kambanda Judgment].
155. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, 1.
156. Jean Kambanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, Provisional Appellant's
Brief and Motions for Extension of the Time-Limits and for Admission of New Evidence on
Appeal Pursuant to Rules 115 and 116 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3-6 (Mar. 29,
2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kanbanda's Appeals Briefl.
157. Telephone Interview with SK (Dec. 1, 2004); Telephone Interview with Howard
Morrison, ICTR Defense Counsel for Justin Mugenzi (Dec. 2, 2004); Interview with BM in The
Hague, Neth. (Nov. 8, 2004).
158. See generally Kambanda Plea Agreement, supra note 154.
159. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, 48; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-
97-23-I, Transcript at 6 (Sept. 3, 1998).
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enhanced the reconciliatory and truth-telling value of her guilty
plea. 160 Further, Kambanda had tendered his guilty plea before the
completion of any ICTR trials; thus, his guilty plea, coming so early in
the life of the ICTR, had the potential to set a powerful example for
subsequent defendants to follow. Finally, Kambanda provided
prosecutors with a wealth of information relevant to their
investigations. Kambanda provided ninety hours of recorded
testimony for use in subsequent trials of senior political and military
leaders, 161  information which the prosecution described as
"invaluable,"162 and he promised to testify for the prosecution in those
trials. 163 Such cooperation is also ordinarily rewarded with a sentence
reduction.
Despite these considerations, the prosecution recommended that
Kambanda receive a life sentence 164-the harshest sentence the ICTR
can impose 165-and one can surmise why it felt compelled to make such
a recommendation. Indeed, the very same factors that might be
thought to justify a significantly reduced sentence recommendation for
Kambanda likely convinced prosecutors to recommend a term of life
imprisonment. Kambanda was the second highest-ranking political
authority in Rwanda during the genocide and was substantially
involved in the implementation of the genocide. Thus, the prosecutors
likely reasoned that if anyone deserved a life sentence, it was
160. Plavi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 103, 80.
161. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief at
22-23 (Aug. 31, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kambanda Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing
Brief].
162. Id. at 22-23; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Transcript at 12 (Sept. 3,
1998) (on file with author). The prosecution described Kambanda's cooperation as follows:
The accused has assisted the Prosecutor in interpreting the horrific events that
occured [sic] in Rwanda between 7 April and 7 July 1994, as well as direct evidence
involving other accused and suspects. Without disclosing the substance of his audio
recorded statement, his testimony has enabled the Prosecutor to have first hand
information, and evidence of such key facts as the meeting between the Council of
Ministers and Prefets held on 11 April 1994, where the topic of massacres committed
against the civilian population was raised; the contents of deliberations and decisions
agreed upon by consensus in the numerous closed sessions of the Cabinet; the
involvement of Ministers, senior Military officers and Prefets in the commission of
offences within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Kambanda Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 161, at 23.
163. Kambanda Plea Agreement, supra note 154, 42; see also Lawyer for the Former
Rwandan Prime Minister Argues for Light Sentence, INTERNEWS (Sept. 4, 1998), available at
http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTRreports/ICTRNewsSep98.html (reporting prosecutor's
comments that Kambanda would testify in the genocide trials of other government and military
leaders).
164. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, 60.
165. ICTR Statute, supra note 8, art. 23(1).
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Kambanda.' 66  That perception carried all the more significance
because Kambanda was convicted at the very outset of the ICTR, so the
disposition of his case garnered particularly intense publicity. The
prosecution did try to ameliorate the effect of its harsh sentencing
recommendation on future plea negotiations by suggesting that any
future application for pardon or commutation of sentence made by
Kambanda "be considered favorably on the basis of past, current and
future significant cooperation extended to the prosecution,"16 7 but
beyond that it was not willing to go. The Trial Chamber apparently
agreed with the prosecution's assessment of the case because it
sentenced Kambanda to life imprisonment. 168 Although the Trial
Chamber recognized Kambanda's guilty plea as a mitigating factor, it
held that the aggravating circumstances surrounding Kambanda's
crimes "negate[d] the mitigating circumstances."
1 69
The sentence infuriated Kambanda, and he immediately
appealed, seeking to quash his guilty plea and proceed to trial.170 He
argued, among other things, that he had not been provided competent
legal advice and that he had been inappropriately detained in
isolation in a safe-house 500 kilometers from the detention facility
where the other ICTR defendants are held. 171  Kambanda also
immediately ceased cooperating with the prosecution.' 72 After the
Appeals Chamber rejected his appeal,' 73 the prospects for subsequent
guilty pleas appeared dim: because Kambanda had received absolutely
nothing for his guilty plea, it seemed unlikely that future defendants
would choose to waive their right to trial.
2. Serushago
Omar Serushago did waive his right to trial, pleading guilty to
genocide and crimes against humanity in December 1998-three
months after Kambanda received his life sentence-but Serushago's
166. The prosecution had previously recommended a life sentence for Jean Paul Akayesu, a
sentence which the Trial Chamber imposed, and Akayesu was only a mayor of the Taba commune.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, T 54 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter
Akayesu Judgment); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript of Sentencing
Hearing (Oct. 2, 1998).
167. Kambanda Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 161, at 2.
168. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, at Verdict.
169. Id. 62.
170. Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment, 3 (Oct. 19, 2000)
[hereinafter Kambanda Appeals Judgment].
171. Kambanda's Appeals Brief, supra note 156, TT 2-10.
172. Letter from Carla Del Ponte to Agwu Okali, ICTR Registrar (Apr. 25, 2000) (on file with
author).
173. Kambanda Appeals Judgment, supra note 170, 126.
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decision to plead guilty was made long before the decision in
Kambanda was handed down. Serushago was a low-level leader of a
small group of militiamen. He supervised a roadblock at which Tutsi
were detained and killed, and he admitted to killing four people
himself.174 Residing in Nairobi following the Rwandan massacres,
Serushago approached ICTR prosecutors in April 1997 and provided
them information 75 that led, among other things, to the arrest of
several high-ranking ICTR defendants including Kambanda and
Georges Ruggiu, 176 whose case will be discussed next. In July 1998,
Serushago voluntarily surrendered to the ICTR even though he had
not been indicted by the Tribunal, 177 and, soon after the indictment
was prepared, he pled guilty to it.178 Serushago's motives for bringing
himself before the ICTR may never be known. Some believe that he
underwent a religious conversion that made clear to him his wrongful
conduct while others note that he received approximately $5,000 from
the ICTR prosecution. Serushago maintained that the money was
used "to pay for taxis and assist the Prosecution in arrests,"' 79 but not
all are convinced that the money was intended only for those
purposes. Whatever his motivation, Serushago may have experienced
some misgivings when he learned of Kambanda's life sentence, but his
substantial cooperation and voluntary surrender likely gave him little
choice at that point but to adhere to his plan to plead guilty.
As in Kambanda, the prosecution made Serushago no written
promises regarding its sentence recommendation; indeed, Serushago's
plea agreement provides that sentencing "is at the entire discretion of
the Trial Chamber."'80 When the time came to recommend a sentence,
however, the prosecution did provide Serushago some consideration
for his plea. Because Serushago was a low-level defendant whose case
had not generated significant publicity, prosecutors - as well as the
174. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, 25 (Feb. 5, 1999)
[hereinafter Serushago Sentence].
175. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39, Transcript at 15-16 (Jan. 19, 1999)
[hereinafter Serushago Transcript] (on file with author).
176. Serushago Sentence, supra note 174, 32; Serushago Transcript, supra note 175, at 11;
see also Press Release, ICTR, Rwanda: First Non-Rwandese Suspect Arrested, ICTRILNFO-9-2-
062 (July 23, 1997) (reporting the arrest of Georges Ruggiu); Press Release, ICTR, Rwanda: Top
Figures of Former Regime Arrested, ICTR/INFO-9.2-61 (July 18, 1997) (reporting Kambanda's
arrest).
177. Serushago Sentence, supra note 174, 1, 34.
178. Id. 2, 4; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-37, Plea Agreement Between
Omar Serushago and the Office of the Prosecutor (Dec. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Serushago Plea
Agreement] (on file with author).
179. Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 824
(Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Nahimana Judgment].
180. Serushago Plea Agreement, supra note 178, 40.
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Trial Chamber for that matter-likely felt more able than in
Kambanda to discount Serushago's sentence without giving rise to
ruinous publicity. The prosecution accordingly lauded Serushago's
substantial cooperation l8 l and put forth a sentence recommendation of
not less than twenty-five years' imprisonment.18 2 At the time the
prosecution made that recommendation, it had recommended
sentences of life imprisonment in every previous case in which it made
a recommendation.' 8 3 And the Trial Chambers had imposed life
sentences in each of those cases. 8 4 In every subsequent case that has
gone to trial, the prosecution has likewise recommended a life
sentence. 8 5 Thus, the twenty-five-year sentence that the prosecution
recommended for Serushago can be understood to reflect a discount for
his guilty plea and cooperation, as does the fifteen year sentence that
the Trial Chamber in fact imposed.18 6 Indeed, only three other ICTR
defendants have received more lenient sentences than Serushago, and
two of them were the remaining two defendants who pled guilty.'87
181. The prosecution maintained that Serushago had cooperated in four distinct ways: by
assisting in the arrest of other defendants; by providing information in other cases and agreeing
to testify in those cases; by providing a detailed account of his own criminal conduct; and by
voluntarily surrendering. Serushago Transcript, supra note 175, at 10-12.
182. Id. at 15.
183. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, T 60; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-
4-T, Sentence (Oct. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu Sentence]; Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, Sentence 25 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter
Kayishema & Ruzindana Judgment].
184. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, at Verdict; Akayesu Sentence, supra note 183;
Kayishema & Ruzindana Judgment, supra note 183, 27-28.
185. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgment and Sentence, $ 503
(July 15, 2004); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, 338 (June 17,
2004); Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence, $ 815
(Feb. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence,
1097 (Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Nahimana Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-
98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, 956 (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No.
ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, 489 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No.
ICTR-97-20.T, Judgment, 558 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and G~rard
Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T, Judgment and Sentence, $ 890 (Feb. 21,
2003) [hereinafter Ntakirutimana Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A,
Judgment and Sentence, 994 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3,
Judgment and Sentence, 464 (Dec. 6, 1999). The Trial Chamber did not report the prosecution's
sentence recommendation in the Kamuhanda case. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-
95-54A-T, Judgment, 753-760 (Jan. 22, 2004). However, the fact that the Trial Chamber
sentenced Kamuhanda to life imprisonment strongly indicates that the prosecution
recommended a life sentence in that case as well. Id. 770.
186. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, Verdict (Feb. 5, 1999).
187. The only defendant to receive a more lenient sentence after trial was Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana, who was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Ntakirutimana Judgment, supra
note 185, 921. Ntakirutimana's advanced age and poor health contributed to the leniency of his
sentence. See id. 989.
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3. Ruggiu
Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian, became interested in Rwandan
politics in the early 1990s after befriending some Rwandan students
who were his neighbors in Belgium. 188 Ruggiu met with Rwandan
President Habyarimana on a number of occasions, and he participated
in political debates in Belgium regarding Rwanda. 189 Ruggiu, believed
by some to be a passionate idealist'90 and by others to be mentally
unbalanced, 191 became radically opposed to the RPF, which had been
engaged in an armed conflict with the Hutu-led Rwandan government.
In late 1993, Ruggiu moved to Rwanda apparently to marry 92 and to
work as a journalist and broadcaster for the Radio Television Libre des
Mille Collines ("RTLM'). During the spring of 1994, RTLM broadcasts,
including those by Ruggiu, incited the population to kill Tutsi.
193
A year after the atrocities, Ruggiu authored a book proclaiming
his innocence and maintaining that the RTLM broadcasts were
intended to mobilize Rwandans against the RPF, not against Tutsi
188. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, 38 (June 1,
2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu Judgment]. At Ruggiu's pre-sentencing hearing, his lawyer
maintained that Ruggiu "had come to know Rwanda through highly partisan friends who gave
him a biased idea of the political situation in the country." How Belgian Journalist Became
Involved in Hate Media, INTERNEWS, May 15, 2000, available at http://www.internews.org/
activities/ICTR Reports/ICTRNewsMayOO.html#mayl5c; see also Prosecution v. Ruggiu, Case
No. ICTR-97-32-I, Transcript at 109-12 (May 15, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu Transcript] (on file
with author).
189. Ruggiu Judgment, supra note 188, 41.
190. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 115, 146, 149.
191. See Convicted Ex-Radio Presenter has Mental Problems, Defence Suggests, HIRONDELLE
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 2, 2002, available at http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/0
/c319ac23033fcelac1256721007ae237 (reporting Ruggiu's counsel's claims that the defendant
suffered from "emotional problems") [hereinafter Convicted Ex-Radio Presenter]; Telephone
Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 2004).
192. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 113. At his sentencing hearing, one of Ruggiu's
former colleagues testified that Ruggiu found in his Rwandan friends a warm and accepting
adopted family. Id. at 149-50.
193. Ruggiu Judgment, supra note 188, 42, 44(iv)-(v), 50; see also PRUNIER, supra note
143, at 200 (reporting that the radio station RTLM "poured out a torrent of propaganda, mixing
constant harping on the old themes of 'majority democracy,' fears of 'Tutsi feudalist enslavement'
and ambiguous 'calls to action."'); Schabas, supra note 146, at 524 ('CThey set up a private radio
station, Radio-Television Libre Mille-Collines, which battered Rwanda with hate propaganda
over the following months."). See generally Nahimana Judgment, supra note 185 (convicting
radio and newspaper officials of genocide and direct and public incitement to commit genocide);
Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Domestic
Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 559 (1998) ("During this time period, the
Hutu government began to develop a propaganda machine calculated to instill in the Hutu
citizenry a fear of the Tutsi."). For a comprehensive treatment of Hutu hate propaganda, see
LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, supra note 149, at 65-95.
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civilians. 194 Not surprisingly, then, after he was arrested, Ruggiu pled
not guilty. He later contended that he remained convinced of his
innocence until one of his co-defendants made a speech to the other
ICTR detainees, informing them that the Rwandan violence had in fact
been a planned genocide.1 95 Ruggiu reported that this news caused him
great distress and led him to engage in interviews with the
prosecution. 96 He reported that after serious reflection, he recognized
his moral responsibility to tell the truth and to plead guilty to direct
and public incitement to commit genocide. 197
During this time, Ruggiu's lawyers made efforts to obtain
firmer sentencing guarantees than prosecutors had provided
Kambanda. 98 On the surface, these efforts failed: Ruggiu's plea
agreement, like Kambanda's and Serushago's, contains no promises
regarding the prosecution's sentencing recommendation. 199 But at the
same time, the prosecution clearly recommended a reduced sentence for
Ruggiu as a result of the guilty plea. The Prosecutor recommended a
twenty year prison sentence for Ruggiu, 200 the shortest sentence ICTR
prosecutors had theretofore ever recommended. In addition, and
presumably to encourage future guilty pleas, the Prosecutor expressly
stated that she would have recommended a life sentence had Ruggiu
proceeded to trial.
20 1
The Trial Chamber likewise seemed intent on encouraging
future guilty pleas. As noted above, the Kambanda Trial Chamber, by
194. I Lied in My Book to Protect RTLM, Says Convicted Radio Presenter, HIRONDELLE NEWS
AGENCY, Feb. 28, 2002, available at http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd
48f5826c12564cf004f793d/c319ac23033fcelac1256721007ae237.
195. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 47.
196. Id. at 47-56. It was later revealed that Ruggiu lied to prosecutors in some of these early
interviews. Convicted Ex-Radio Presenter has Mental Problems, Defense Suggests, supra note
191.
197. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 56-59; Plea Agreement Between Georges Ruggiu
and the Office of the Prosecutor, 2, 4, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-DP (May
12, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu Plea Agreement].
198. Hate Radio Presenter Set to Plead Guilty to Genocide Charges, HIRONDELLE NEWS
AGENCY, May 9, 2000, http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826cl2564cfO04f
793d/c319ac23033fce lac1256721007ae237.
199. Ruggiu Plea Agreement, supra note 197, 220. Prosecutors emphasized this point, both
in the press, see, e.g., Portrait of Georges Ruggiu, Journalist who Incited Genocide, HIRONDELLE
NEWS AGENCY, May 14, 2000, http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826c12564
cf004f793d/c319ac23033fcelac1256721007ae237 ("Since Ruggiu started confessing, his lawyers
say they have reached an agreement with prosecutors that will govern the legal and factual
framework of the case. They stress, however, that this accord contains no 'parallel promises[.]"'),
and to the Trial Chamber, see, e.g., Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 66 (detailing
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte's vehement assertion that no promises had been made to Ruggiu).
200. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 190.
201. Id. at 188.
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sentencing Kambanda to the harshest sentence available to it, did
nothing to motivate subsequent ICTR defendants to plead guilty. The
Serushago Trial Chamber did appear to treat Serushago more
leniently as a result of his guilty plea, but the Trial Chamber did not
discuss in any detail the mitigating role that Serushago's guilty plea
played in his sentence. The Ruggiu Trial Chamber, by contrast,
explicitly praised guilty pleas. 202 It lauded Ruggiu's guilty plea for
"sparing the Tribunal a lengthy investigation and trial"20 3 and for
reflecting Ruggiu's "acknowledgement of his mistakes" which,
according to the Trial Chamber, constituted "a healthy application of
reason and sentiment. ' 20 4 Most importantly, the Trial Chamber
announced to other defendants that "some form of consideration"
would be shown to defendants who plead guilty "in order to encourage
other suspects and perpetrators of crimes to come forward."20 5 The
Trial Chamber then sentenced Ruggiu to twelve years' imprisonment,
a sentence that was subsequently blessed by the prosecution.
Although the government of Rwanda sharply criticized Ruggiu's
sentence, the ICTR's Chief of Prosecutions described it as "a good
gesture for other accused who would wish to plead guilty and accept
responsibility for their crimes."206
If ICTR defendants considered sentencing discounts to be an
influential incentive to plead guilty, then by June 2000 the ICTR
should have been poised to receive a substantial number of guilty
pleas. Although, until Ruggiu, the prosecution had made no express
promises regarding its sentencing recommendations, a comparison of
its recommendations following trials-all of which stood at life
imprisonment-and its recommendations in Serushago and Ruggiu
showed a prosecutorial practice of recommending discounted
sentences for defendants who pled guilty. And even if defendants
202. Some believe that the differing treatment given to guilty pleas in ICTR cases relates
less to an overall evolution in the Tribunal's assessment of guilty pleas and more to the
backgrounds of the particular judges involved in the cases. Telephone Interview with WM (Oct.
19, 2005). Judge Kama, for instance, who presided over the Kambanda and Serushago cases,
hailed from Senegal, a civil-law country, while Judge Pillay hailed from South Africa, a common-
law country. As a general matter, ICTY and ICTR judges originating in civil-law countries
appear less comfortable with plea bargaining than judges from common-law countries,
presumably because bargaining is not so prevalent in civil-law countries. For a description of
bargaining and bargaining analogues in Continental civil-law countries, see Combs, supra note
56, at 37-46.
203. Ruggiu Judgment, supra note 188, 53.
204. Id. 55.
205. Id.
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remained uneasy about the prosecution's sentencing
recommendations, the Ruggiu Trial Chamber's clear announcement
that Trial Chambers would compensate guilty pleas with sentencing
concessions might have been expected to reassure them. No ICTR
defendant tendered a guilty plea for four-and-one-half years, however,
until Vincent Rutaganira pled guilty in December 2004.
4. Rutaganira
Vincent Rutaganira served as conseiller of the Mubuga sector,
Gishyita Commune, Kibuye Prefecture 20 7 from 1980 to 1994.208 The
Prosecutor's charges against Rutaganira centered on a massacre of
Tutsi that took place at the church in Mubuga. Between 4,000 and
5,000 Tutsi had sought refuge in the church, and all but a few were
killed during a three-day massacre in April 1994.209 The indictment
charged that Rutaganira and two others had ordered the attack on the
church and had personally participated in the killings.210 On the basis
of these allegations, the indictment charged Rutaganira with six counts:
genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity, murder as a
crime against humanity, inhumane acts as a crime against humanity, a
violation of Article Three common to the Geneva Conventions, and a
violation of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 211
Rutaganira had fled Rwanda after the massacres and was still
at large at the time the Prosecutor issued the indictment against him in
1996. In February 2002, Rutaganira voluntarily surrendered to the
Tribunal, 212 and by the time he pled guilty, eight-and-one-half years
after his indictment, the prosecution was prepared to take a very
different view of the crimes he had committed. In particular, in his plea
agreement, Rutaganira admitted only to omissions; that is, he denied
both ordering the attack on the church and participating in the attack,
the charges that had formed the basis for his original indictment.
Rather, he admitted only that he was aware that Tutsi civilians had
gathered in the church, that he was aware that assailants were
gathering near the church before the attack took place, and that
207. Rwanda is divided into eleven prefectures, and each of these prefectures is further divided
into communes, which are themselves divided into sectors.
208. Prosecutor v. Kayishema et al., Case No. ICTR-95-1-I, First Amended Indictment 1} 28
(Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Rutaganira Indictment].
209. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, 392, 404
(May 21, 1999).
210. Rutaganira Indictment, supra note 208, 51.
211. Id. 60.
212. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Transcript at 7 (Jan. 17, 2005) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Rutaganira Transcript].
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"despite the fact that he was conseiller of Mubuga secteur he failed to
protect the Tutsi who had sought refuge" in the church.21
3
As part of the plea agreement, Rutaganira pled guilty to only
one count: aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against
humanity on the basis of his omissions., Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the prosecution did not seek merely to withdraw the
remaining counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, but rather asked the Court to acquit Rutaganira of those counts
because, the prosecution maintained, there did not exist sufficient
evidence to convict him.214  As for the sentence to impose on
Rutaganira, the prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of
between six and eight years' imprisonment, and it further agreed to
recommend that Rutaganira serve his sentence either in a European
country or in the Kingdom of Swaziland. 21 5 Finally, the plea agreement
makes clear that Rutaganira would not cooperate with the
prosecution. 216 The Trial Chamber acceded to the prosecution's request
and acquitted Rutaganira of the charges to which he did not plead
guilty. The Trial Chamber sentenced Rutaganira to six years'
imprisonment, 21 7 the shortest sentence ever imposed by the ICTR.
Rutaganira represents the first case of overt sentence
bargaining at the ICTR as it is the first case in which the prosecution
was willing to commit to recommending a specific range of sentences in
exchange for the defendant's guilty plea. Rutaganira also represents
the first ICTR charge bargain,218 but it is not the typical sort of charge
bargain prevalent in national criminal justice systems. In the typical
charge bargain, prosecutors agree to withdraw provable counts in
exchange for the defendant's guilty plea. Rutaganira's plea agreement
appears to reflect a typical charge bargain because Rutaganira
admitted to facts substantially less serious than the facts that formed
the basis of his indictment, but it differs in that the prosecution
apparently was willing to accept Rutaganira's meager admissions
213. Id. at 10-11.
214. Id. at 2-3.
215. Id. at 8. As noted infra, most ICTR convicts have been sent to serve their sentences in
Mali.
216. Id. at 29.
217. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment and Sentence (Mar. 14,
2005).
218. A charge bargain appeared to take place in Serushago but likely did not. Serushago's
initial indictment charged him with five counts: genocide, and murder, extermination, torture,
and rape as crimes against humanity. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-I, Modified
Indictment at 20-24 (Oct. 14, 1998). Serushago pled guilty to four of the counts, and the
prosecution dropped the count of rape as a crime against humanity. Prosecutor v. Serushago,
Case No. ICTR 98-39-S, Sentence, 2-4. According to prosecutors, the rape charge was
withdrawn for lack of evidence to prove the charge.
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because it truly did not have the evidence to prove the original charges
at trial. The prosecution said as much during Rutaganira's sentencing
hearing, admitting that its "chances of success in proving all the
charges against him was... extremely low"'219 because the Prosecutor
was "not in possession of any evidence ... which indicates that Mr.
Rutaganira himself was implicated in the planning of the said
attack,... nor does [the Prosecutor] possess any evidence ... indicating
that Mr. Rutaganira's role in the said attack at Mubuga church was
premeditated."
220
The evidence and testimony at Rutaganira's sentencing hearing
supported the prosecution's representations. Witnesses testified, for
instance, that Rutaganira and his wife had hidden two Tutsi girls and a
Tutsi woman in their home during the massacres, despite the fact that
the Rutaganiras themselves would have been killed had their
assistance to the three Tutsi been revealed.221 Another Tutsi witness
testified that Rutaganira had saved her life by telling assailants that
she was a Hutu,222 while others testified that Rutaganira had been on
very good terms with Tutsi before the killings, acting as a godfather to a
number of Tutsi children and asking Tutsi to be godparents to some of
his children.223 Finally, after the 1994 violence, Mrs. Rutaganira
returned to the same town in Rwanda in which the Mubuga church
massacres took place, and she was appointed Deputy Mayor for
Women's Development. That she holds a political position in Rwanda's
current Tutsi-led government reinforces the prosecution's assertions
that no compelling evidence exists to link Rutaganira with the planning
or implementation of the killings at Mubuga church.
Thus, the dramatic difference between the factual basis of
Rutaganira's indictment and the factual basis of his guilty plea appear
to have resulted from evidentiary insufficiencies rather than from
charge bargaining. Rutaganira's plea deal should nonetheless be
considered a charge bargain because the prosecution asked the Trial
Chamber to acquit Rutaganira of the remaining charges of crimes
against humanity and war crimes for lack of evidence.
224
219. Rutaganira Transcript, supra note 212, at 8.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 20, 24-25, 31.
222. Id. at 15-16.
223. Id. at 20, 24.
224. The prosecution also asked the Trial Chamber to acquit Rutaganira of genocide, but
that request is in keeping with the factual basis of Rutaganira's guilty plea. One cannot commit
genocide without having the specific intent to commit genocide. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, 91 (May 21, 1999) ("A distinguishing aspect of
the crime of genocide is the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy a group in whole or in
part.... It is this specific intent that distinguishes the crime of genocide from the ordinary crime
113
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Extermination as a crime against humanity-the crime to which
Rutaganira pled guilty-is a more serious crime than murder as a
crime against humanity because extermination requires proof of "an
element of mass destruction which is not required for murder."
225
Therefore, if the prosecution possessed sufficient evidence to convict
Rutaganira of aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against
humanity, that evidence must have been sufficient to convict him of
aiding and abetting in murder and inhumane acts as crimes against
humanity. It is not surprising that the prosecution would desire to
eliminate those charges once Rutaganira pled guilty to extermination:
all of the counts related to the same conduct that formed the basis for
the extermination charge. In such cases, prosecutors commonly
withdraw counts that are less serious than the counts to which the
defendant pleads guilty. The distinctive feature of Rutaganira,
however, is that the prosecution did not seek merely to withdraw the
less serious counts but rather to have the Trial Chamber acquit
Rutaganira of those counts on the basis of insufficient evidence. That
request is implausible on its face, given Rutaganira's guilty plea to the
more serious crime of extermination, and one can only assume that
prosecutors agreed to advance this improbable position on the
insistence of Rutaganira himself. As the following discussion will
reveal, that insistence indeed reflects the mind-set of most ICTR
defendants and sheds light on the difficulties facing ICTR prosecutors
who seek to procure guilty pleas.
B. The Dearth of ICTR Guilty Pleas: The Insignificant Influence of
Sentence Discounts
Although ICTR prosecutors failed to obtain any guilty pleas
during the four-and-one-half years between the guilty pleas in Ruggiu
and Rutaganira, it was not for their lack of effort. Prosecutors initiated
plea discussions in a number of cases and not only offered generous
sentencing concessions, 226 but also indicated a willingness to negotiate
over other issues of potential interest to defendants. Both the
Rutaganira plea agreement and my interviews suggest that ICTR
prosecutors are now routinely willing to commit to recommending a
of murder."). Thus, because Rutaganira admitted only to failing to protect the Tutsi, the
prosecution did in fact lack sufficient evidence to convict him of genocide.
225. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 591 (Sept. 2, 1998)
[hereinafter Akayesu Judgment].
226. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2,
2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004).
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sentence within a narrow range of sentences. 227 Although defendants
still have no guarantee that a Trial Chamber will sentence within the
prosecution's recommended range, the fact that ICTR Trial Chambers
most commonly sentence defendants to life imprisonment after trials
228
means that even defendants who do not obtain the precise sentence
that they bargained for are likely to garner some benefit from a guilty
plea. Further, unlike prosecutors in national criminal justice systems
who have the ability to bargain only over the duration of the sentence,
ICTR prosecutors can offer defendants additional benefits in exchange
for their guilty pleas. As the following discussion will show, the location
at which the defendant will serve his sentence had for years been a
potentially fertile field for negotiation before it became an express term
in the Rutaganira plea agreement. And in more recent times, the
prosecution has made plans to transfer some cases to Rwanda for trial;
that threat of transfer could likewise constitute a compelling bargaining
chip.
Turning first to the location of a defendant's detention, the ICTR
Statute provides that convicted persons must serve their sentences in
Rwanda or in any State that has indicated its willingness to accept
convicted defendants. 229 Until lately, the only countries that had
agreed to accept ICTR convicts were Mali, the Republic of Benin, and
the Kingdom of Swaziland, 230 and virtually all ICTR defendants
convicted thus far have been sent to serve their sentences in a prison in
Bamako, Mali.231  Recently, however, three European countries-
227. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1,
2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1,
2004).
228. Ten of the seventeen ICTR defendants who proceeded to trial received life sentences.
Akayesu Judgment, supra note 225, at Sentence; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case
No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, Sentence 32 (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No.
ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, 1008 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case
No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, 7 502 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda,
Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence, 473 (Dec. 6, 1999); Nahimana Judgment, supra
note 185, at 77 1105, 1108 (Dec. 3, 2003) (sentencing Nahimana and Ngeze to life sentences);
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, 7 968 (Dec. 1, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgment and Sentence, 511 (July 15,
2004); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment, 770 (Jan. 22, 2004). An
eleventh defendant, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, would have received a life sentence, but the Trial
Chamber reduced his sentence to thirty-five years' imprisonment to remedy the prosecution's
violation of his procedural rights. Nahimana Judgment, supra note 185, 77 1106-07.
229. ICTR Statute, supra note 8, art. 26.
230. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTRI, Fact Sheet No. 6: International Co-
operation with the Tribunal, http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/factsheets/6.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2006).
231. See Rwandan War Crimes Court Postpones Ministers' Trial Until February, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESS, Oct. 30, 2004 ("Kambanda and five other convicts are currently jailed in Mali.
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France, Italy, and Sweden-signed accords in which they agreed to
imprison ICTR convicts, and France ratified its accord in May 2004.232
Just how much influence ICTR prosecutors can have over the location-
of-detention decision is unclear, since it is a determination typically
made by the President of the Tribunal; for a few years now, however,
prosecutors have at least been willing to pursue discussions on the
issue.233 Ruggiu's plea bargain, in fact, was said to have included an
unofficial prosecutorial promise to transfer Ruggiu to Italy, where some
of his family resides.
234
The most obvious benefit to an ICTR defendant of detention in a
European prison relates to the more comfortable conditions in which
the defendant will be held.235 That the families of many high-level
ICTR defendants have relocated to European countries makes a
European imprisonment all the more attractive. Perhaps most
importantly, defendants imprisoned in Europe are typically eligible for
release after they have served one-half to two-thirds of their
sentences, 236 a benefit not guaranteed to those imprisoned in Mali.
Thus, ICTR defendants sent to European prisons may not only serve
their sentences in greater comfort, but may serve significantly shorter
sentences than defendants who are sentenced to the same term of
imprisonment but who serve their terms in Mali.
As important as the location-of-detention question may be to an
ICTR defendant, the location-of-trial question is even more important.
To comply with the Security Council's instruction that the ICTR
complete its work by 2010, the Tribunal has committed to transferring
some of its cases to national courts in Rwanda. 237 Prosecutors compiled
Three other people who have been given sentences without further appeal are still being held in
ICTR cells, waiting for a country to take them in.").
232. France Ratifies Rwanda Accord, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 11, 2004.
233. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1,
2004); Interview with BM, in The Hague, Neth. (Nov. 8, 2004).
234. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 29,
2004); Interview with BM, in The Hague, Neth. (Nov. 8, 2004).
235. Although ICTR convicts detained in Mali are housed in special facilities prepared with UN
financial aid, these facilities cannot compare with the roomier, better-equipped prisons of Europe.
236. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 539, 649 n.569 (1990) (reporting that French sentences are reduced by one-half for good
behavior); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International
Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 382 n.225 (reporting that an ICTY defendant
imprisoned in Norway is eligible for parole after serving half of his sentence if he is a first time
offender); see also Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and their Ability to Provide Adequate
Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 353, 367-68 (2001)
(describing Western European parole laws as "infinitely more lenient" than those in other parts
of the world).
237. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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a tentative list of cases for transfer, but they did not make this list
public238 for fear of the defendants' reaction. 239 The prospect of a
Rwandan prosecution terrifies some defendants, who believe that they
will suffer physical abuse or even death if they return to Rwanda. That
fear motivated ICTR defendants to conduct a high-profile protest in
September 2004, when forty-four of the ICTR's fifty-six detainees
boycotted their trials and threatened to launch hunger strikes.240 Given
the depth of the defendants' disquiet, the ability to transfer a case to
Rwanda provides prosecutors with a potent bargaining chip. Indeed,
although the prosecution had expected Rutaganira to plead guilty soon
after his voluntary surrender in 2002, it was not until the prosecution
made clear that it intended to transfer his case to Rwanda that
Rutaganira decided to enter his guilty plea.24
1
The above discussion indicates that ICTR prosecutors should be
in a strong position to procure guilty pleas. Prosecutors are willing and
able to offer substantial sentencing concessions to defendants who plead
guilty, and these concessions should be all the more valuable since the
sentences imposed after trials have been so severe. Prosecutors
additionally have the ability to bargain with defendants over the
location of their detention and even over the criminal justice system in
which their case will be heard, issues that will have life-altering impact
in many cases. Thus, given the prosecution's strong desire for guilty
pleas and the compelling issues available for negotiation, one would
have expected a substantial proportion of ICTR defendants to have pled
guilty. After Ruggiu, however, four-and-one-half years elapsed before
another ICTR defendant pled guilty, and a number of ICTR defense
counsel assert that few, if any, additional guilty pleas should be
expected. 242 As the following discussion will reveal, that prediction
stems from the fact that the key inducement offered to convince
domestic defendants to plead guilty-a sentence reduction-has little
persuasive value for ICTR defendants. Rather, these defendants place
greater weight on a variety of primarily ideological factors that serve to
discourage them from pleading guilty.
238. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1,
2004).
239. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004).
240. Modestus Kessy, Genocide Suspects Call Off Protest, THE SUNDAY OBSERVER (U.K.),
Sept. 26, 2004.
241. Thierry Cruvellier, Councillor Rutaganira Strikes a Good Deal, INT'L JUST. TRIB. (Paris,
Fr.), Dec. 20, 2004.
242. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23,
2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004).
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Indeed, most ICTR defendants have refused to plead guilty
because they truly do not believe that they are guilty of the crimes for
which they have been charged. 243  It is widely accepted in the
international legal community that the Rwandan massacres constituted
a genocide, and every ICTR defendant convicted thus far has been
convicted of some form of genocide. 244 The great majority of ICTR
defendants, however, steadfastly deny that genocide occurred in
Rwanda, maintaining instead that the 1994 violence took place in the
context of the long-running war between the Rwandan government and
the RPF. ICTR defendants do not dispute that events spiraled out of
control and that unfortunate and unnecessary violence was targeted
against Tutsi civilians. But they maintain that this violence
constituted the excesses of a legitimate and spontaneous national
defense effort, not a genocidal plan to eliminate the Tutsi.245 They also
stress that crimes were committed by both sides of the conflict. 246 The
ICTR has not prosecuted any members of the RPF, however, a fact
which has exacerbated the defendants' belief that they are victims of
victors' justice-that is, that they are being prosecuted only because
their side lost the war-and that the Tribunal functions merely as a
tool of the current Tutsi-led Rwandan government. Although most
ICTR defendants are thus convinced that they cannot receive a fair
trial,247 they see value in drawing out the proceedings and broadcasting
their political views through those proceedings.
243. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2,
2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23,
2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004); see also MELVERN, supra note 153, at 3 ('The
Arusha prisoners remain convinced of the rectitude of their actions.").
244. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, 334 (June 17, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence, 806 (Feb. 25,
2004); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment, 750 (Jan. 22, 2004);
Nahimana Judgment, supra note 185, TT 1092-1094; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, 942 (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-
96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, 480 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR
97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, T 553 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Elizaphan & G6rard
Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T, Judgment and Sentence, 7 877-78
(Feb. 21, 2003); Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgment and Sentence,
T 495 (July 15, 2001); Ruggiu Judgment, supra note 188, at Verdict; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case
No. ICTR-96-13, Judgment and Sentence, Verdict (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case
No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence, Verdict (Dec. 6, 1999); Kayishema & Ruzindana
Judgment, supra note 183, at Verdict 2; Serushago Sentence, supra note 174, at Verdict;
Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, at Verdict; Akayesu Judgment, supra note 166, at Verdict.
245. Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 29, 2004).
246. Id.; Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004). Commentators estimate that, in
putting an end to the killing spree, the Tutsi-led RPF killed tens of thousands of Hutu. Filip
Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship, 103 AFR. AFF. 177, 194
(2004).
247. Telephone Interview with WM (Oct. 19, 2005).
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The prosecution's recent attempts to secure guilty pleas have
highlighted the ways in which the defendants' characterization of the
violence and their role in that violence can shape and sometimes derail
efforts to obtain guilty pleas. In at least one case, for instance,
prosecutors and defense counsel were able to agree on a sentence
recommendation-and a generous one at that, by all accounts-but
were nonetheless unable to conclude a plea agreement because the
defendant refused to plead guilty to charges of genocide. 248 That the
desire to avoid the label of gdnocidaire would be so compelling as to
preclude an agreement, even when the prosecution agreed to the
sentencing recommendation sought by the defendant, mystified the
prosecutors with whom I spoke.249 Yet, the defendant's position is fully
in keeping with the historical view of the conflict to which ICTR
defendants subscribe. While an ICTR defendant may be able to justify
to himself a guilty plea to crimes against humanity, since it is
undisputed that massive violence did occur in 1994, he cannot admit to
taking part in a genocide because doing so would be fundamentally at
odds with the defendant community's long-held characterization of the
violence. That the only guilty plea to be tendered in recent years-that
of Rutaganira-required the prosecutor not just to withdraw the
genocide count but to request Rutaganira's acquittal on that count only
supports this view.
The legal characterization of crimes is typically of little
significance to criminal defendants, whether domestic or international,
unless that characterization bears directly on the defendant's expected
sentence. That is, most criminal defendants do not particularly care
whether they are convicted of this crime or that crime except in so far
as the conviction affects the sentence. The high-ranking status of
virtually all ICTR defendants helps to explain the atypical emphasis
that these defendants place on characterization issues. While the ICTY
has tried both high-level architects of the atrocities and low-level,
hands-on killers, and the Special Panels have prosecuted only low-level,
uneducated offenders, the vast majority of ICTR defendants held
prominent positions in Rwandan public life. Because most ICTR
defendants had been senior politicians, military leaders, or influential
business people, they possess far greater concern than would lower-
ranking defendants about the legal and factual characterization of the
conflict. In particular, they ardently seek to promote a narrative that
defends and enhances their historical legacy. One defense counsel
248. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2,
2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004).
249. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004).
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reported, for instance, that his client's primary goal during his trial was
to impeach prosecution witnesses whom he believed to be lying and to
present the testimony of witnesses who could reveal to the world what
he believed was the true nature of the events of 1994. The prospect of
spending the rest of his life behind bars was, his counsel believes, of less
concern to this defendant than was his opportunity to create through
his trial a historical record that might, even many years from now,
vindicate his view of the conflict.250 For these reasons, it should come
as no surprise that three of the four ICTR defendants who pled guilty
held low-level positions 251 and consequently had no legacy in need of
protecting.
The defendants' commitment to their characterization of the
violence, in addition, has been reinforced during the several years that
most ICTR defendants have been imprisoned. Before and during trial,
ICTR defendants are detained in the United Nations Detention Facility
("UNDP') in Arusha, Tanzania. By all accounts, the defendants have
formed a closely-knit, hierarchically-ordered community that
communicates regularly, engages in joint decisionmaking, 252 and
mirrors in many ways the characteristics of the Rwandan
administrative state. In such a community, defendants do not have the
benefit of hearing views contrary to their own; thus, their own beliefs
become even more entrenched. 253 Further, those most responsible for
the 1994 violence are said to wield the greatest power within the
detainee community.254 Rwandan society is said by many to be
characterized by an "unconditional obedience to authority,"255 so that
the leaders of the detainee community have considerable ability to
suppress views that are inconsistent with prevailing understandings.
Defendants are additionally deterred from pleading guilty because
admitting genocide undermines the legal position of their fellow
detainees. Group loyalty, then, discourages defendants from taking this
step, and so does fear. The families of many ICTR defendants live in
250. Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004).
251. Rutaganira, in addition, likely also had less formal education than most of the
remaining ICTR defendants. Many of the latter are bi- or tri-lingual, while Rutaganira speaks
only Kinyarwanda. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-I, Minutes of Proceedings at
L.a. (Mar. 7, 2002).
252. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 48-49.
253. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2,
2004).
254. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1,
2004); MELVERN, supra note 153, at 3.
255. PRUNIER, supra note 145, at 141. But see Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity,
Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice, 79 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (calling
the authoritarian thesis into question, by for instance, pointing to "instances of disobedience and
resistance to state authority under a succession of regimes").
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Hutu communities in various nations, and some defendants
legitimately fear that their families will suffer retaliation if they plead
guilty.
256
While a fundamental dispute about the nature of the 1994
events stands as the primary factor deterring ICTR defendants from
pleading guilty, there exist other, perhaps less influential, reasons for
the dearth of guilty pleas. First among these relates to ICTR defense
counsel and the advice they give to their clients. Speculation exists, for
instance, that some defense counsel, particularly those from developing
nations, may be less inclined to encourage their clients to plead guilty
even when the clients would benefit from doing so, because counsel
themselves have financial incentives to proceed to trial.257 While many
Western counsel earn less at the ICTR than they would in their home
countries, counsel from developing nations typically earn considerably
more at the ICTR than they would at home. A conflict-of-interest can
arise, therefore, between counsel, who have a financial interest in
prolonging their ICTR representation, and their clients, who may
benefit from pleading guilty. Other ICTR defense counsel strongly
identify with their clients' political views and with their understanding
of the events of 1994. These counsel are as convinced of their clients'
innocence as the clients themselves and typically discourage guilty
pleas, considering them unprincipled capitulations.
For some ICTR defendants, health and life expectancy
considerations also serve to diminish the influence of sentencing
discounts. A number of ICTR defendants are reportedly infected with
HIV.258 These defendants may conclude that their life expectancies are
already so reduced that the prosecution's sentencing concessions will
ultimately have no practical effect on the amount of time that they
spend incarcerated. That is, these defendants might reason that, if
convicted, they will die behind bars no matter what sentence they
receive, so they might as well try for an acquittal. Guilty pleas may be
undesirable in addition because they hasten the defendants' conviction
and their subsequent transfer from the UNDF to the prison in which
they will ultimately serve their sentences. The UNDF is a comfortable
detention facility by African standards and one that provides its
detainees with appropriate medical treatment. By contrast, the
Magistrat of the Direction National de l'Administration Penitentiaire
256. Telephone Interview with WM (Oct. 19, 2005).
257. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1,
2004).
258. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1,
2004); Interview with BM, in The Hague, Neth. (Nov. 8, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ
(Dec. 1, 2004).
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et de l'Education Surveillee in Mali reported that while ICTR convicts
serving their sentences in Mali receive some medication for
"transmissible diseases," the amounts available are insufficient. 259
Thus, to the extent that an ICTR defendant considers that even after a
guilty plea he will still serve a lengthy sentence, he may choose to
maximize the portion of that sentence that he serves at the UNDF. A
final factor deterring ICTR defendants from pleading guilty stems from
the legacy of distrust generated by the Kambanda case. Whether
accurate or not, the prevailing belief amongst ICTR defendants is that
Kambanda was misled into pleading guilty. Consequently, some ICTR
defendants have remained skeptical that the prosecution's promises are
made in good faith.260
The foregoing discussion, then, places the earlier analysis of the
ICTR's guilty pleas in a new light. The earlier discussion traced the
evolution that has occurred in the ICTR's willingness to reward guilty
pleas with sentencing discounts, and it observed that, on the surface,
that evolution suggested that the ICTR should expect to receive a
substantial number of guilty pleas. Having now delineated the other
factors that have proven more influential than sentence discounts to
ICTR defendants, the guilty pleas tendered thus far appear to be best
understood as the products of unique circumstances that are unlikely to
be replicated. Kambanda, for instance, pled guilty expecting to receive
an extremely short sentence. Kambanda's counsel argued for a
maximum term of two years' imprisonment, 261 and Kambanda
apparently believed that he was likely to receive such a sentence. No
ICTR defendant since Kambanda could be so mistaken.
Serushago's and Ruggiu's guilty pleas likewise stemmed from
unusual circumstances that are unlikely to be repeated at the ICTR.
Serushago was a low-level offender whose case never would have come
before the ICTR had Serushago himself not placed it there. Because he
had no leadership role, Serushago could plead guilty without concern
for the historical effect of his plea.
259. Telephone Interview with Ahmadou Tourre (Sept. 13, 2005). Medication is generally
scarce in Malian prisons. See E.V.O. DANKwA, AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN & PEOPLE'S RIGHTS,
SERIES IV, NO. 4, MALI PRISONS REVISITED: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON PRISONS
AND CONDITIONS OF DETENTION IN AFRICA 16-18 (1999). At least one women's prison in Bamako
releases prisoners with HIV because they "simply don't have the means to provide care and
treatment for them." Julia Nogushi, HIV Management in a Malian Women's Prison, BRUNAP
NEWS (Brown Univ. AIDS Program, Providence, RI), Spring 2004, at 16.
260. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23,
2004). In addition, high-level defendants might fear that the Trial Chamber's apparent practice
of discounting sentences following guilty pleas might apply only to low-level offenders such as
Serushago and Ruggiu.
261. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Transcript at 33 (Sept. 3, 1998).
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Ruggiu's guilty plea was likewise uncomplicated by many of the
factors deterring the remaining ICTR defendants from pleading guilty.
Although, as an initial matter, Ruggiu clung to the Hutu's
characterization of the violence, as a Belgian who had emigrated to
Rwanda only four months before the massacres began, Ruggiu did not
experience the ethnic overtones of the conflict or the subsequent
selective prosecutions in the way that other ICTR defendants do. In
addition, even though Ruggiu hails from a civil-law country in which
plea bargaining is not prevalent, 262 as a European, he was likely more
receptive to the lure of a sentence discount than his community-minded
Rwandan co-defendants. Ruggiu's guilty plea is difficult to interpret in
part because Ruggiu himself is difficult to understand. A close friend
testifying on his behalf described him as excessively rule-oriented and
hard to get along with; even his lawyer described him as "not a
particularly easy character in his person."263 Moreover, the prosecution
has received little benefit from his testimony or the information he
provided. Ruggiu admitted to lying to prosecutors in his early
interviews,264 and his testimony against his former co-defendants was
so riddled with inconsistencies that the Trial Chamber rejected it "in its
entirety."265 Ruggiu's guilty plea cannot, then, be seen to presage much
of anything since it may have sprung from the same idealism and
impulsiveness that apparently motivated Ruggiu's relocation to
Rwanda in the first place.
Before Rutaganira pled guilty in December 2004, a number of
ICTR defense counsel whom I interviewed predicted that, as a result of
the many factors canvassed above, the ICTR would not receive any
further guilty pleas. 266 Although Rutaganira's guilty plea renders that
prediction technically inaccurate, the reasons underlying the prediction
remain compelling. Because Rutaganira held a low-ranking position in
the Rwandan political hierarchy, many of the factors that act to
discourage more senior ICTR defendants from pleading guilty had less
relevance for him. Further, the prosecution had the ability to offer
Rutaganira benefits in addition to a lenient sentence recommendation.
Because he was a low-level offender, Rutaganira was just the sort of
262. See Christine Van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 42 (Christine Van den Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993) ("The Belgian
system does not know the plea of guilty, and concomitantly, the concept of plea bargaining is
unknown.").
263. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 49, 146-47.
264. Nahimana Judgment, supra note 179, 549; Convicted Ex-Radio, supra note 264.
265. Nahimana Judgment, supra note 179, 548-49.




defendant whose case was apt to be transferred to Rwanda. Thus, the
prosecution had that bargaining chip at its disposal, and it was willing,
in addition, to seek a favorable detention location for Rutaganira. Most
importantly, Rutaganira's plea agreement required him to admit only
that a massacre took place that he failed to prevent, and that is an
admission that even the most intractable ICTR defendant could likely
make. ICTR prosecutors cannot be satisfied by such minimal
admissions in other cases, and it remains to be seen whether the desire
to avoid a trial in Rwanda will provide sufficient motivation to persuade
other defendants whose cases might be transferred to Rwanda to plead
guilty. It certainly may. ICTR defendants are reportedly terrified of
the physical violence they believe they will suffer in Rwanda,267 and
even if they escape such harm, if convicted, they can look forward only
to an unpleasant detention in an over-crowded Rwandan prison that
may not adequately provide for their medical needs. 268 One defense
counsel went so far as to describe a transfer to Rwanda as a death
sentence. 269 In addition, because a trial in a Rwandan court is not apt
to provide defendants with as desirable a public platform to proclaim
their version of the events of 1994 as an ICTR trial, the perceived value
of trials will diminish. The question of whether it is ethically
appropriate to bargain over issues of such potential significance as the
transfer of cases to Rwandan courts is beyond the scope of this Article,
but, ethical or not, such bargaining likely provides prosecutors with the
best vehicle for convincing future ICTR defendants to plead guilty.
V. CULTURAL FACTORS INFLUENCING PLEA BARGAINING AND THE
PERCEPTION GAP BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL: GUILTY
PLEAS AT THE SPECIAL PANELS FOR SERIOUS CRIMES
East Timor had been a Portuguese colony for more than 450
years270 when, in 1974, Portugal began to consider dismantling its
colonies. Before Portugal could take any action, however, Indonesia
267. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1,
2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1,
2004). Others believe that, because cases that the ICTR transfers to Rwanda will be carefully
watched, ICTR defendants are relatively unlikely to suffer physical violence. Telephone
Interview with WM (Oct. 19, 2005).
268. For an indictment of ICTR prison conditions in the late 1990s, see Human Rights First,
Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: A Human Rights First Report on the ICTR and National
Trials, VIII.E. (July 1997); Drumbl, supra note 193, at 571-72.
269. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004).
270. For a discussion of the Timorese colonial period, see James J. Fox, Tracing the Path,
Recounting the Path: Historical Perspectives on Timor, in OUT OF THE ASHES: DESTRUCTION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF EAST TIMOR 1, 1 (James J. Fox & Dionisio Babo-Soares eds., 2003).
[Vol. 59:1:69
2006] GUILTY PLEAS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 125
invaded East Timor in December 1975 and soon after formally
annexed the territory, proclaiming East Timor to be Indonesia's
twenty-seventh province. 271 By 1999, Indonesia's continued military
presence in East Timor had led to trenchant international criticism
and a financial drain on Indonesia's fragile economy. 272  As a
consequence, then-Indonesian President B.J. Habibie committed to a
UN-sponsored consultation process whereby a referendum would be
held permitting the East Timorese to vote either to become
independent or to remain within Indonesia, bearing a special
autonomous status.273 The months leading up to the August 1999
ballot saw considerable violence, sponsored by Indonesia and aimed at
intimidating the East Timorese population into voting to remain
within Indonesia. 274 When 78.5 percent of the East Timorese voted
instead for independence, 275 heavily armed groups conducted a
"scorched earth" campaign. These groups "burned and looted entire
towns and villages, attacked and killed at random in the streets, and
forcibly 'evacuated' or kidnapped people to the western half of the
271. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on East Timor, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General, 5, delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/54/726, S/2000/59 (Jan. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Commission of Inquiry on East Timor]; see also
Phillip J. Curtin, Comment, Genocide in East Timor? Calling for an International Criminal
Tribunal for East Timor in Light of Akayesu, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 181, 184-85 (2000) (discussing
the colonial history and Indonesia's invasion of East Timor); Sylvia de Bertodano, Current
Developments in Internationalized Courts, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 226, 228-29 (2003) (providing a
historical background on East Timor).
272. The financial issues stemmed in part from the monetary crisis in South-East Asia,
which rendered Indonesia particularly reliant on International Monetary Fund restructuring
loans and particularly vulnerable to international criticism that might endanger the provision of
those loans. See Grayson J. Lloyd, The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations
and the International Community, in OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 270, at 79, 8 -85 (discussing
the influence of international pressure and IMF loans on the Indonesian government's
concessions regarding East Timorese autonomy).
273. Suzannah Linton, Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice
System in East Timor, 25 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 122, 128-29 (2001); see also Dionisio Babo-
Soares, Political Developments Leading to the Referendum, in OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 271,
at 57, 64-66 (discussing the political and military events leading up to the referendum). See
generally Lloyd, supra note 272, at 84-92.
274. See Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, supra note 271, 41-42, 124 (discussing
the tactics used to intimidate East Timorese civilians); The Secretary-General, Situation of
Human Rights in East Timor: Note by the Secretary-General, 26, U.N. Doc A/54/660 (Dec. 10,
1999) ("[P]ro-integration groups launched a campaign of intimidation and violence directed
against persons and communities known for their pro-independence sympathies.").
275. Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in
International Justice, 12 CRIM. L. F. 185, 203 (2001). Voter turnout was extremely high: 98.6% of
registered voters cast their ballots. Fausto Belo Ximenes, The Unique Contribution of the
Community-Based Reconciliation Process in East Timor 7 (May 28, 2004) (unpublished paper, on
file with author).
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island, which was still part of Indonesia." 276 After sending security
forces to halt the violence, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1272, establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor and empowering it "to exercise all legislative and
executive authority, including the administration of justice."277
Pursuant to that authority, the Secretary-General for East Timor
created Special Panels for Serious Crimes in the Dili District Court to
prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
particularly serious domestic crimes.278 Although the success of the
Special Panels was substantially impeded by Indonesia's refusal to
surrender suspects, 279 the Special Panels were able to prosecute
276. Hansjbrg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 50 (2001); see also Suzannah
Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM.
L. F. 186, 202-03 (2001); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE
OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 261 (2002).
277. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
278. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/11, §§ 9-10, UNTAETJREG/2001/11 (Mar. 6, 2000); UNTAET
Reg. No. 2000/15, § 1.3, UNTAET[REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000). The domestic crimes over which
the Dili District Court has jurisdiction are murder, sexual offenses, and torture. UNTAET Reg.
No. 2000/11, supra, § 10.1. The Special Panels were internationally dominated: they were
composed of two international judges and one East Timorese judge, and the Court of Appeal
hearing cases involving serious crimes had a panel with two out of three international judges.
UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, supra, § 22. Since East Timor gained independence in May 2002, the
Serious Crimes Unit, which was the prosecutorial arm of the Special Panels, worked under the
legal authority of the Prosecutor-General in Timor-Leste, the name taken by East Timor on
independence. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, THE LOLOTOE CASE: A SMALL STEP
FORWARD, 3 (July 2004) [hereinafter THE LOLOTOE CASE: A SMALL STEP FORWARD].
279. By December 2004, the Special Panels had indicted 370 individuals. Press Release,
Office of the Deputy Gen. Prosecutor for Serious Crimes Timor Leste, SCU Indicts Suai Church
Massacre Commanders (Nov. 30, 2004). At least 281 of those individuals were residing in
Indonesia, JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, THE FUTURE OF THE SERIOUS CRIMES
UNIT: JSMP ISSUE REPORT 10 (Jan. 2004), and that country refused to surrender them. See id.;
AMNESTY INT'L & JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE: THE
WAY FORWARD § 4.1 at 23 (Apr. 2004) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE] ('The Indonesian
government has publicly stated that it will not cooperate with the Timor-Leste government in
bringing to trial persons against whom indictments have been presented to the Special Panels.");
ASIA PACIFIC CENTRE FOR MILITARY LAW & JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, REPORT
OF PROCEEDINGS: SYMPOSIUM ON JUSTICE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COMMITTED ON THE
TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR § 3.1 at 5 (Jan. 2003) ('Thus far, there has been no cooperation from
Indonesia with requests for the detention and transfer of indictees within Indonesia.").
In an effort to stave off calls for an international criminal tribunal for East Timor on the
order of the ICTY and ICTR, the Government of Indonesia agreed to undertake domestic
prosecutions of Indonesians accused of international crimes relating to Timorese independence.
These trials have recently concluded and have been condemned as shams. Indonesia selected
only five incidents out of 670 for prosecution, and the prosecutions themselves were plagued by
corruption, incompetence, and an effort to shield perpetrators from responsibility. See JUSTICE
FOR TIMOR-LESTE, supra, §§ 5-9 (providing a history of the Indonesian trials); William J. Furney,
East Timor Atrocities: Submit to International Tribunal, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Aug.
15, 2003 (reporting that "almost every major international human rights group slamm[ed] the
trials of 18 former officials as an unabashed 'whitewash."'); Eugene Bingham, Getting Away with
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eighty-seven defendants, convicting eighty-four of them. In May 2005,
the UN stopped funding the Panels and they consequently closed.280
Details of Special Panels prosecutions are extremely difficult to
obtain.281 Some judgments are not available in English, and some
that are available in English are limited to three or four page
"Dispositions of the Decision," which do little more than state the
defendants' crimes and the sentences imposed for those crimes.
28 2
Special Panels cases are therefore challenging to research,28 3 but
prosecutors and defense counsel indicate that at least 50 percent of
Special Panels defendants elected to plead guilty. 284 The proportion of
Murder, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Aug. 30, 2003 (reporting on the corruption and non-cooperation
of the Indonesian government during the trials); David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is
the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, ASIA PACIFIC ISSUES (East-West Center,
Honolulu, HI), Aug. 2002, at 4 (discussing Indonesia's "show trials"). Twelve of the eighteen
defendants were acquitted outright, and four of the six who were convicted were sentenced to
terms of three years' imprisonment for crimes against humanity. All of the defendants remained
free while their cases were on appeal, JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE, supra, § 9.9 at 48, and in 2004,
Indonesia's appeals court overturned four of the six convictions which concerned Indonesian
defendants and halved the sentences of the remaining two defendants, both of whom are ethnic
Timorese. Andrew Burrell, Just Two Punished for Timor Atrocities, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REVIEW,
Aug. 7, 2004; Jakarta Rejects Timor Convictions, BBC NEWS, Aug. 6, 2004. Following
dissatisfaction with these prosecutions, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established a
Commission of Experts to examine and report on the prosecutions. Annan Names Experts to
Probe Impunity in Independence Violence in Timor-Leste, U.N. NEWS SERV., Feb. 18, 2005. The
Commission's report recommends requiring Indonesia to review the prosecutions and to re-open
them if appropriate. It also recommends giving Indonesia six months to provide a
comprehensive report to the UN Secretary-General concerning its investigations of its own
prosecutions and the indictments issued by the Serious Crimes Unit. The Secretary-General,
Annex 1: Summary of the Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review
the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999,
25, 27-28, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/455 (May 26, 2005). If
Indonesia fails to undertake this investigation, the Commission recommended that the UN
Security Council establish an ad-hoc criminal tribunal for Timor-Leste. Id. 29.
280. Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, available at
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Court%20Monitoring/spsc.htm; Human Rights Watch, Human
Rights Overview: East Timor, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/eastti9825.htm.
281. The best source for information on the Special Panels is the website of the Judicial
System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), http://www.jsmp.minihub.org.
282. E.g., Prosecutor v. Mendes Correia, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious
Crimes, Dispositions, Case No. 19/2001 (Mar. 3, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sarmento, Dili District
Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 18/2001, Disposition, (July 16, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Mendonga, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No.
18a/2001, Disposition of the Decision (Oct. 13, 2003).
283. In January 2005, the President of the Court of Appeal issued instructions that all
information in case files, including final decisions, would no longer be publicly available. Press
Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Public Access Barred to Decisions from
District Courts (Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with author). Decisions such as these certainly do not
enhance the already limited transparency of the Panels.
284. Telephone interview with Nicholas Koumjian, Deputy Prosecutor for Serious Crimes,
Special Panels for Serious Crimes (July 29, 2004); Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Def.
Counsel, Special Panels for Serious Crimes (July 30, 2004).
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defendants who pled guilty is thus much higher at the Special Panels
than it is at the ICTY or the ICTR, and that high proportion does bear
a significant relationship to the sentencing discounts bestowed on
Special Panels defendants who entered guilty pleas. The relationship,
however, is a complex one. Special Panels defendants themselves
were little tempted by the prospect of sentence discounts. Instead,
they were motivated to plead guilty by a coalition of cultural and
socio-economic factors that not only play little role in the guilty-plea
decisions of Western defendants but may be difficult for Westerners
even to comprehend. Indeed, for a variety of reasons that will soon be
canvassed, many Special Panels defendants would have pled guilty
even if they had not obtained any sentencing benefits in exchange.
Special Panels defendants are represented by counsel, however, and in
the last years of the Panels' existence, counsel insisted that their
clients receive appropriate discounts before they would enter guilty
pleas.28 5 Thus, sentencing discounts came to be required if East
Timorese defendants were to tender guilty pleas, but it was not
typically the East Timorese defendants who required them. The next
Section will examine why the prospect of sentence discounts did not
substantially influence the guilty-plea decisions of Special Panels
defendants, and the following Section will explore the way in which
the presence of defense counsel served to transform sentence discounts
from an incidental benefit to the primary goal of defendants' guilty
pleas.
A. Sentencing Discounts Through the Eyes of Special Panels
Defendants
In the early days of the Special Panels, no plea negotiations
took place. 286 The prosecution saw no pressing need to resolve its
cases summarily, and defense counsel at that time were so few, so
under-resourced, and so unfamiliar with guilty pleas that they were
not truly capable of engaging in plea negotiations.287 In addition,
285. In the Lolotoe case, for instance, when defendant Jos6 Cardoso spontaneously attempted
to apologize to the court, defense counsel immediately stopped Cardoso from speaking and asked
to confer with him. After that conference, Cardoso asserted that he no longer wished to say
anything. Judicial System Monitoring Programme, The Lolotoe Case, Trial Notes (Apr. 10, 2002)
(unpublished document, on file with author).
286. Telephone interview with Essa Faal, former Chief of Prosecutions, Special Panels for
Serious Crimes (July 30, 2004); Telephone interview with Stuart Afford, former prosecutor,
Special Panels for Serious Crimes (Feb. 17, 2005); Telephone interview with Brenda Sue
Thornton, former prosecutor, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, (Sept. 12, 2005).
287. Telephone interview with Brenda Sue Thornton, former prosecutor, Special Panels for
Serious Crimes (Sept. 12, 2005).
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neither the prosecution nor the defense knew what range of sentences
the Special Panels would be inclined to impose, so bargaining over
sentencing recommendations seemed a particularly uncertain
endeavor. 288 However, despite the fact that early Special Panels
defendants received no promise of a sentence discount, virtually all of
them admitted to participating in the crimes for which they were
charged, and many formally attempted to plead guilty.28 9  The
prospect of a sentence reduction was obviously not the factor
motivating these early Special Panels defendants to plead guilty.
Rather, the primary explanation for the defendants' propensity to
spontaneously confess their crimes rests on the East Timorese belief
system and, more particularly, on the Timorese understanding of
crime and the proper response to crime.
Special Panels defendants subscribe to a world-view that is
very different from that of Westerners, and one that is much less
likely to value the sentencing concessions that prove so important to
ICTY defendants and defendants in Western criminal justice
systems. 290 The majority of East Timorese survive by means of
subsistence farming and believe that, to ensure appropriate weather
288. Telephone interview with Stuart Alford, former prosecutor, Special Panels for Serious
Crimes (Feb. 17, 2005).
289. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fernandes, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious
Crimes, Case No. 02 C.G. 2000, 4 (Mar. 1, 2000) ('The Defence admitted that Julio Fernandes
stabbed twice Americo, that the victim was tied, beaten and suffering and that the crowd was
shouting 'kill him, kill him."'); Prosecutor v. Soares Carmona, Dili District Court, Special Panels
for Serious Crimes, Case No. 03 C.G. 2000, Judgment, 3 (Mar. 8-Apr. 25, 2001) ("Most of the
factual allegations made by the Public Prosecutor are undisputed because Carlos Soares
Carmona himself acknowledged them."); Prosecutor v. Bere, Dili District Court, Special Panels
for Serious Crimes, Case No. 10/2000, Judgment, 5 (May 15, 2001) ("Most of the factual
allegations made by the Public Prosecutor are undisputed because Manuel Gonqalves Leto Bere
himself acknowledged them.'); Prosecutor v. Soares, Dili District Court, Special Panels for
Serious Crimes, Case No. 12/2000, 4 (May 31, 2001) ('The accused admits that he shot the
victim. . . "); Prosecutor v. Leki, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No.
05/2000, Judgment, 2 (June 11, 2001) ('The defendant did not plead guilty. He stated at the
time he was forced to kill only one of the alleged victims, and consequently was not guilty.");
Prosecutor v. Valente, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 3/2001, 2
(June 19, 2001) (reporting that the defendant "recognizes that he killed Benedito Marques
Cabral, but [says] that he was ordered.").
290. Belief systems vary from region to region in East Timor. See David Mearns, Looking
Both Ways: Models for Justice in East Timor, AUSTRALIAN LEGAL RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL
PUBLICATION, at 32 (Nov. 2002) (stating that underlying principles of justice and social
interaction exist "despite [the villagers] relative autonomy and apparent differences in detail.")
(on file with author); Tanja Hohe & Rod Nixon, Reconciling Justice: 'Traditional' Law and State
Judiciary in East Timor, paper prepared for the United States Institute of Peace and delivered
at the workshop on the Working of Non-State Justice Systems, held at the Overseas
Development Institute, Brighton U.K., at 12-13 (Mar. 6-7, 2003) (on file with author); Fox, supra
note 270, at 1. 1 have space to present only a bare-bones summary of selected beliefs that are
common to most regions and that are relevant to my discussion.
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conditions, soil fertility, and the like, they must maintain excellent
relations with their ancestors. 291 Maintaining these relations requires
East Timorese to perform certain rituals, adhere to certain taboos, and
maintain hierarchical social relationships. It is only through these
practices, the East Timorese believe, that they will appease their
ancestors and prevent misfortune. 292 Indeed, as one scholar put it, the
East Timorese "would be afraid not to follow their customs, as it could
prove very dangerous to them and their families not to do so. The idea
that mystical sanctions are likely to be imposed by the ancestors or
the spirits remains a very strong force.
'293
The need to appease powerful ancestral spirits also informs the
East Timorese understanding of crime and its appropriate
punishment. 294  The East Timorese view crimes and other
transgressions of the social order as disruptions of the cosmic flow of
values. Because crime creates an imbalance of values, the appropriate
response to crime must aim to restore that balance, which will in turn
reinforce the socio-cosmic order. 295  Such a restoration requires
reconciliation between affected individuals and their communities,
and to achieve that reconciliation, offenders are typically required to
acknowledge their wrongdoing publicly, to apologize, and to obtain the
victim's forgiveness. 296 A successful reconciliation signifies that the
conflict has been resolved and that both sides are again engaged in a
peaceful relationship; if reconciliation fails to occur, by contrast, East
Timorese believe that the social order remains imbalanced and the
community's well-being subject to threat.
The desirability-indeed, the compelling need-in the East
Timorese belief system for reconciliation motivated most Special
Panels defendants to confess their wrongdoing regardless of whether
sentencing concessions were promised them in return for their
291. Hohe & Nixon, supra note 290, at 11.
292. Id.
293. Mearns, supra note 290, at 44-45; see also Dionisio Babo-Soares, Nahe Biti: The
Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation (and Justice) in East Timor, 5 ASIA PACIFIC
J. ANTHROPOLOGY 15, 22 (2004) ("Failure to observe appropriate rituals/exchanges leads to an
imbalance, which might result in negative consequences to those living in the secular world.").
294. Indeed, "[alll socio-cultural aspects of 'traditional' society are interdependent. Any one
aspect, such as law, kinship or the belief system cannot be extracted from the entire socio-cosmic
system without taking it out of context." Hohe & Nixon, supra note 290, at 12.
295. Id. at 18.
296. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION
PROCESS OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 26-27 (April 2004)
(on file with author) [hereinafter UNDP REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS];
see also Babo-Soares, supra note 293, at 15-16 (observing that the East Timorese conception of
reconciliation "forms part of a grand process that aims to link the past and the future" and is an
evolving process which seeks ultimately to achieve a stable social order within society).
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confessions. Special Panels defendants wanted to return to their
original communities after suffering whatever punishment the Special
Panels chose to mete out, but they knew that they would not be
welcomed back unless they had reconciled with their victims. To
accomplish this, the defendants needed to suffer the punishment
prescribed by the Special Panels. Although the following discussion
will reveal that Special Panels defendants have little understanding of
the contours of the crimes with which they were charged, they do
possess a basic understanding that their actions were wrong, and that
their wrongdoing must give rise to punishment. 297 Confessing their
crimes serves to acknowledge their wrongdoing and constitutes the
first step in the reconciliation process.
Sentencing discounts provided only a weak inducement to
Special Panels defendants in addition because East Timorese view
incarceration as an alien form of punishment and do not seek to avoid
it with quite the same urgency as Western defendants. Because crime
is conceived as creating an imbalance of values, traditional East
Timorese justice mechanisms do not seek primarily to punish the
offender, but aim rather to restore values and to re-establish the socio-
cosmic order. 298  To that end, traditional East Timorese justice
requires first and foremost that the offender compensate the victim
and the victim's family, whose honor has been damaged, as a means of
re-establishing balance. 299 In cases of theft, for instance, the offender
is required to compensate the victim for the stolen goods and to pay
additional compensation. If a house is destroyed, the perpetrator
must compensate the victims for everything that was in the house or,
if he is unable to do so, the victims are entitled to the perpetrator's
belongings.300 Even a murder may result in compensation being paid
by the murderer to the victim's family.3 0 1 Because compensation and
reconciliation constitute the central features in the East Timorese
297. Telephone interview with Sylvia de Bertodano, former Defense Counsel, Special Panels
for Serious Crimes (Dec. 2, 2004). Indeed, one defense counsel asserted that Special Panels
defendants often talk of "killing" in an imprecise way. If a defendant, for instance, draws the
blood of a victim who then falls to the ground, he might feel that he has "killed" that victim even
though subsequent questioning reveals that the victim later got up and was killed by other
militia members. Email interview with Sebastian Appenah, Defense Researcher[Lawyer, Special
Panels Defence Lawyers Unit (Dec. 6, 2004).
298. Hohe & Nixon, supra note 290, at 18.
299. Mearns, supra note 290, at 43; see also id. at 54 ("[T]he variety of local practices in the
area of justice and dispute resolution are all built upon a fundamental principle of reciprocity
and fair compensation."); UNDP REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS, supra
note 296, at 11, 28 ("[J]ustice in East Timor [is] not always about punishment, but also
compensation, contrition and other forms of reciprocity.").
300. Hohe & Nixon, supra note 290, at 21.
301. Id. at 20.
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conception of justice, detention is rarely imposed on offenders. Indeed,
in the eyes of many East Timorese, detention constitutes precious
little punishment since prisoners are fed and housed in jail, and in
some cases can avoid their compensation obligation.302 I do not mean
to suggest that Special Panels defendants find incarceration
appealing, but in light of the difficulties inherent in eking out a
sustainable existence in East Timor, Special Panels defendants do not
appear to view incarceration with quite the same distaste as do
criminal defendants from more prosperous nations. Consequently, a
promise to reduce the sentence of incarceration is not apt to be valued
as highly by Special Panels defendants.
Finally, sentencing discounts did little to influence the guilty-
plea decisions of Special Panels defendants because these defendants
had only a limited ability to understand the nature of the guilty-plea
process or even the larger prosecution surrounding it. The Special
Panels were not able to obtain custody over high-level offenders, 30 3 so
virtually all of the defendants brought before the Panels were
illiterate farmers, 3 4 many of whom were coerced into participating in
the atrocities. In addition to lacking general education, these
defendants lacked specific understanding of the nature of criminal
processes. During the twenty-four years that Indonesia occupied East
Timor, the East Timorese were completely excluded from judicial
processes. Consequently, East Timorese have had "no experience of a
functional criminal justice system with necessary checks and
302. Id. at 64; see also Chandra Lekha Sriram, Globalising Justice: From Universal
Jurisdiction to Mixed Tribunals, 22 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 7, 25 (2004) ("Concerns have been raised
among village leaders that when a perpetrator has been caught and locked up, this will do
nothing to alleviate the economic and social suffering of the victim(s) and the village and hence
an additional punishment is expected upon return."). During the Indonesian period, serious
criminal matters were supposed to be handled by state courts, but these were not regarded as
legitimate bodies to resolve disputes: "These courts remained inaccessible and alien, as they did
not involve traditional leaders or the conflicting parties, they were not cost effective or time
efficient, and the [sic] did not result in 'appropriate' sanctions or incorporate the important notion
of compensation." UNDP REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS, supra note 296,
at 25 (emphasis added).
303. See supra text note 279 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. da Costa, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes,
Case No. 7/2000, 16 (Oct. 11, 2001) (describing the defendant as "[A]n ignorant person who is
illiterate."); Prosecutor v. Marques, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case
No. 09/2000, T 168 (Dec. 11, 2001) (defendant Gonsalo Dos Santos describing himself as
illiterate); Prosecutor v. Bere, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No.
10/2000, 2 (May 15, 2001) (reporting on a defense motion that described the defendant as in
illiterate civilian); Press Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court Sentences
Liquica Militia Member to 20 Years Jail (Sept. 10, 2002) ('The judges emphasized that [the
defendant] was illiterate .... "); Suzannah Linton & Caitlin Reiger, The Evolving Jurisprudence
and Practice of East Timor's Special Panels for Serious Crimes on Admissions of Guilt, Duress
and Superior Orders, 4 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 167, 182 (2001).
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balances,"305 and, according to one defense counsel, they have little
conception even of rights.30 6 Further, many Special Panels defendants
speak only Tetum, a simple language that does not have words for
some of the distinctions relevant to explaining certain crimes,3 07 while
other defendants speak even less sophisticated tribal languages.3 08
Throughout its life, the Special Panels suffered from an inadequate
staff of interpreters and translators. But even with a sufficient
number of highly qualified interpreters, many Special Panels
defendants would have been unable to grasp certain concepts
necessary for understanding the crimes for which they were charged
because their languages did not permit the explication of those
concepts. Unlike ICTR defendants, then, who may be prepared to
plead guilty to crimes against humanity but balk at assuming the
label "gdnocidaire," most Special Panels defendants were unable even
to comprehend the distinction.30 9 Indeed, as the following exchange
from the Umbertus Ena case demonstrates, even a Panel's relatively
straightforward efforts to ascertain whether a defendant understands
the nature of the charges against him can fail.
JUDGE: Can you understand the nature of the accusation against you? Did you read
indictments or someone read it for you?
DEFENDANT: I'm saying like this, I will speak about, I said that I'm only a small man
and there is people who would like to kill myself, and I defend myself so I could leave.
JUDGE: You will have time to make declaration, but now the tribunal would like to ask
you whether you have read the indictments and that if you understand the nature of the
indictments. Last time we read for you about the right that you have to access your
legal defense and that you have opportunity to discuss about the accusation against you
with your defense. Did you read the indictments submitted by the prosecutor against
you?
305. UNDP REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS, supra note 296, at 28; see
also Telephone interview with Mohamed Othman, Former Prosecutor General of East Timor
(Aug. 4, 2004).
306. Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Defense Counsel, Special Panels for Serious
Crimes (July 30, 2004).
307. For instance, in the Lolotoe case, defense counsel was not able to receive from a witness
a comprehensible answer to the question "Do you know the difference between soldier and
militia" because the word "difference" reportedly does not exist in Tetum. Judicial System
Monitoring Programme, The Lolotoe Case, Trial Notes (Apr. 11, 2002) (on file with author).
308. See Press Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court Sentences Liquica
Militia Member to 20 Years Jail (Sept. 10, 2002) ("The judges emphasized that [the defendant]
was illiterate and did not speak Indonesian or Tetum, East Timor's national language, only
speaking his local dialect."); JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, SPECIAL PANELS FOR
SERIOUS CASES - WEEKLY REPORT (Jan. 27-31, 2003) (In the Josg Cardoso case, "[T]he court was
delayed until 1012 hours because of difficulties in finding a Bunak language interpreter, the only
local dialect spoken by the witness.").
309. Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Defense Counsel, Special Panels for Serious
Crimes (July 30, 2004).
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DEFENDANT: Can I speak?
JUDGE: Yes please.
DEFENDANT: Would you wasn't me to speak loudly or to answer your question?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your honor, my client does not understand. If you can give me
time 5 minutes to speak to him about what is happening now. I have spoken to him last
time, but it seems that he still not understand.
JUDGE: The court gives five minutes for the defense to talk to his client about this, but
first let's try again.
JUDGE: Umbertus Ena, do you know why you are here?
DEFENDANT: Because of what happened in 1999.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I'm worrying that he may mitigated himself and I worry because
he is very unsophisticated man.
JUDGE: This court gives five minutes to both defense counsels to talk to their clients.
This court is postponed to 5 minutes.
AFTER 5 MINUTES BREAK
JUDGE: After the consult with the defense counsel, I think that I can ask the question,
Umbertus Ena, can you please stand up? Do you understand the accusation against
you?
DEFENDANT: I know.
JUDGE: Do you know the nature of the accusation?
DEFENDANT: I know.310
Guilty-plea colloquies proved even more worrisome as they
suggested that many Special Panels defendants pled guilty without
any real awareness of what they were doing or of the consequences of
their pleas. When Special Panels judges asked Benjamin Sarmento if
he wanted to plead guilty, for instance, he seemed to indicate that he
did, but he repeatedly asserted that he had been ordered to commit
the crimes, making such statements as: "People send us to kill. That's
why we did it. That is like we accept our guilty," and "This charge, I
accept, because they told me to do it. That's why I accept. But the
problem is that for me to think about doing it, I wouldn't have done it.
That is because I was told to do it. '311 Despite the obvious ambiguities
310. Prosecutor v. Ena, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No.
05/2002, Transcript at 2 (Feb. 14, 2003).
311. Public Prosecutor v. Sarmento, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes,
Court Record at 10 (June 30, 2003) (on file with author).
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in Sarmento's admissions, the Panel accepted his guilty plea, making
no attempt to apprise him of the consequences of his action. A few
minutes later, Sarmento's co-defendant, Romeiro Tilman, also
attempted to plead guilty, and his responses were even more
equivocal. Tilman apparently held the victim down while someone
else killed him. When asked if he was prepared to plead guilty,
Tilman responded:
I agree. This is not because of what I wanted, but because those in charge forced me. I
did it. It is not that I used a knife, or a machete to kill. I didn't. The commander of
militia forced me. I was scared of death. My colleague did it. And I have been in jail for
over 3 years. This wrong is not mine. The person who did this is not here. And I, have
come to accept my wrong.... I feel that I am wrong because I held with my hands.
3 12
Because Tilman claimed to have been forced to commit the crime, the
court adjourned to allow him to consult with his lawyer. Returning
from his consultation, Tilman said simply: "I am guilty.
313
The Special Panels defendants' already-limited ability to make
informed decisions about the guilty-plea process was further impeded
by an insufficient staff of translators, a problem mentioned above and
one that was especially acute at the Special Panels' outset. Trials had
to be postponed for lack of interpreters, 314 and in many cases, defense
counsel were not provided their own interpreters, so they had to seek
help from prosecution interpreters or court interpreters in order to
consult with their clients. 315 Even in the Special Panels' later days,
312. Id. at 15.
313. Id. at 16.
314. See Suzanne Katzenstein, Note, Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor,
16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 252 (2003); JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, SPECIAL
PANELS FOR SERIOUS CASES - WEEKLY REPORT (Jan. 27-31, 2003) (reporting that the trial was
postponed because of the difficulty of finding a language interpreter and that a prosecution
witness was never called to testify because translation was unavailable). Further, some
judgments have been issued in only one of the Panels' official languages, even though judges on
that very Panel were unable to read the judgment. See de Carvalho v. Prosecutor General, Court
of Appeal of East Timor, Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 2001, Judgment of Fredrick Egonda-Ntende,
1 1 (Oct. 29, 2001) (Because the Court of Appeal judgment "is in Portuguese, a language I do not
understand, and there are no translation services.... I have therefore decided to briefly explain
my reasons for the decision made today."); Fernandes v. Prosecutor General, Court of Appeal of
East Timor, Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 2001, Judgment of Fredrick Egonda-Ntende, 36, (June
29, 2001) ("The majority of this court, if I understand there [sic] position correctly, (that position
is set out in Portuguese, a language I do not understand and for which no translation is
provided .... )"; JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE, supra note 279, § 3.10 ("[D]ecisions, two thirds of
which are delivered in Portuguese, are not translated into English, Bahasa Indonesia or Tetum
with the result that some trial judges, defense lawyers and suspects cannot understand them.");
see also de Bertodano, supra note 271, at 233 (reporting that a judgment "was given in
Portuguese and, despite an obligation on the Court to provide translations, it has not been made
available in English").
315. Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Lolotoe Trial Observation Weekly Summary
for 21-25 October (2002) (unpublished document, on file with author).
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interpreters were required to work for extensive periods of time
without breaks,3 16 and they consequently often failed to translate
crucial exchanges between counsel and judges into languages that the
defendants could understand. 317  Thus, even if a Special Panels
defendant was one of the rare sort who understood the nature of the
guilty-plea process and wished to condition his plea on the promise of
a sentence reduction, the defendant may well have had no ability to
communicate such a desire.
In sum, Special Panels defendants are culturally disposed to
confess their crimes without concern for any sentencing benefits they
might receive. In the East Timorese world view, offenders must
reconcile with their victims if balance is to be restored following a
crime, and the offender's admission of wrongdoing constitutes a vital
first step in that process of reconciliation. For that reason, during the
Panels' first few years, virtually every defendant immediately
admitted his wrongdoing upon apprehension. That these defendants
might receive a sentence discount in exchange for their admissions
was of little or no consequence to them. They confessed instead for the
reasons just canvassed, and their lack of education, their limited
language skills, and the dearth of interpreters at the Special Panels
prevented these defendants from evaluating the benefits that their
confessions might have gained for them if they had been inclined to
seek them.
It is typically the role of defense counsel to seek such benefits
for their clients, but while early Special Panels defendants were
formally represented by defense counsel, that representation was
insufficient by any measure. Many early defense counsel were East
Timorese who had little or no training in criminal defense, let alone in
plea bargaining. In addition, the Special Panels conducted their work
on a meager $6.3 million annual budget, and, at the outset, virtually
none of those funds were allocated to defense costs. 318 As a result, in
the early cases defense attorneys had no ability to undertake
316. One interpreter, who was translating into Bahasa Indonesia, Tetum, and Portuguese
asked to have the afternoon off, maintaining that he was exhausted. Because the Panel had no
other interpreters, he was not allowed to leave. Judicial System Monitoring Programme, The
Lolotoe Case, Trial Notes (Oct. 31, 2002) (unpublished document, on file with author). Another
translator repeatedly complained about working conditions, id., and was later disqualified after
he made a number of loud outbursts during court sessions. Judicial System Monitoring
Programme, The Lolotoe Case, Trial Notes (Nov. 13, 2002) (unpublished document, on file with
author).
317. THE LOLOTOE CASE: A SMALL STEP FORWARD, supra note 278, § 3.4.
318. $6 million of the $6.3 million was allocated to the prosecution. Virtually all of the
remaining $300,000 constituted the salaries of the international judges. Cohen, supra note 279,
at 5. As Cohen relates, "No one in either the Public Defenders' office or UNTAET could tell me
whether or not the Public Defenders had a budget or, if so, what it was." Id.
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investigations, and indeed, not a single defense witness was called to
testify in the first fourteen trials, not even in a massive case charging
ten defendants with crimes against humanity.319 The Special Panels
prosecutors with whom I spoke indicated that early defendants had so
little assistance that the prosecutors themselves sometimes felt
compelled to step into the role of defense counsel to caution
defendants about making incriminating statements.
320
Sentencing discounts thus had no influence over the guilty-plea
decisions of early Special Panels defendants. As noted above, virtually
all of the early Special Panels defendants immediately admitted their
wrongdoing upon apprehension despite the fact that no benefits were
offered them, and some tried formally to plead guilty. In a number of
cases, the Special Panels declined to accept these guilty pleas because
the defendants' admissions did not precisely match the charges
contained in the indictment, or because the defendants maintained
that they had been forced-or at least ordered-to commit the acts, so
questions remained about their mens rea.321  Although these
319. Id.; de Bertodano, supra note 271, at 232; see JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING
PROGRAMME, GENERAL PROSECUTOR V. MARQUES (THE LOS PALOS CASE): A JSMP TRIAL REPORT
§ 2.3.2.2 (Mar. 2002) ("No witnesses or physical evidence were presented by the defence."); id. §
3.2.2.1 ('The defence raised other reasons for not calling witnesses for the trial, of which one was
lack of resources. They frequently stated that they lacked both cars and the time to travel to the
districts to speak to potential witnesses, to provide transport to court and to pay for the witness
expenses such as food and lodging while being in Dili."). See also Prosecutor v. Gongalves Bere,
Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Case No. 10/2000, Judgment at 4 (May 15,
2001) ("The Defence did not present any witnesses or evidence."); Prosecutor v. Dos Santos Laku,
Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 8/2001, Judgment, 3 (July 25,
2001) (same); Prosecutor v. Soares Carmona, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious
Crimes, Case No. 03 C.G. 2000, Judgment at 2 (Apr. 19, 2001); Prosecutor v. Leki, Dili District
Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Case No. 05/2001, Judgment, 14 (Sept. 14, 2002) ("The
Legal Counsel of the accused did not bring any witnesses nor [sic] he presented any evidence.").
320. Telephone interview with Brenda Sue Thornton, former prosecutor Special Panels for
Serious Crimes (Sept. 12, 2005). Cohen also reports that the "prosecution has not sought to take
advantage of [defense] inadequacies, but has repeatedly tried to help novice defense counsel by
coaching them about how to make motions or objections." Cohen, supra note 279, at 5.
321. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Valente, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes,
Case No. 03/2001, 2 (June 19, 2001) [hereinafter Valente] (observing that although the defendant
tried to enter a guilty plea, the "Special Panel deemed that there was no confession of guilt in
this case because 'the statement of the accused does not correspond with the facts alleged in the
indictment and that there is no clear consultation with the legal representative."'); JUDICIAL
SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, "Los PALOS" CASE TRIAL NOTES 4-6 (Sept. 9, 2001) (on file
with author). Linton & Reiger, supra note 304, at 188 ("The post-Fernandes practice suggests
that that [sic] the Special Panels now shy away from taking decisions at the pre-trial stage and
prefer to proceed to trial whenever the issue of coercion is raised."). In the Gaspar Leki case, for
instance, the defendant pled guilty to murder because he shot and killed a man who had been
hiding in the bushes. The Panel initially accepted the guilty plea, and only as a result of further
questioning did it learn that, although the defendant had been ordered to shoot anything that
moved, he believed that he was shooting a wild pig in the bush. Since the element of deliberate
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defendants did not receive any sentencing concessions from the
prosecution, the Panels themselves ostensibly considered the
defendants' guilty pleas to be mitigating factors in sentencing. A
cursory examination of the sentences imposed on the first handful of
defendants to be tried individually, as well as the sentences imposed
on the ten defendants who were tried together in the Special Panels'
first multi-defendant case indicates, however, that early defendants
received little, if anything, for their guilty pleas.
Jodo Fernandes was the first Special Panels defendant to plead
guilty, and his sentencing Panel asserted that it gave him credit for
his guilty plea by treating it as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
322
The Panel also considered the superior orders pursuant to which
Fernandes committed the crime a mitigating factor, and it sentenced
him to twelve years' imprisonment for the one murder he
committed. 323 Following the Fernandes decision, the Panel conducted
trials in a number of cases featuring similar facts. In particular,
Carlos Soares, Manuel Bere, Agustinho da Costa, and Augusto
Tavares were each convicted of one murder following a trial, and each
had the benefit of superior orders as a mitigating factor. These cases,
thus, resembled Fernandes in every respect except for Fernandes's
guilty plea. Soares, Bere, da Costa, and Tavares received sentences of
imprisonment of fifteen-and-one-half years, fourteen years, fifteen
years, and sixteen years, respectively. Because these sentences are on
average approximately 20 percent longer than Fernandes's sentence,
it might appear that Fernandes received a 20 percent discount as a
consequence of his guilty plea. However, another defendant, Jos6
Valente, was convicted of one murder following a trial, and without
the benefit of either superior orders or a guilty plea, received a
sentence of twelve-and-one-half years' imprisonment,324 only six
intent to commit murder was called into question, the Panel reversed its decision to accept the
guilty plea and proceeded to trial. Id. at 17-18.
322. Prosecutor v. Fernandes, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Case No.
01/00 C. G. 2000, Judgment, 20(b) (Jan. 25, 2001).
323. Id. 20 and Verdict. Fernandes was charged only with murder because financial
constraints forced prosecutors to charge early Special Panels defendants with domestic crimes
under the less demanding Indonesian criminal code, rather than with international crimes. See
Linton, supra note 276, at 215; Suzannah Linton, Correspondents' Reports, in Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 471, 481 (2000) (noting that the decision to charge domestic crimes was a
"pragmatic" one given the "inadequate resources and the immensity of the task of proving
international crimes" and further noting that because suspects could not be detained indefinitely
pending investigation of international crimes, "[tihe only other acceptable option would have
been to release the suspects.").
324. Valente, supra note 321, at 11-12. Valente did admit "some facts before the Court and
freely cooperated with the Public Prosecutor about his involvement in becoming a member of
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months longer than the sentence imposed on Fernandes. Further,
Joseph Leki was convicted of committing four murders-three more
than Fernandes-and with superior orders as a mitigating factor, Leki
received a sentence of thirteen years' imprisonment, 325 just one year
longer than Fernandes's sentence. Thus, after comparing these
sentences, it is not clear whether Fernandes received any discount for
his guilty plea.
The Special Panels conducted its first multi-defendant trial in
the Los Palos case, and the sentences imposed on the ten Los Palos
defendants similarly fail to reveal the quantum of discount, if any,
that the Special Panels bestowed on defendants pleading guilty. Nine
of the Los Palos defendants were members of the Team Alfa militia,
while the tenth, Joni Marques, was one of Team Alfa's commanders.
The Los Palos indictment charged Joni Marques with seven counts,
and in his opening statement, Marques attempted to plead guilty to
three of the counts, 326 though he had not negotiated with the
prosecution for any sentencing concessions in exchange for his guilty
pleas.327 The Panel declined to accept two of the attempted guilty
pleas, because Marques's admissions did not precisely match the
charges, 328 but it did accept the third, which related to the murders of
nine clergy members and journalists. 329 In its sentencing, the Panel
stated that it considered as a mitigating factor Marques's guilty
plea,330 but the Panel's judgment gives little indication of what benefit,
if any, Marques received for that guilty plea.
The Panel determined that Marques was "in charge" of the
operation to kill the clergy and journalists. While the Panel
Team RatihiPanah." Id. at 11. But the same could be said of most of the defendants discussed
thus far.
325. Prosecutor v. Leki, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No.
05/2000, Judgment, 11-12 (June 11, 2001).
326. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, "Los PALOS" CASE TRIAL NOTES 4 (Sept. 9,
2001) (on file with author). Marques also admitted to participating in the crimes described in the
remaining counts, but, with respect to those crimes, he challenged various aspects of the
prosecution's case. Id.; Prosecutor v. Marques, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious
Crimes, Case No. 09/2000, 43-63 (Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Marques].
327. Telephone interview with Stuart Alford, former prosecutor, Special Panels for Serious
Crimes (Feb. 17, 2005).
328. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, "LOS PALOS" CASE TRIAL NOTES 6 (Sept. 9,
2001) (on file with author).
329. Marques, supra note 326, 70. Marques's admissions even with respect to that count
did not precisely match the prosecution's allegations because Marques denied that he was the
commander of Team Alfa. Id. 67. The Panel apparently considered the charges and the
admissions a close-enough fit, however, and it made its own finding that, despite his
protestations to the contrary, Marques was in fact a commander. Id. 921.
330. Id. 1069. The Panels also considered as a mitigating factor the inculpatory statements
that Marques made that did not rise to the level of a guilty plea. Id. 1055.
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acknowledged that the plan itself was drafted by Indonesian officers,
it considered the fact that Marques supervised the plan's
implementation to be an aggravating factor. 331 The Panel sentenced
Marques to nineteen years' imprisonment for this count, 332 which is
the same sentence that the Panel imposed on two of Marques's co-
defendants, neither of whom had a leadership role in the operation.
333
The mitigating effect of Marques's guilty plea, then, seems to have
been to negate the aggravating effect of his supervisory role in the
killing operation; however, it is not clear what the aggravating effect
would have been since a comparison of the sentences that the Panel
imposed on Marques and his co-defendants on the other counts is not
very illuminating. Marques, for instance, was convicted on another
count of ordering a murder, while co-defendant Jodo da Costa was
convicted of physically assisting in that murder. The Panel considered
as an aggravating factor Marques's supervisory role, and he received a
nineteen year sentence, while da Costa, who was not considered a
supervisor, received a seventeen year sentence. 334 The comparison is
not particularly useful, however, because the two defendants were
involved in the murder in very different ways and because the Panel
also considered da Costa "one of the leaders in arresting the victim,"
so da Costa's sentence, like Marques's, may also have been enhanced
to some degree as a result of his leadership role in the arrest.
A possibly more useful comparison can be made from the
sentences that the Los Palos Panel imposed on a count involving the
expulsion of civilians and the destruction of villages. The Panel
determined that although there was insufficient evidence to prove that
Marques had burned any houses himself, Marques was present when
expulsions and house-burnings took place, and his presence was that
of a commander. 33 5 The Panel considered his supervisory position as
an aggravating factor and sentenced him to seven years'
imprisonment. The Panel went on to find that co-defendant Paolo da
Costa himself burned houses and expelled villagers, but it found that
he did so pursuant to the superior orders of Joni Marques. In
sentencing Paolo da Costa, then, the Panel not only did not find any
aggravating factors with respect to a leadership role, but considered as
a mitigating factor the superior orders under which Paolo da Costa
331. Id. 7 1068.
332. Id. 7 1071.
333. Id. 1077, 1084. The Panel imposed 18 year sentences on three other co-defendants.
Id. I 1091, 1098, 1113. It imposed a 17 year sentence on a final co-defendant. Id. 7 1106.
334. Id. IT 1012-23.
335. Id. 796.
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committed the crime. 336 Yet, the Panel sentenced da Costa to six
years' imprisonment, 337 a term only one year shorter than the term it
imposed on Marques. Again, the facts underlying the two convictions
are by no means identical, but the sentences do suggest that
Marques's supervisory role did not earn him a significant sentence
increase. To the extent, then, that Marques's guilty plea for the
killing of the clergy and journalists merely negated the sentence
increase that the Panel imposed for his supervisory role, one can
surmise that Marques's guilty plea benefited him little.
B. Enhancing the Influence of Sentencing Discounts: The Role of
Defense Counsel
Although most Special Panels defendants would have pled
guilty without the lure of sentencing concessions, those concessions
ended up playing an influential role in determining how many
defendants, and which ones, pled guilty during the last few years of
the Special Panels' existence. Later Special Panels defendants
themselves remained as uninfluenced by sentencing discounts as their
earlier counterparts, but because funding increased for defense
counsel as time went on, later defense counsel were more numerous
and better able to make efforts to advance their clients' interests. In
later Special Panels' cases, then, defense counsel routinely insisted
that their clients receive sentence discounts if they were to plead
guilty. As a result of this insistence, plea negotiations became
commonplace during the later years of the Special Panels, and
prosecutors were forced to offer defendants sentencing concessions if
they wanted to procure guilty pleas.
Not every defense counsel engaged in bargaining. Indeed,
some routinely advised their clients not to plead guilty despite the
potential for a sentence reduction. Some defense counsel hailing from
civil-law countries, for instance, were relatively unfamiliar with plea
bargaining and were opposed in principle to the practice. Other
defense counsel, like many ICTR defense counsel, declined to bargain
with the prosecution because they believed their clients to be innocent
and could not in good faith encourage them to plead guilty to crimes
they did not commit. Defense counsel frequently described Special
Panels' investigations as one-sided and based on insufficient




evidence. 338 One defense counsel went so far as to opine that 85 to 90
percent of the Special Panels' convictions would be acquittals in any
other jurisdiction.3 39 That belief notwithstanding, the fact remained
that the Special Panels convicted eighty-four out of eighty-seven
defendants. 340  Although those dismal statistics motivated some
defense counsel to strongly encourage their clients to plead guilty so
long as the prosecution offered reasonable concessions, others felt
uncomfortable participating in a process that, in their minds,
perpetuated an injustice. The fact that most Special Panels
defendants had no ability to understand the nature of the crimes-
against-humanity charges to which they would have been pleading
guilty raised additional concerns for some defense counsel. 341
When bargaining did take place, it centered on the sentence
that the prosecution would ask the Panel to impose. Although
prosecutors initially had little need to offer incentives to expedite
proceedings, by the spring of 2003, the UN had made plans to end its
mission in East Timor in May 2004. The lifespan of the mission was
extended for an additional year,342 but by August 2003, the
prosecutorial arm of the Special Panels had already begun
downsizing. 343 The realization that the Special Panels would close its
doors in a short time without having completed its work 344 motivated
prosecutors to make substantial efforts to obtain guilty pleas.
Prosecutors began promising to recommend specific sentences to the
Special Panels in exchange for defendants' guilty pleas, and the
338. See Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Defense Counsel, Special Panels for
Serious Crimes (July 30, 2004); Email interview with Sebastian Appenah, Defense
Researcher/Lawyer, Special Panels Defence Lawyers Unit (Dec. 6, 2004).
339. Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Defense Counsel, Special Panels for Serious
Crimes (July 30, 2004).
340. Information Release, Serious Crimes Unit, Special Panels Acquits Aparacio Guterres
(Feb. 16, 2005). The Special Panels acquitted four defendants, but one acquittal was reversed on
appeal. See Information Release, Serious Crimes Unit, Special Panels Trial Ends with an East
Timorese TNI Soldier Being Acquitted of Crimes Against Humanity (Dec. 8, 2003) (reporting on
the acquittal of Paulino de Jesus); Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court of Appeal
Overturns Decision of Acquittal of the SPSC, in JUSTICE UPDATE 11/2004 (Nov. 4-9, 2004)
(reporting on the appellate reversal of the acquittal).
341. Telephone interview with Sylvia de Bertodano, former Defense Counsel, Special Panels
for Serious Crimes (Dec. 2, 2004).
342. S.C. Res. 1573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1573 (Nov. 16, 2004).
343. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, THE FUTURE OF THE SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT:
JSMP ISSUE REPORT 5-8 (Jan. 2004); see also Amnesty International, Indonesia and Timor Leste:
International Responsibility for Justice, AI INDEX: ASA 03/01/2003 (Apr. 14, 2003).
344. See JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE, supra note 279, § 1 (asserting that the Special Panel's
"chances of completing its task... are extremely remote."); Sylvia de Bertodano, Have Some
Faith in Iraqi Justice, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 20, 2004, at 7 ("It is highly unlikely that all
trials, let alone all appeals, will be completed before the funds run out.").
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Special Panels apparently never imposed a sentence longer than that
recommended by the prosecution. 45 Indeed, as I will briefly describe
below, one Special Panel tried to construct a sentencing framework
that would encourage defendants to plead guilty, but its efforts may
have been for naught.
In the Agustinho Atolan case, a Special Panel set forth a
specific and generous sentencing discount to bestow on defendants
who pled guilty. Agustinho Atolan pled guilty to one count of murder
as a crime against humanity, and the defense and prosecution agreed
to recommend a seven year prison sentence. After surveying
analogous past cases, the Panel concluded that the Special Panels'
practice had been to sentence defendants convicted of one murder
following a trial to a term of imprisonment of between twelve and
sixteen years.3 46 The Panel went on to praise defendants who, "being
regretful, [choose] a procedural option which spares time and
resources of the Court," and it asserted that if such defendants were to
receive an appropriate "advantage" in exchange for their guilty plea,
then their sentences should be halved. To support the need for a
substantial discount, the Panel observed: "A less drastic approach
proved to be useless: after the first decision of the Special Panel, in the
Jodo Fernandes case, where the Court took a less lenient decision,
more than one year elapsed before a second guilty plea was
submitted."347  Consequently, after concluding that it would have
sentenced Atolan to a term of fourteen years' imprisonment had the
case proceeded to trial, the Panel sentenced him to a term of seven
years' imprisonment, 348 the exact sentence recommended by the
prosecution.
Six months later another Panel adhered to the framework
articulated in Atolan in the Martins & Gon~alves case. There,
Anastacio Martins pled guilty and was convicted of murder as a crime
against humanity for the killing of three people, while his co-
defendant, Domingos Gongalves, proceeded to trial and was also
convicted of murder as a crime against humanity for the killing of
three people and of deportation as a crime against humanity. Cutting
and pasting several paragraphs from the Atolan judgment, the Panel
345. Telephone interview with Essa Faal, former Chief of Prosecutions, Special Panels for
Serious Crimes, (Nov. 16, 2004).
346. Prosecutor v. Atolan, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No.
3/2003, Judgment, 6 (June 9, 2003). Without further explanation, the Panel asserted that the
sentences imposed on three defendants that had fallen outside this range were justified by
"specific reasons." Id. at 7.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 8.
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held that a guilty plea should normally result in a 50 percent
reduction in sentence. 349 The Panel then determined that had Martins
proceeded to trial, a single brutal murder of the sort he committed
would have warranted a sentence of sixteen years' imprisonment, and
that his three murders would have resulted in a twenty-three year
sentence. Discounting the sentence by half, then, on the basis of his
guilty plea, the Panel sentenced Martins to eleven-and-one-half years'
imprisonment, which was within the eight-to-twelve year range
recommended by the prosecution. 350 Gonqalves did not plead guilty, so
he was in line to receive a twenty-three year sentence for the three
murders he committed and an additional year of imprisonment for the
deportation count. Although Gonqalves did not receive any discount
for a guilty plea, the Panel did consider, in mitigation, his low rank
and the substantial current difficulties that he and his family faced.
351
In light of these mitigating factors, the Panel sentenced Gongalves to
fifteen years' imprisonment.
352
Despite the potential benefits of a clear rule, the sentencing
framework articulated in Atolan and Martins & Gonqalves has not
been followed. Indeed, a Special Panel composed of two of the same
three judges who decided Atolan subsequently imposed a number of
lenient sentences following trials that undercut efforts to procure
guilty pleas. One month after the Martins & Gonqalves decision, for
instance, this Panel convicted Damiao da Costa Nunes of two counts of
murder as crimes against humanity, and one count of persecution as a
crime against humanity. Pursuant to the framework set forth in
Atolan and Martins & Gonqalves, da Costa Nunes should have
received a sentence of more than fourteen years' and less than twenty-
three years' imprisonment. Instead, the Panel made no mention of the
Atolan and Martins & Gonqalves sentencing framework, and despite
concluding that there existed no mitigating factors,353 it sentenced him
349. Prosecutor v. Martins, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No.
11/2001, Judgment, 17 (Nov. 13, 2003).
350. Id. at 18.
351. Id. The Panel noted for instance, that Gongalves is unemployed, that he "has lost a leg,
cut by his own wife, his wife is mad; his children are young and his mother is very old." Id.
352. Id. at 19.
353. Prosecutor v. da Costa Nunes, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes,
Case No. 1/2003, Judgment, 65-76 (Dec. 10, 2003).
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to a mere ten-and-one-half years' imprisonment. 35 4  That Panel's
sentencing in subsequent cases was similar.
355
The fact that the guilty-plea rate at the Special Panels was as
high as 50 percent, despite the Special Panels' somewhat arbitrary
sentencing practices, acts as additional confirmation that sentencing
discounts did not motivate the guilty-plea decisions of Special Panels
defendants. That is, the uncertainty inherent in the Special Panels'
sentencing would have deterred a substantial proportion of defendants
from pleading guilty if the defendants' primary goal had been to
receive a sentence reduction. ICTY defendants stopped pleading
guilty, for instance, as soon as Trial Chambers started imposing
sentences longer than those recommended by the prosecution. Since
other factors were more influential to the guilty-plea decisions of
Special Panels defendants, the Panels' arbitrary sentencing practices
had a much more limited deterrent effect. 35 6
In sum, sentence concessions appeared on the surface to play
much the same role at the Special Panels that they do at the ICTY or
in national criminal justice systems since Special Panels defendants
who were offered reasonable discounts in exchange for their guilty
pleas were much more likely to enter guilty pleas than defendants
who were not. Below the surface, however, the picture is very
different; at the ICTY and in national criminal justice systems, it is
the defendant's ardent desire to reduce his incarceration time that
inspires his counsel to insist on concessions from the prosecutor.
354. Id. at 20. Judge Blunk, the judge who had not participated in Atolan dissented to the
sentence, asserting that it failed to meet the goals of deterrence, retribution, reconciliation, and
reprobation. Id. at 22 (Blunk, J., dissenting).
355. For instance, a Panel composed of the same members convicted Umbertus Ena after a
trial of murder and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity for the killing of two
independence supporters and an assault on a third. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY GENERAL
PROSECUTOR FOR SERIOUS CRIMES TIMOR LESTE, SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT UPDATE 9 (Apr. 30,
2004). Again, pursuant to the sentencing framework articulated in Atolan and Martins &
Gongalves, Ena should have received a sentence of more than fourteen years' imprisonment and
less than twenty-three years' imprisonment, but the Panel sentenced him to an eleven-year term.
The Panel also convicted Marcelino Soares after a trial of one count of murder as a crime against
humanity, one count of torture as a crime against humanity, and one count of persecution as a
crime against humanity for killing one independence supporter and severely beating two others.
After determining that not only did the defendant fail to express regret but that he "appeared
pleased with himself, when the victims of his torture testified to his savage cruelty, and showed
the severe wounds inflicted by him," the Panel sentenced him to eleven years' imprisonment.
Prosecutor v. Soares, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 11/2003,
Judgment, Disposition, 12-14 (Dec. 11, 2003).
356. However, the Panels' arbitrary sentencing did act to deter some defense counsel who
were already slightly uneasy about plea bargaining from advising their clients to plead guilty.
One counsel who expressed discomfort with plea bargaining, for instance, opined that, given the
Special Panels' seemingly random sentencing practices, one could never be certain that a
defendant would actually gain anything from pleading guilty.
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Although Special Panels defendants may likewise desire to reduce
their terms of imprisonment, that desire is not the key factor
prompting them to plead guilty. Instead, a variety of cultural and
socio-economic factors coalesce to motivate Special Panels defendants
to confess even if they do not receive any sentencing benefit for doing
so. The influence of sentence discounts at the Special Panels, then,
held sway not primarily over Special Panels defendants but rather
over their counsel.
VI. CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining can be practiced in any number of ways, and
different forms of plea bargaining are more prevalent in some
jurisdictions than in others. Charge bargaining is most prevalent in
American jurisdictions where prosecutors exercise broad discretion
over charging decisions that largely define the limits of criminal
punishment. Sentence bargaining will be practiced alternatively or
additionally in American jurisdictions where judges virtually always
sentence in accordance with prosecutorial recommendations.
Bargaining between prosecution and defense tends to be less overt in
England and Australia. Although charge bargaining does occur,
357
implicit bargaining-the least obvious form of plea bargaining-is
probably most prevalent in those countries. 358 Both charge bargaining
and sentence bargaining, wherever practiced, can concern not only the
defendant's guilty plea but other issues as well. In exchange for
charging or sentencing concessions, the prosecution might require the
defendant to provide information about the crimes of other
357. See generally SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 441-68 (describing charge bargaining
in England); Richard Read, Plea Negotiation and the Role of the Prosecution in Victoria, 6 J. JUD.
ADMIN. 25 (1996) (discussing charge bargaining in some jurisdictions of Australia).
358. On implicit bargaining in Australia, see Willis, supra note 2. On implicit bargaining in
the United Kingdom, see SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 398; R. v. March [2002] EWCA
(Crim) 551, 2002 Crim.App. R(S) 98 (Eng.); Du Plooy v. H.M. Advocate, High Court of Justiciary,
[2003] S.L.T. 1237, 2003 WL 22257793 (Scot.). As Penny Darbyshire writes:
Plea bargaining in England and Wales cannot be directly likened to negotiating in the
United States, because we lack certain elements common in US legal systems: our
prosecutors do not make sentence recommendations; most of our offences do not carry
minimum sentences; our judges are not supposed to indicate the sentences they are
minded to impose. In England, then, we tend to speak of plea bargaining as the
exchange of a guilty plea for a reduced charge or some hope of a reduced sentence.
The last can be induced without involvement of the prosecutor, or any explicit
bargain. This is called 'implicit bargaining.'
Darbyshire, supra note 2, at 897.
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defendants, for instance, or to waive his right to appeal 359 or his right
to receive exculpatory evidence collected by the prosecution.
360
Although plea bargaining can take many forms and result in
many different sorts of agreements, the force driving all of them is the
defendant's desire for a sentence reduction. Although a small
percentage of defendants charged with domestic crimes will plead
guilty without concern for sentencing concessions because the
evidence against them is so compelling, 361 domestic defendants in the
main agree to self-convict because they expect to receive shorter
sentences. Indeed, the fact that sentence discounts motivate domestic
defendants to plead guilty virtually goes without saying in the plea-
bargaining literature. It is simply understood that defendants
prosecuted in Western criminal justice systems seek to minimize their
incarceration time. While reducing the length of their sentence may
not be their sole concern, it is so significant a concern that an offer of a
sentence reduction will be a persuasive inducement in virtually every
case. That inducement will prove all the more compelling to
defendants who are in fact guilty of the crimes for which they have
been charged and who are confronted with substantial evidence of that
guilt. But reports indicate that even some innocent defendants
likewise plead guilty to avoid the risk of a longer sentence imposed
upon conviction after a trial.
362
359. Most plea agreements at the ICTY and the Special Panels, for instance, require
defendants to waive their right to appeal their sentence if they are sentenced within the range
agreed upon in the plea agreement. See, e.g., Momir Nikoh6 Plea Agreement, supra note 73, 14;
Obrenovi6 Plea Agreement, supra note 73, 14; Telephone interview with Essa Faal, Chief of
Prosecutions, Special Panels for Serious Crimes (July 30, 2004).
360. See, e.g., Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea
Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1999) (discussing
the practice of waiving discovery rights in plea bargain contracts); Shane M. Cahill, Note, United
States v. Ruiz: Are Plea Agreements Conditioned on Brady Waivers Unconstitutional?, 32
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1 (2002) (examining the constitutionality of plea agreements
conditioned on the defendant's willingness to waive his right to receive impeachment evidence).
Proposed amendments to the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would put an
end to bargaining over the defendant's right to receive exculpatory evidence because they would
require federal prosecutors to disclose all exculpatory evidence fourteen days before a guilty plea
is entered. Robert W. Tarun et al., Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information
Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 95 (2004).
361. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 657
(1981) (observing that some defendants plead guilty because they "sense no chance of victory at
trial"); Weninger, supra note 3, at 293.
362. MICHAEL ZANDER & PAUL HENDERSON, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CROWN COURT STUDY 139 (1993); John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and
Plea Negotiation in England, 13 LAW & Socy REV. 287, 298 (1979) (reporting that "innocent
persons are frequently placed at risk and that, on occasion, the weaker and less knowledgeable
are wrongly persuaded to plead guilty.").
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The relatively straightforward relationship between sentencing
discounts and guilty pleas just described does not exist in the context
of international crimes. Although some international defendants rely
on sentence-based calculations when deciding whether or not to plead
guilty, for a substantial proportion of international defendants
currently in the dock, sentence inducements have only limited
persuasive value. The reasons for their lack of influence vary with the
circumstances. High-level ICTR defendants, for instance, are so
convinced of their innocence, so ideologically committed to their
characterization of the Rwandan conflict, and so concerned about their
place in the history books that virtually no sentence inducement will
persuade them to plead guilty to genocide. Low-level Special Panels
defendants, by contrast, are so ignorant about their legal rights and so
culturally disposed to admitting wrongdoing and seeking
reconciliation that, absent the constraining hand of counsel, no
sentence inducement is needed to persuade them to plead guilty.
Prosecutors who seek to procure guilty pleas from current or future
defendants brought before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the
Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia, or the International Criminal
Court will no doubt be confronted with a different array of factors that
will impact the influence of sentencing discounts over those
defendants.
This discussion elides the question of whether prosecutors
should be seeking guilty pleas for international crimes. There is no
question that plea bargaining constitutes one of the most disreputable
features of the American criminal justice system.363 American charge
bargaining frequently distorts the historical record of proceedings,
364
363. See Combs, supra note 36, at 4-5 n.13 (collecting critical sources). Plea bargaining is
none too popular in other countries either. See Kathy Mack & Sharyn Roach Anleu, Sentence
Discount for a Guilty Plea: Time for a New Look, 1 FLINDERS J. L. REFORM 123, 124 (1997) ("It is
our conclusion that the sentence discount for a guilty plea as it currently operates in Australia is
wrong in principle and in practice and should not be supported."); Kathy Mack & Sharyn Roach
Anleu, Choice, Consent and Autonomy in a Guilty Plea System, 17 L. CONTEXT 75, 75-76 (1999)
(suggesting reform of the Australian plea-bargaining system to take account of defendants'
diverse social identities); Willis, supra note 2, at 72 (recounting various criticisms of Australian
plea bargaining); Murder Sentence Changes Unveiled, BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004 (criticizing
British plan to reduce a defendant's sentence by up to a third, following a guilty plea); Lincoln
Archer, "We Feel We've Been Robbed," BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004 (same).
364. Some prosecutors systematically over-charge defendants so as to be able to withdraw
charges during the bargaining process. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 89 (1968) (describing prosecutors who "charge robbery when
they should charge larceny from the person, [who] charge grand theft when they should charge
petty theft, [who] charge assault with intent to commit murder when they should charge some
form of battery...") [hereinafter Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining];
Ruttenberg, supra note 38, at 325-26 (The prosecutor "may charge the defendant in the original
indictment with a crime or crimes that he knows he cannot prove, and then, 'bargain' down to
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and any sort of plea bargaining can encourage prosecutors and defense
attorneys to misrepresent facts and to bring frivolous motions to
obtain a better plea.365 Moreover, as a result of the way in which most
appointed counsel are compensated in the United States, plea
bargaining gives rise to conflicts of interest whereby defense counsel
have strong incentives to pressure their clients to plead guilty,
regardless of whether it is in their best interests to do so. 366 Many of
the charges for which he has the necessary proof."); Frase, supra note 236, at 621 (noting that
American prosecutors "have an incentive to exaggerate initial charges so as to leave more room
for later plea bargaining concessions"); see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1963-66 (1992) (observing that mandatory
minimum sentencing schemes provide useful bargaining positions for the prosecutor, who may
then obtain a guilty plea for a lesser crime that, in fact, more accurately represents the
defendant's conduct). Other prosecutors issue accurate indictments but withdraw charges in a
way that understates the actual criminal responsibility. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 16 (1978) ("In the plea bargaining that takes the form of charge
bargaining (as opposed to sentence bargaining), the culprit is convicted not for what he did, but
for something less opprobrious."); Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 11, at 1141
(observing that charge bargaining frequently mislabels the conduct that it punishes so that
"[g]uns are 'swallowed' as armed robberies become unarmed robberies; burglaries committed at
night are transformed through prosecutorial wizardry to burglaries during the day; and
defendants solemnly affirm that they have driven the wrong way on one-way streets in towns
without one-way streets").
365. Prosecutors might, for instance, conceal fatal defects in the case, such as that a critical
witness has died, will not testify, or cannot be found. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining, supra note 364, at 65-67; see also William F. McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluffing
and the Case Against Plea-Bargaining, in PLEA BARGAINING 1, 9 (William F. McDonald & James
A. Cramer eds., 1980); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1121, 1149 (1998). Defense attorneys, for their part, frequently demand jury trials when they
have no interest in trying the case before a jury. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining, supra note 364, at 56. They also often file numerous pre-trial motions in an effort to
enhance their own bargaining positions. Id. at 80; see Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the
Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 94 (1976) ("A skilled defense attorney can do much to force the
prosecutor to expend resources in bringing a case to trial.").
366. The conflicts of interest arise because American defense counsel are compensated in
ways that motivate them to dispose of virtually all of their cases through guilty pleas. Retained
defense attorneys typically obtain a flat fee, paid up-front, for their representation. David Lynch,
The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 115, 123 &
n.9 (1994). That fee is always sufficient, and frequently generous, for the work involved in
securing a guilty plea. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1182-84 (1975). But it is often woefully inadequate as compensation for taking a
case to trial. See Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 1988; Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake- Up Call from
the Plea Bargaining Trenches, 19 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 138 (1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 53-54 (1988) (noting
that because retained lawyers are typically paid a flat fee up front, when they take a case to
trial, their "additional hours of effort typically have to be provided free of charge"); Alschuler,
The Defense Attorney's Role, supra at 1181-1206 (describing the retained defense attorneys'
incentive to convince their clients to plead guilty); Gordon van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the
American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 502 (1992) (noting that retained
attorneys "make more money disposing of cases by plea bargain than by trial" and that some
"lawyers complain of 'losing money by going to trial"'); Chad Baruch, Through The Looking
Glass: A Brief Comment on the Short Life and Unhappy Demise of the Singleton Rule, 27 N. KY.
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these abuses also have the potential to wreak havoc in the
international context, and the hue and cry that greeted the sentences
imposed in certain ICTY guilty-plea cases367 suggest a similar level of
public dissatisfaction with plea bargaining in that realm.
The desirability of plea bargaining in the international realm is
not a topic that can be addressed here. 368 Whatever its desirability,
what can be observed is that in a national criminal justice system,
defendants who are not motivated by sentence discounts would spell
the end of efforts to secure guilty pleas because sentence discounts are
the only real inducement that national prosecutors have to offer.
International prosecutors, however, have at their disposal additional
incentives. For some international defendants, the location of
detention can matter more than the length of detention. Likewise,
where there is more than one criminal justice system available to
prosecute the defendant, the question of which one takes the honors
can be of key significance. Bargaining over these issues may be more
easily conducted outside the public glare, thereby benefiting
prosecutors accustomed to public rebuke for their lenient sentence
L. REV. 841, 850 (2000) (noting that court appointed defense attorneys and those paid a flat fee
who proceed to trial "takefl the risk of earning as little as one or two dollars per hour."); Jerome
H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RES. 52, 61 (1967) (noting
the economic advantage that can accrue to the private attorney who pleads her client guilty).
Lawyers who are appointed to represent indigent defendants have similarly compelling
incentives to convince their clients to plead guilty. Appointed counsel are typically paid either a
flat fee or an hourly rate with a ceiling. Whichever form the compensation takes, the amounts
are embarrassingly low. Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are
Special Solutions Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 290 (1997-1998) ("[I1n criminal defense work,
flat fees are common for lawyers representing indigent defendants, and the rates are
outrageously low, especially in death penalty cases."). Appointed defense attorneys in New York
County, New York, for instance, are paid "$40 per hour for in-court work and $25 per hour for
out-of-court work, with caps of $1,200 for felony cases and $800 for misdemeanor cases." Terry
Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras, Local Bars Fight to Hike Counsel Rates, 17 CRIM. JUST. 42, 42
(2002). Because the compensation caps are almost always the same regardless of whether the
defendant pleads guilty or goes to trial, appointed defense counsel have enormous incentives to
dispose of as many cases as possible by guilty plea. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,
supra note 1, at 1989; Bruce W. Neckers, Michigan's System of Compensation for Criminal
Defense of the Indigent is Inadequate, 81 MICH. BAR J. 8 (Jan. 2002) ('Those serving indigent
defendants in counties with flat rates, or 'fee schedules,' are faced with a disturbing disincentive
to serve their clients well because in most cases the lawyer receives a maximum amount for the
type of service rendered despite the time it takes to render the service.").
367. See supra note 137.
368. I will briefly note, however, that international criminal prosecutions labor under
pressures unknown to domestic criminal courts. The Special Panels closed its doors in May 2005,
leaving many defendants unprosecuted. Attempts to secure guilty pleas in this context, then,
must be evaluated by entirely different criteria. See NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH FOR
BRIDGING JUSTICE AND TRUTH (forthcoming 2006) (arguing, among other things, that plea
bargaining is justified in the context of international crimes as a means of enhancing the
penological goals that international criminal prosecutions are intended to serve).
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recommendations in guilty-plea cases but creating an additional worry
for those already uneasy about plea bargaining. Whether the offer of
such inducements will or should be the next frontier in international
plea bargaining cannot yet be known. What is currently clear,
however, is that international prosecutors who wish to procure guilty
pleas must be more flexible and more creative in their efforts if they
are to counterbalance the many factors that can deter international
defendants from pleading guilty.

